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Selective Incorporation: Revisited*
JEROLD H. ISRAEL**

INTRODUCTION

In June 1960 Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Ohio ex re. Eaton v.
Price' set forth what came to be the doctrinal foundation of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure revolution. Justice Brennan advocated adoption of
what is now commonly described as the "selective incorporation" theory of the
fourteenth amendment. That theory, simply put, holds that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause fully incorporates all of those guarantees of
the Bill of Rights deemed to be fundamental and thereby makes those guarantees applicable to the states. During the decade that followed Ohio ex re. Eaton v. Price, the Court found incorporated within the fourteenth amendment
all but a few of the thirteen Bill of Rights guarantees that relate to the criminal
justice process. 2 For many observers, these selective incorporation rulings3
were the Warren Court's primary achievement in the criminal justice field.
Measured by the number of prosecutions affected, the selective incorporation
rulings had a monumental impact; in a single decade those rulings expanded
the reach of constitutional regulation of criminal procedure many times beyond that which had been attained 4 through all of the Court's constitutional
rulings over the previous 170 years.
* © Jerold H. Israel, 1982.
** Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.B.A. 1956,

Case Western Reserve University; LL.B. 1959, Yale Law School.
1. 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.). The lower court's judgment in
Eaton was affirmed by an equally divided court. Justice Brennan's separate opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, argued for reversal. The following year, Justice Brennan presented a more complete statement of the selective incorporation doctrine in his dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154-60 (1961). See generally Brennan, The Bill ofRights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1961). Justice Brennan's opinions were not the first to suggest the
selective incorporation doctrine, but they were the first both to articulate it clearly and to advance it as
a preferred position. Justice Black discussed selective incorporation in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-87, 89 (1964), but he preferred adoption of the broader theory of total
incorporation. See infra note 139 (discussing Justice Black's dissent in Adamson). Justice Harlan's
dissent in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), arguably also may be viewed as based on a
selective incorporation theory, but his analysis is ambiguous and the opinion might be urging total
incorporation. See infra note 188 (discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in Hurtado).
2. The thirteen consist of (I) the fourth amendment guarantees relating to searches and seizures; the
fifth amendment guarantees relating to (2) grand jury indictment, (3) double jeopardy, (4) due process,
and (5) self-incrimination; the sixth amendment guarantees relating to (6) a public and speedy trial, (7)
an impartial jury, (8) notice of the nature and cause of the accusation, (9) confrontation of opposing
witnesses, (10) compulsory process, and (11) assistance of counsel; and the eighth amendment prohibitions against (12) excessive bail and fines and (13) cruel and unusual punishment.
3. Every scholarly review of the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions has recognized the
selective incorporation rulings as one of the two or three primary achievements of the criminal procedure revolution. See, e.g., Allen, The JudicialQuestfor PenalJustice: The Warren Court and Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 518, 527; Amsterdam, The Supreme Court andthe Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 794-96 (1970); Israel, CriminalProcedure,The Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Micii. L. REV. 1320, 1329-30 (1977). Indeed, Justice Brennan has
suggested that selective incorporation decisions may be the most "significant" of all the Warren Court
rulings "in preserving and furthering the ideals we have fashioned for our society." Brennan, State
Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492-93 (1977).
4. State prosecutions account for approximately 95% of all felony prosecutions. Y. KAMISAR, W.
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This article reexamines the selective incorporation doctrine from the perspective gained through having observed its application for approximately
twenty years. Selective incorporation has been the subject of considerable
commentary, 5 but little attention has been given to its underlying rationale.
This article explores that rationale and considers the extent to which the decisions of the Burger Court have adopted its basic premises. Although many
have viewed selective incorporation as a doctrine founded merely on a desire
of the Warren Court majority to extend the consiitutionalization of criminal
procedure, several additional value judgments also contributed to the doctrine's adoption. The Burger Court majority has accepted the doctrine without
fully accepting all of those value judgments. The continued application of selective incorporation rests on considerations somewhat different from those
that led to its adoption. This article suggests that the key to the Court's adherence to selective incorporation has been a flexibility in constitutional interpretation that permits consideration of factors that the original supporters of
selective incorporation largely rejected.
To explore this thesis, one must be familiar not only with the selective incorporation theory, but also with the theories that served as its forebearers. Selective incorporation was an outgrowth of two quite different theories dealing
with the relationship between the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of
Rights, both of which had been advanced within the Court for many years
prior to Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price. The ability of selective incorporation to
command majority support during the 1960's best can be understood in light of
the division within the Court that those two theories had spurred. Similarly,
an analysis of the value judgments underlying the selective incorporation doctrine requires an appreciation of the values underlying those antecedent theories. Unfortunately, a review of those prior theories and their treatment by the
Court cannot be as brief today as it would have been in the 1960's, when both
theories were given extensive coverage in almost every course in constitutional
law or criminal procedure. Even those who are already familiar with the terrain may find the review worthwhile, however, as the development of those
theories constitutes one of the more interesting chapters in our constitutional
history.
I. DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE 1960's
Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, Barron v. BaltiLAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (1980). Only the roughest estimates can be
made of the total number of misdemeanor prosecutions. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34
n.4 (1972) (estimate of four to five million misdemeanor cases, exclusive of traffic offenses). The
number of federal misdemeanor prosecutions (including both 18 U.S.C. § 3401 misdemeanors and 18
U.S.C. § 1(3) petty offenses), however, is so low-approximately 100,000 in 1980-that one can safely
say that state prosecutions account for more than 98% of all misdemeanor prosecutions. 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 11, 90-91.
5. There was extensive discussion of the doctrine's rationale and historical basis during the 1960's.
See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill ofRights ds a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965);
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1964); Wiehofen,
Supreme CourtReview ofState CriminalProcedure,10 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 189 (1966); Cushman, Incorporation,Due Process,andthe BillofRights, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 467 (1966). Subsequent articles have
focused on the practical impact of the doctrine. See, for example, the articles cited supra in note 3.
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more6 had firmly established that the Bill of Rights was intended to constrain
only the newly established federal government. Since the language of only a
few of the amendments clearly evinces that intent, 7 it is not altogether surprising that the plaintiff in Barron argued that the other amendments were not so
limited. He maintained that the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation applied to state as well as federal
action. 8 Rejecting that contention, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the question presented was "of great importance, but not of much difficulty." 9 He
noted that the Constitution had been established by the people of the United
States "for their own government and not for the government of the individual
State. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution,
provided such limitations and restrictions in the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated."' 0 In the few instances in which the framers
thought that federal constitutional intervention in a state's treatment of its citizens was necessary, the Constitution explicitly provides that the particular provision applies to the states. Thus, article I, section 10 provides that "[n]o State
shall .... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."" Justice Marshall reasoned: "Had Congress [which
proposed the amendments] engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in
they would have declared this purmatters which concerned themselves alone,
12
pose in plain and intelligible language."'
In framing the fourteenth amendment, the thirty-ninth Congress clearly "engaged in the extraordinary occupation"' 3 described by Justice Marshall in Barron. As in article I, section 10, the language of the amendment explicitly
indicates the goal of "affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments."' 4 What was not so clear was the
extent to which Congress intended to pursue that goal. The meaning of section
one of the fourteenth amendment proved to be especially troublesome. That
section provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
6. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).

7. Those are the first, sixth, and seventh amendments. The first amendment refers to actions of
Congress. The sixth amendment refers to juries selected from the state and district (presumably the
federal judicial district) in which the crime was committed. The seventh amendment speaks of jury
determinations not being reexamined in any "Court of the United States." For a contrary view of the
purpose of the Bill of Rights, see 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1049-82 (1953) (except for first and seventh amendments, Bill of Rights intended to apply to states). But see Fairman, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalLimitations in
State GovernmentalAuthority, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 40 (1953) (attacking Crosskey's methodology and
concluding that Bill of Rights not intended to apply to states).
8. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247.
9. Id
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
12. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 15
Congress obviously intended the first sentence of section one to override the
ruling in Dred Scott v. Sanford.'6 That infamous decision held that a Negro,
because his "ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,"
could not become a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution and
therefore was not entitled to the "privileges and immunities guaranteed by that
instrument to the citizen," including the privilege of suing in a federal court. 17
In granting both national and state citizenship to all persons born in the
United States, the first sentence of section one nullified DredScott and ensured
that both the recently freed and previously freed blacks would thereafter be
"citizens" under the Constitution.
Beyond the granting of citizenship, the precise objective of section one is
more difficult to ascertain. The second sentence indicates an intent to protect
the freed blacks, as well as others,' 8 from abuses of state power. The limitations it sought to impose, however, are couched in terms-such as "equal protection" and "due process"-that are open to varying interpretations. In the
years since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a substantial part of the
Supreme Court's workload has been devoted to defining and redefining those
terms. One of the more difficult issues considered in that process has been the
extent to which the prohibitions of section one encompass the guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights-that is, the extent to which the fourteenth amendment imposes upon the states prohibitions identical or similar to those imposed
upon the federal government by the Bill of Rights. Prior to 1960 two different
positions had been advanced within the Court regarding that issue. The "fundamental fairness" position had consistently won the support of a majority; the
"total incorporation" position had been advanced at different times in dissents.
Not all of the justices supporting either of those positions agreed on its precise
scope. Some might therefore say that actually three or four different positions
had been advanced.' 9 For our purposes, however, it is best to focus on the two
major positions, treating the less substantial divisions as variants of those positions. The total incorporation position is examined first.
15. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
16. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
17. Id. at 403. The Court also declared the Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional, nonwithstanding its conclusion that Scott could not bring suit. Id at 452.

18. Although the "one pervading purpose" of the Reconstruction amendments was to guarantee "the
freedom of the slave race," the protections afforded were not limited to those of "African descent."
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72 (1872). The congressional supporters of the
amendment also were concerned with discriminatory actions that southern states had taken against
white loyalists, and there was discussion of the equity of protecting "all persons, whether citizens or
strangers [ie., aliens]." See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 217-18 (1977).

19. The separate position of Justice Black, as opposed to other supporters of total incorporation,
regarding the scope of the due process clause led to characterization of his position as "total incorporation" and their position as "total incorporation plus." See infra notes 115-18, 162-63 and accompanying
text (discussing views of Justice Black and other Justices supporting total incorporation). The different
approaches of the pre-1930's and post-1930's fundamental fairness rulings might also be characterized
as distinct positions, particularly in light of the different values considered to be protected by the Bill of
Rights. See infra text accompanying notes 180-264 (discussing these fundamental fairness rulings).
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A.

TOTAL INCORPORATION

The total incorporation position holds that the fourteenth amendment incorporates all of the Bill of Rights guarantees and thereby applies those guarantees to state action in the same manner that they are applied to the actions of
the federal government. Total incorporation was first suggested in Justice
Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases,20 the first fourteenth amendment case to come before the Court. It was not advanced in a clear-cut fashion, however, until Justice Field did so in 1892 in his dissent in O'Neil v.
Vermont.2 Although Justice Douglas once counted ten justices who supported
the total incorporation position, others view the correct number as six or
seven.2 2 The important count, in any event, is the number of Justices sitting at
one time who supported the position, and that count never rose above four.
20. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118-19 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice

Bradley argued that the privileges and immunities of citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment included "the right of habeascorpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship,
the right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public
measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and. . . including almost
all of the rest, the right of not being deprivedof lfe, liberty, or property without due process of law," as
well as "still others ... specified in the original constitution, or in the early amendments of it." Id. at
118 (emphasis in original). Whether he meant to include all of the Bill of Rights guarantees is unclear.
His reference to "still others" found in the "early amendments" suggests that he did, but six years later,
in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), he authored an opinion in which he stated that there was
"nothing in the constitution" that would prevent a state from adopting the "civil law and its method of
procedure for one county and the common law and its method for others." Id at 31. Although Justice
Bradley's focus in Lewis was on the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amendment, his
statement raises doubts as to whether he viewed the seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil cases
as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Justice Swayne, who had joined Justice Bradley's
dissent in Slaughter-HouseCases, also joined his opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Lewis.
21. 144 U.S. 323, 360-63 (1892). See infra text accompanying note 83 (quoting from Justice Field's
dissent in O'Neil). The first Justice Harlan, in a separate dissent in which Justice Brewer concurred "in
the main," noted his agreement with Justice Field that the fourteenth amendment protected from state
invasion those "fundamental rights of life, liberty, or property recognized or guaranteed by the constitution," which rights were "principally, enumerated in the earlier Amendments of the Constitution."
144 U.S. at 370-71. As noted by Professor Morrison, although several cases decided between the
Slaughter-House Cases and OWell presented an opportunity for advancement of the total incorporation theory, that theory was not squarely put to the Court by counsel until 1887. Morrison, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 145-47 (1949).
22. Justice Douglas' list is found in his concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
346 (1963). He included Justices Bradley and Swayne dissenting in Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 124; Justice Clifford dissenting in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1876); Justice Field, the
first Justice Harlan, and Justice Brewer dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. at 366; and Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1946).
There is some question as to the position taken by Justices Bradley and Swayne in the Slaughter-House
Cases. See supra note 20 (discussing Justice Bradley's and Justice Swayne's position on total incorporation). Although Justice Clifford joined Justice Field's dissent in Walker v. Sauvinet, which would
have required the states to provide jury trials in civil cases, the argument for total incorporation had not
yet been squarely made, see Morrison, supra note 21, at 145-48, and Justice Clifford was no longer on
the Court when Justice Field dissented in O'Neil. Justice Brewer, although accepting the dissenting
position in O Wel, later abandoned total incorporation in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). Thus,
Professor Landynski suggests the correct number is six: the four dissenters inAdamson (Black, Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge), Justice Field, and the first Justice Harlan. Landynski, Due Process and the
Concept of OrderedLiberty, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 38 (1974). Justice Frankfurter might have counted
one less, including only the first Justice Harlan and the four Adamson dissenters. He noted in
Adamson:
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the constitution and the beginning of the present membership of the Court-a period of seventy years-the scope of that
Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges. Of all these judges, only one, who may
respectfully be called an eccentric exception, indicated the belief that the Fourteenth Amend-
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Thus, total incorporation was always a minority position. It was, however, an
exceptionally influential minority position and significantly contributed to the
Court's eventual adoption of the selective incorporation position.
1. The Rationale of Total Incorporation
Dissenting inAdamson v. Calfornia,23 Justice Black cited the "provisions of
the [fourteenth] amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole," 24 as the
textual basis for total incorporation. Because the privileges and immunities
clause had received a narrow construction in prior cases, and because the
equal protection clause seemed inapplicable, Justice Black's statement was interpreted as advocating that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights occur primarily through the due process clause. 2 5 Justice Frankfurter in his Adamson
26
concurrence immediately challenged this use of the due process language.
Surely, he argued, if the thirty-ninth Congress had intended to make the first
eight amendments applicable to the states, it would not have done so by including a prohibition against the denial of due process. "It would be extraordinarily strange," he stated, "for a Constitution to'27convey such specific
commands in such a round-about and inexplicit way."
Justice Frankfurter's argument appears to be well taken. Inclusion of a sinment was a shorthand summary of the first eight amendments... and that due process incorporated those eight amendments.
332 U.S. at 62. Justice Frankfurter, however, was focusing on the use of the due process clause as a
basis for incorporation, see infra text accompanying note 127, and therefore probably excluded Justice
Field, who relied strictly on the privileges and immunities clause. See Mendelson, JusticeBlack'r Fourteenth Amendment, 53 MINN. L. REv. 711, 721 (1969).
23. 332 U.S. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 100-18 (discussing Justice Black's Adamson dissent).
24. 332 U.S. at 71 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's reliance upon the section as a whole, rather
than upon the privileges and immunities clause alone, may be explained by differences in the classes of
persons covered by the various fourteenth amendment clauses. See infra notes 25 & 33 and accompanying text (discussing that explanation). But see in/ra note 34 (noting contention of commentators that
privileges and immunities clause can be interpreted as protecting all persons, not just citizens of United

States).
25. See Comment, Due Processand the Bill ofRights, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 372, 373 (1948) (Black took
view that fourteenth amendment due process clause makes all guarantees of Bill of Rights binding on
states); Note, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 IOWA L. Rav. 666, 666-67 (1948)
(Black's dissent developed theory that fourteenth amendment due process clause protects from state
abridgement rights protected from federal abridgement by first eight amendments); Comment, Due
Process-Purposeand Scope of the FourteenthAmendment, 21 S. CAL. L. REv. 47, 59 (1947) (Black's
opinion construed due process clause to include all guarantees of Bill of Rights); Haigh, Defning Due
ProcessofLaw: The Case ofMr. JusticeHugo L. Black, 17 S.D.L. REv. 3, 15 (Black advanced incorporation theory of due process). Two other factors also contributed to the view that Justice Black's opin'ion relied substantially upon the due process clause. First, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion,
responding to Justice Black's analysis, focused on the due process clause. 332 U.S. at 61 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); infra note 127 and accompanying text. Second, because Justice Black apparently
viewed total incorporation as protecting aliens and corporations as well as citizens, see Mendelson,
supra note 22, at 715, 721,724-25, it was assumed that coverage could be achieved only through the due
process clause. But see infra note 34 (noting contention of commentators that privileges and immunities
clause can be interpreted as protecting all persons, not just citizens of United States). On the other
hand, the historical material Justice Black cited consists primarily of discussions of the privileges and
immunities clause. See 332 U.S. at 120 (Black, J., dissenting). Also, primary reliance on due process
would have been contrary to the narrow view of due process taken by Justice Black in other cases, See
in/ra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black's view).
26. 332 U.S. at 63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. Id
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gle guarantee, which itself is only one of many guarantees found in the first
eight amendments, hardly indicates a legislative intent to encompass all of the
remaining guarantees as well. In a later opinion, Justice Black responded to
Justice Frankfurter's claim that total incorporation lacked textual support.
Justice Black argued that although the total incorporation theory relied on the
historic purpose of the fourteenth amendment "as a whole," it looked to the
language particularly of the privileges and immunities clause. 28 That clause
had also been emphasized in the opinions of the earlier dissenters supporting
total incorporation, especially Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont.29
The privileges and immunities clause clearly does offer a more satisfactory
textual basis for total incorporation than the due process clause.30 Analyzing
the language without regard to its historical usage, the phrase "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" can readily be construed to include the constitutional guarantees provided United States citizens as protection against the national government. As Justice Black noted, "[W]hat more
precious 'privilege' of American citizenship could there be than the privilege to
claim the protection of our great Bill of Rights?" 3 1 The fourteenth amendment
was designed to provide the citizen with protection against state action; a prohibition against state abridgment of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States" would be an "eminently reasonable way of expressing the
idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States."'32 Reliance on
the privileges and immunities clause presents its own difficulties, however. If
the privileges and immunities clause was intended to make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states, a clause prohibiting a state from depriving any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law would seem extraneous.
The fifth amendment already provides such protection, and if the privileges
and immunities clause includes all of the Bill of Rights guarantees, it encompasses a due process guarantee as well as the other guarantees in the first eight
amendments.
Perhaps the best response to the contention that total incorporation renders
the due process clause superfluous lies in the different classes of persons pro28. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). While emphasizing the
language of the privileges and immunities clause in particular, Justice Black persisted in relying on the
"Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole." Id at 166 n.1 (emphasis in original).
29. 144 U.S. at 337 (Field, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying note 83 (quoting from Justice
Field's dissent in ONeil). Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases also had relied on the
privileges and immunities clause. 83 U.S. at 112 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see supra note 20 (discussing
Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases). Justice Harlan's position was less clear. His
dissent in O'Neil may have relied upon the due process clause as well as upon the privileges and
immunities clause. See 144 U.S. at 370. Furthermore, his dissent in Hurtado relied on due process,
although it is debatable whether that opinion advanced a total incorporation position. 110 U.S. at 538
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see infra note 188 (discussing Justice Harlan's Hurtado dissent); see also Morrison, supra note 21, at 146 (same).
30. Professor Tribe, however, suggests that total incorporation could have emerged either "as an
elaboration of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship" or as "a translation of fourteenth
amendment 'liberty' into the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights, with the understanding that depriving someone of such liberty 'without due process of law' means doing so 'where the federal government could not."' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (1978) (footnote omitted) (citing
Black, UnfinishedBusiness of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 34 (1970)).

31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
32. Id
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tected by the privileges and immunities and due process clauses. 33 In particular, the former clause refers to the protection of citizens, while the latter refers
to "any person," which includes aliens as well as citizens. 34 This response,
however, raises the problem of why the framers of the fourteenth amendment
would have desired to grant such privileges as jury trial and grand jury indictfederal government, the Bill of
ment only to citizens when, with respect to 3the
5
Rights made them available to all persons.
Supporters of total incorporation suggest that any deficiencies in the textual
support for their position are more than offset by a historical record that
clearly shows the framers' intent to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. They interpret that record as showing that the congressional supporters
33. One way in which the clauses differ is in their treatment of corporations. Corporations fall
outside the protection of the privileges and immunities clause, Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204
U.S. 359, 363 (1907), but within the reference to "persons" protected by the due process and equal
protection clauses, Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
34. Professor Ely has argued that the privileges and immunities clause need not be interpreted as
protecting only citizens:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" could mean that only citizens are protected in their privileges or
immunities, but it surely doesn't have to. It could just as easily mean there is a set of entitlements, "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States," which states are not to
deny to anyone. In other words, the reference to citizens may define the class of rights rather
than limit the class of beneficiaries. Since everyone seems to agree that such a construction
would better reflect what we know of the purpose, and since it is one the language will bear
comfortably, it is hard to imagine why it shouldn't be followed.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 25 (1980) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Professor Ely
starts from the premise that there was "no conscious intention to limit the protection of the clause to
citizens." Id The amendments supporters, however, distinguished between the protection of citizens
through the privileges and immunities clause and the protection of all persons, including aliens,
through the due process and equal protection clauses. See R. BERGER, supra note 18, at 217-20; see also
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1865-66) (statement of Sen. Howard). Professor Yarborough suggests that Justice Black may have shared Professor Ely's view, at least in part:
A reading of the debates on the fourteenth amendment's adoption reveals that its sponsors
included within the [privileges and immunities] clause's meaning certain rights (e.g., those of
the Bill of Rights) which historically had applied to all persons, as well as other rights applicable to citizens alone. Justice Black apparently recognized and accepted this anomaly. He
agreed, for example, that the safeguards of the Bill of Rights extended, via the fourteenth
amendment, to all persons in state cases. However, in conference discussion of Edwards v.
California [see infra note 41], he indicated that the right of interstate travel was a fourteenth
amendment privilege of national citizenship which extended its protection only to citizens, not
aliens.
Yarborough, Justice Black, The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation,30 U. MIAMI L. RaV. 231,
270 (1976). Professor Mendelson views Justice Black's opinion inAdamson as a result-oriented attempt
to "homogenize" the two clauses. Mendelson, supra note 22, at 715. He argues that Justice Black "borrow[ed] the privileges and immunities language as a reference to the Bill of Rights from one [clause]
and the word 'persons' to get the desired coverage from another" and thereby "create[d] a new constitutional provision." Id
35. See Fairman, Does the FourthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 59
(1949). Professor Fairman notes that "[a]s a matter of formal analysis then [accepting arguendo total
incorporation], one might attribute to the [Joint House and Senate] Committee a design to give the
citizen the protection of the entire Bill of Rights, and then consciously duplicating in part, to extend to
aliens, or to corporations, or to both, a particular one of the several guarantees of Amendments I to
VIII. Such a view would, however, be quite unrealistic." Id See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 280-81 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that freedom of speech must be "absorbed" by
the due process clause rather than by the privileges and immunities clause in order to protect both
aliens and corporations).
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of the fourteenth amendment were dissatisfied with state protection of individual liberties and intended through that amendment "to nationalize civil liberties in the United States."'3 6 In an appendix to his dissenting opinion in
4damson,37 Justice Black set forth various statements made during the congressional debate on the amendment that support this view of the amendment's purpose. 38 Relying especially on the statements of Representative
Bingham, a key draftsman of section one, and of Senator Howard, who
presented the amendment before the Senate, 39 Justice Black concluded that
"with full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and
backers of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the constitutional rule that decision had announced." 40 According to Justice Black, the supporters sought to accomplish this end primarily through the
the Bill of Rights
privileges and immunities clause, which would 4encompass
1
guarantees as well as other fundamental rights.
Critics of this historical analysis argue that it gives far too much weight to
36. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 118 (1948).
37. 332 U.S. at 92-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. Id Other reviews of the historical record favorable to total incorporation include H. FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative
History," andthe ConstitutionalLimits on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Curtis, The Bill
ofRights as a Limitation on State Authority:A Reply to ProfessorBerger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45
(1980); Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982).
39. 332 U.S. at 99-123. Although Justice Black relied primarily on the statements of Bingham and
Howard, he also cited a statement by Representative Stevens, comments by congressional critics of the
proposed amendment, the general concerns reflected in the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and newspaper articles of the time (as canvassed in H. FLACK, supra note 38, at 140-46). See
also Yarborough, supra note 34, at 249-50 (concluding that Justice Black's most significant evidence for
total incorporation was Bingham and Howard's statements in congressional debates).

40. 332 U.S. at 72.
41. Id at 74-75. Although it is unclear exactly how far Justice Black would have carried the privileges and immunities clause under his interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, he clearly would
not have limited it to the Bill of Rights guarantees. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81
(1941) (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring) (recognizing that interstate travel is protected by the
privileges and immunities clause). His later opinions suggest that, apart from the Bill of Rights guarantees, he would have included only rights relating directly to the Slaughter-House view of privileges and
immunities--that is, rights that owe their existence to the federal government, federal constitution, or
federal laws. See infra text accompanying note 69 (discussing Slaughter-House). Senator Howard and
Representative Bingham, on the other hand, apparently took a much broader view of the clause's funcBill ofthat
Rights.
Senator Howard, in the very same speech in
incorporation
of thestated
tion apart
from its total
which
he suggested
incorporation,
the privileges
and immunities clause would encomv. Coryeil,opin6 F.
in Corfield
Washington's
JusticeSeeBushrod
pass
Washington's
53 (quotingopinion
from Justice
infra note
1823)noted
(No. in3230).
Gas. the
546fundamental
(C.C.E.D. Pa.rights
ion).

Based in large part on his opposition to the concept of substantive due process, Justice Black took a
very narrow view of due process. See H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 23-42 (1968); Haigh,

D~fningDue Process: The Caseof Mr. Justice Black, 17 S.D.L. REv. 1, 37 (1972) (Justice Black defined
as judicially
statutesand
Constitution
that is, the
due process as the law
clause as
immunitiesconstrued);
privileges
the valid
To acceptand
text.
163ofanthe land, accompanying

see also infra note
encompassing Corfield would have been to accept the same type of fundamental fairness or "natural
law" view of constitutional rights that Justice Black so firmly opposed in his interpretation of the due
process clause. See Landynski, supra note 22, at 37 (suggesting that Justice Black sought to limit the
fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities to rights relating to national citizenship, although

characterizing this position as not supported by any historical materials); J. ELY, supra note 34, at 28
(taking a similar position).
Certainly, none of the earlier supporters of total incorporation would have subscribed to Black's
limited view of fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities. See Landynsk; supra note 22, at 37-

38 (discussing views of Bradley, Field, the first Harlan, and Swayne); see also infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing views of other Adamson dissenters).
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the statements of only two members of Congress. 42 The critics note that there
is "little evidence that anyone else, either in Congress or among those who
ratified in the states, shared. . .[Bingham and Howard's] view." 43 The critics
stress that section one of the amendment was presented to the Congress and
the ratifying states as designed basically to provide a constitutional foundation
for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 44 That Act declared all persons born in the
United States to be citizens and provided that such citizens, without regard to
race, would have the "same right in every State" to contract, sue, and hold and
inherit property, and to enjoy the "full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property" as were "enjoyed by white
citizens." 45 In seeking to constitutionalize this prohibition against discrimination, the framers might well have relied entirely on the equal protection and
due process clauses. 46 In that case, the privileges and immunities clause would
be construed as merely reinforcing the grant of national citizenship in the
amendment's first sentence by prohibiting state interference with such rights of
national citizenship as already existed, rather than as adding to those rights.47
This construction logically precludes also reading the clause as extending the
Bill of Rights to state proceedings.
Critics of the total incorporation theory acknowledge, however, another possibility that comes closer to Justice Black's position. The framers of the fourteenth amendment may have sought to strengthen the Civil Rights Act by
42. Fairman, supra note 35, is undoubtedly the leading critical analysis of Justice Black's review of
the historical record. Later works building on that article include Fairman, The Supreme Court andthe
ConstitutionalLimita/lonson State Governenal4uthority, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 40 (1953), and Fairman,
4 Reply to ProfessorCrosskey, 22 U. CHI.L. REv. 144 (1954); R. BERGER, supra note 18, at 134-56, and
Berger, Incorporationof the Bill ofRights in the FourteenthAmendment: 4 Nine-Lied Cat, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 435 (1981); and Mykketvedt, Justice Black and the Intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Bill ofRtlgh/s and the States, 20 MERCER L. REv. 432 (1969). Professor Fairman also
has argued that Representative Bingham "did not understand Barronv. Baltimore and therefore did not
understand the question of incorporation." Fairman, supra note 35, at 34-35; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 n.9 (1978) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Fairman).
43. Landynskl, supra note 22, at 37. Others have seen the historical record as considerably more
ambiguous than suggested by Justice Black and his supporters, or by Professor Fairman, supra note 42,
and his supporters. See Kurland, The Ptivileges or Immunities Clause: "1Its Hour Come Round at
Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 407:
The legislative history of this provision of the amendment, in Congress, is otherwise about as
revealing as the legislative history of the equal protection clause. By that I mean that it affords a license to take anything from it that the interpreter wishes to put in it. If recent scholarship on the fourteenth amendment has revealed anything, it has revealed that in this area
truth, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. The primary rules of construction are two:
(1)The language does not mean what it says. (2) The language does not say what it means.
With these tools at hand, the conclusion is readily reached that any clause was intended to
have the broadest effect or that it was intended to have no effect at all.
44. Berger, supra note 42, at 440-41; Mykketvedt, supra note 42, at 438. See generally Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (some members of Congress supported the fourteenth amendment in
order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act as applied to the states).
45. Act of April 19, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
46. While equal protection obviously is aimed at discrimination, the due process clause also can be
viewed, in its historical context, as directed primarily at discrimination. See infra text accompanying
notes 162-63 (discussing Justice Black's reading of the due process clause as basically requiring only a
consistent and fair application of pre-existing law).
47. This basically was the view of the amendment later taken in the Slaughter-House Cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 59-70 (discussing apparent rejection of total incorporation theory by
Court in Slaughter-House Cases).
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extending its protection beyond the prohibition of discrimination to provide
the newly freed citizens not just with pre-existing rights of national citizenship,
but also with those basic rights noted in the Civil Rights Act, and perhaps
others as well, as they traditionally had been enjoyed by white men.4 8 To do
this, the framers quite naturally would have turned to the language found in
article IV of the Constitution, which provides that citizens of each state "shall

be entitled to all privileges and immunities" of the citizens in the several
states.49 In the leading interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on circuit in Coifield v. Coryell, 50 noted that the privileges and immunities language encompassed those
rights that were "fundamental. . . to citizens of all free governments."'5 1 Justice Washington's list of fundamental rights included each of the rights noted
in the Civil Rights Act.5 2 Admittedly, Justice Washington's list of rights was
not exhaustive, and his analysis might readily be extended to include some of
the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, although none were mentioned in his
Coofteld opinion.5 3 But the critics argue that the inclusion of all the Bill of
Rights in the list of fundamental rights was beyond the understanding of the
time.5 4 Evidence that not all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were
viewed as essential to the "security of person or property" 55 is found in the fact
48. Although this view is contrary to the Slaughter-Houseview of the amendment, it finds considerable support in the congressional debates. Fairman, supra note 35, at 9-12, 24-68, 138-39; R. BERGER,
supra note 18, at 29-51.
49. U.S. CotsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
50. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
51. Id at 551.
52. Id at 551-52.

53. Id Justice Washington noted:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We
feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are,
in their nature fundamental: which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold
and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular
privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, 'and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was
manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision
in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union."
Id The Colyfeld opinion was well known and was frequently cited during the congressional debates on
both the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act. See R. BERGER, supra note 18, at 41-44;
Fairman, supra note 35, at 9-12.
54. R. BERGER, supra note 18, at 35-36; Fairman, supra note 35, at 137-39.
55. See supra text accompanying note 45 (quoting from § I of Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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that several were not provided to any citizen-white or black-under the laws
of various states. In particular, a substantial number of states did not provide
citizens with either the fifth amendment right to prosecution by grand jury
indictment or the full scope of the seventh amendment right to jury trials in
civil cases. 56 Indeed, several of those states ratified the amendment without
any indication that they believed that their state law would have to be
changed. 57 In sum, the critics of Justice Black's analysis contend that, even
assuming that the privileges and immunities clause was designed to expand the
privileges of national citizenship, it was not intended to go beyond the standard announced in Coyield, which certainly did not incorporate all of the"Bill
of Rights.
2. Rejection by the Court
Although the total incorporation doctrine was not squarely presented to the
Supreme Court until 1887,58 the doctrine already had been foredoomed by the
earlier ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases,59 the Court's first decision interpreting the fourteenth amendment. Slaughter-Houseinvolved a challenge by a
group of butchers to a Louisiana statute that granted one corporation the exclusive right to operate a slaughterhouse within the city of New Orleans. 60 The
butchers argued that this grant of a monopoly violated their right to carry on a
trade, recognized in Cor6eld as a privilege and immunity of citizenship, and
therefore was contrary to the recently enacted fourteenth amendment. 61 The
Court rejected that claim in a 5-4 decision. 62 The majority relied substantially
on the phrasing of the fourteenth amendment's two references to citizenship.
The first sentence of the amendment refers to both national and state citizenship. The second sentence, on the other hand, refers only to abridgment of the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. The Court concluded
that the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, recognized in Corfield,
obviously were intended to remain within the protection of article IV and of
the states themselves. 63 The fourteenth amendment sought to protect only the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship. 64 The Court noted that this
interpretation was consistent with "the whole theory of the relations of the
state and federal governments to each other. ' 65 On the other hand, adoption of
the plaintiffs' position would make the Court "a perpetual censor upon all leg56. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that at time of
ratification nearly half of ratifying states did not have requirements as rigorous as fifth amendment for

instituting criminal proceedings through grand jury); Fairman, supra note 35, at 84-134 (describing
rights that states provided citizens at time of ratification of fourteenth amendment).
57. Examining the available records of the legislatures that ratified or rejected the amendment, Professor Fairman found only one item-a rejected state legislative report-that evidenced a view that the
amendment might incorporate the Bill of Rights. See Fairman, supra note 35, at 84-134.
58. Morrison, supra note 21, at 147.
59. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
60. Id at 57.
61. Id at 51-55.
62. Id at 83, 111. The butchers also argued unsuccessfully that the monopoly violated the thirteenth
amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 49-

57.
63. Id at 78-79.
64. Id at 75-78.
65. Id at 78.
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islation of the States."' 66 Consistent with its position in Barron, the Court refused to accept an argument that sought dramatically to alter federal-state
of language "which expresses such a purpose too
relations without the support
'67
clearly to admit of doubt.
Because the Slaughter-House majority limited the protected privileges to
those of national citizenship, it was unlikely that the fourteenth amendment
would be construed as requiring the states to recognize the guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights. The Slaughter-Houseopinion cited as examples of privileges
of national citizenship the right to travel from state to state, the claim of protection on the high seas, and the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."'68 The
Court noted that the privileges and immunities of national citizenship were
confined to that class of rights that "owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."' 69 Although the
rights created by the Constitution were included, those rights, under Barron,
applied only to the citizen's dealings with the federal government. Thus, when
the Court cited the "right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress" as a
privilege of national citizenship, it did not suggest thereby that the fourteenth
amendment now required a state to recognize a general right of assembly and
petition similar to that found in the first amendment. Rather, consistent with
the theory of Slaughter-House, peaceably assembling or petitioning would be
protected from state interference only insofar as those activities were aimed at
the federal government. 70 The Slaughter-House majority thus appeared to reject total incorporation, because a state's refusal to recognize a Bill of Rights
guarantee would have no bearing upon national citizenship unless it interfered
with the citizen's exercise of rights relating to the federal government.
The dissents in Slaughter-House are sometimes viewed as more hospitable
than the majority opinion to total incorporation. 7 1 That view, however, is applicable principally to Justice Bradley's dissent, which was not joined by the
other dissenters. Justice Bradley's opinion certainly suggests that he might
have included within the privileges and immunities clause all of the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. 72 Justice Field's dissent, which was joined by the other
dissenters, did not go beyond the position that the fourteenth amendment now
protected those "fundamental" privileges and immunities of citizenship recog66. Id

67. Id
68. Id at 79.
69. Id
70. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (freedom to assemble peaceably to discuss
federal labor enactments is a privilege or immunity of a United States citizen secured against state
abridgment by § I of the fourteenth amendment). But cf. J. ELY, supra note 34, at 196, suggesting that
the Slaughter-House majority's reference to the constitutional rights of citizens could have led to adoption of the total incorporation position. Professor Ely's suggestion seems to ignore the Slaughter-House
majority's assumption that the fourteenth amendment created no new privileges and immunities, but
only prohibited state interference with those that already existed. The privileges that already existed
under the Bill of Rights did not give citizens absolute rights to free speech, jury trial, and so forth, but
simply gave them a right to have the federal government act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way
with respect to those interests.
71. See J. ELY, supra note 34, at 196-97 (suggesting that dissenting Justices clearly accepted the total

incorporation position).
72. See supra note 20 (discussing Justice Bradley's dissent).

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 265 1982-1983

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:253

nized in Co6field.73 This position arguably would not include several of the Bill
of Rights guarantees. 74 In any event, while the attempts of Justices Bradley
and Field to give fourteenth amendment protection to economic rights shortly
thereafter bore fruit in due process decisions, 75 the Slaughter-House majority's
view of the privileges and immunities clause remained the accepted standard
for that provision.
The first case after Slaughter-House in which the Court directly addressed
the total incorporation issue was In re Kemmler, 76 decided in 1890. 77 A unanimous Court, relying on Slaughter-House, reasoned that the privileges and immunities of national citizenship arose out of "the nature and essential
character of the national government" and therefore did not encompass immu78
nity from state imposition of a punishment alleged to be cruel and unusual.
79
A year later, McElvaine v. Brush, another case involving an alleged violation
of the eighth amendment, was decided on the same grounds.80 Four months
later, in OWeil v. Vermont, 8 ' a division appeared within the Court. The
O'Neil majority refused to consider defendant's cruel and unusual punishment
claim because it had not been assigned as error.8 2 Justice Field, a dissenter in
Slaughter-House, treated the claim on its merits and concluded that the privileges and immunities clause was applicable:
While, therefore, the ten Amendments, as limitations on power...
are applicable only to the Federal government and not to the States,
yet, as far as they declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are
rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the
Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, as to all such rights,
no State shall make
places a limit upon state power by ordaining that
83
or enforce any law which shall abridge them.
73. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96-98 (Field, J., dissenting).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57 (CoTfeld standard did not encompass all of Bill of
Rights). Justice Field did, however, specifically adopt a selective incorporation position in later opinions. See infra text accompanying note 83 (quoting from Justice Field's opinion in OWeil P.Vermont).
75. See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 429-34 (tracing Supreme Court's adoption of Justice Field's and
Justice Bradley's view that fourteenth amendment protects economic rights); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& T. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 392-97 (1978) (same).
76. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
77. Three earlier cases had held that particular Bill of Rights guarantees applied only to the federal
government and that the rights recognized therein were not privileges and immunities of national citizenship. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (seventh amendment right to trial by jury); United

States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (first amendment rights to assemble and petition and second
amendment right to bear arms); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (second amendment right to
bear arms). As Professor Morrison notes, however, the "broad proposition that the Fourteenth Amend-

ment incorporates the Bill of Rights as such" was not presented in any of those cases. Morrison, supra
note 21, at 145-47. Similarly, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), held that due process did not
require a grand jury indictment, but the Court did not consider a total incorporation contention based
on the privileges and immunities clause. Justice Harlan's Hurtado dissent might be read as advocating
total incorporation, but it used a due process analysis and did not state precisely what rights would be
included under that analysis. See infra note 188 (discussing Justice Harlan's Hurfado dissent).
78. 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890).
79. 142 U.S. 155 (1891).
80. Id at 159.
81. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).

82. Id at 331.
83. Id at 363.
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Although he cited Slaughter-House,84 Justice Field did not explain how his
position could be reconciled with the narrow view of the privileges and immunities clause taken by the majority in that case. The first Justice Harlan, in a
separate dissent with which Justice Brewer concurred "in the main," 85 expressed his agreement with Justice Field's conclusion that the fourteenth
those rights "enumerated in the earlier
amendment encompassed
86
Amendments."
Although the cruel and unusual punishment cases appeared to have settled
the issue, total incorporation was debated again in Maxwell v. Dow8 7 and
Twining v. New Jersey,8" decided respectively in 1900 and in 1908. The majority opinion in Maxwell considered defendant's incorporation contention at
length, perhaps because a counsel for the first time had cited one of the
speeches in the congressional debate that had advanced the incorporation concept.A9 The majority noted that the cited speech was not sufficient to support
defendant's position. 90 Because a proposed constitutional amendment must be
ratified by state legislators who would be unaware of the congressional debate,
the "safe way is to read [the amendment's] language in connection with the
known condition of affairs out of which the occasion for its adoption may have
arisen, and then to construe it, if there be therein any doubtful expressions, in a
way sp far as is reasonably possible, to forward the known purpose or object
for which the amendment was adopted." 9' An extensive review of past decisions, 92 including five pages devoted to Slaughter-House alone, 93 convinced
the majority that the fourteenth amendment had been properly construed as
not including the various Bill of Rights guarantees among the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship. 94 Justice Harlan dissented, 9 5 although he
apparently recognized the weight of the precedents, as he made no effort to
distinguish Slaughter-House or the other cases cited by the majority.
In Twining the majority again relied upon its prior decisions, 96 and Justice
Harlan again dissented. 97 The majority recognized, however, that the total incorporation position had some merit. "This view," it noted, "has been, at different times, expressed by justices of this court. . . and was undoubtedly that
entertained by some of those who framed the Amendment. It is, however, not
profitable to examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no
84. Id at 361.
85. Id at 371.
86. Id at 370.

87. 176 U.S. 581 (1900). Defendant claimed that the fourteenth amendment had been violated both
by his prosecution without grand jury indictment (a violation of the fifth amendment guarantee) and by
his trial before a jury of eight persons (an alleged violation of the sixth amendment, which was said to
require a jury of twelve). Id at 582.
88. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Defendant claimed that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was protected by the fourteenth amendment and that the privilege had been violated by an instruction to the jurors that they might draw an unfavorable inference from defendant's failure to testify. Id
at 83.
89. Morrison, supra note 21, at 154-55.
90. 176 U.S. at 601.
91. Id at 602.
92. Id at 584-600.
93. Id at 587-91.
94. Id at 597-98.
95. Id at 605-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. 211 U.S. at 90-114.
97. Id at 114-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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longer open in this Court."9 8
No Supreme Court opinion gave the total incorporation theory serious attention for almost forty years following Twining.99 Then, in 1947, the dissenting opinions in Adamson v. Californiat0 0 suddenly resurrected the theory.
Adamson involved a challenge to a California statute that permitted a defendant's failure to testify to be commented upon by the trial court and prosecutor,
and to be considered by the jury.' 0 ' The Court assumed arguendo that, had
this been a federal case, application of the statute would have violated the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 0 2 Previous
cases had held that the due process guarantee of "fundamental fairness" might
bar certain practices that would also be contrary to a particular Bill of Rights
guarantee, 0 3 and defendant argued that those cases should be extended to his
case."°4 He also argued, in the alternative, that the fifth amendment privilege
was applicable to state proceedings under the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 0 5 Although one might have thought at the time
that only defendant's first argument had any chance of success, it was defendant's total incorporation contention that almost won the day. Justice Black,
in a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Douglas, argued that the earlier decisions
should be overruled and the fourteenth amendment held to completely incorporate the Bill of Rights guarantees. 0 6 Justice Murphy, in a much shorter dissent joined by Justice Rutledge, noted that he agreed with Justice Black that
"the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 0 7 Thus, almost eighty years
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Court came within one
vote of dramatically reshaping the amendment's scope.
Justice Black justified overturning many years of precedent on essentially
two grounds. First, he argued that the past decisions had simply misconstrued
the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. The Court had failed to recognize
that "one of the chief objects. . . [of] the provisions of the Amendment's first
section, separately, and, as a whole,. . . was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states."' 0 8 Justice Black attributed this failure to the Court's lack
of consideration in previous cases of the full historical record.' 09 Citing the
98. Id at 98.
99. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the total incorporation argument was advanced by
defense counsel, but rejected by the Court in a single sentence. Id at 323 ("[t]here is no such general
rule"). Justice Black was a member of the Court at the time, but apparently had "not completely
developed his views regarding the fourteenth amendment." Yarborough, supra note 34, at 237.
Between Palko and Adamson, there were several cases in which Justice Black readily could have advanced the total incorporation position, but he offered no more than a hint of his acceptance of that
viewpoint. See id at 238-44.
100. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
101. Id at 48-49.
102. Id at 50.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 217-26 (discussing Powell v. Alabama).
104. 332 U.S. at 50.
105. Id at 49-50.
106. Id at 74-75.
107. Id at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
108. Id at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
109. Id at 72. Justice Black noted that "[njeither the briefs nor opinions in any of. . . [the prior]
cases, except Maxwell v. Dow. . . [made] reference to the legislative and contemporary history," and
Maxwell had considered only a single congressional speech. Id at 73.
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congressional debates and other materials described earlier in this article, 10
Justice Black maintained that the historical record "conclusively demonstrate[d] that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the
people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights."'II
Although relying primarily on the historical record, Justice Black also
stressed that adoption of the total incorporation position would remove the
Court from the pitfalls of the fundamental fairness approach that past cases
had used in applying the fourteenth amendment's due process clause'12 Justice Black's criticism of this approach to due process adjudication will be considered' at length later in this article.' 1 3 It is sufficient to note here that he
viewed that approach as unacceptably vague and open-ended, and as inviting
decisions based on the subjective, idiosyncratic views of individual Justices.
Total incorporation, he argued, would lead the Court back to the "clearly
marked constitutional boundaries . . . of policies written into the
Constitution." 14
Justice Black's assumption that total incorporation would foreclose continued reliance on a "fundamental fairness" standard of due process obviously
rested on more than a mere incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. The Bill of Rights, after all, included a due process clause
and that clause was repeated in the fourteenth amendment itself. Although
total incorporation would permit reliance upon the various other Bill of Rights
provisions, it would still leave open the use of the due process clause for those
cases that did not fit within those provisions, and it would not, in itself, bar
continued application of a "fundamental fairness" concept of due process in
such cases. To completely foreclose reliance upon this concept, a new definition of due process also was needed. In a previous opinion, not cited in his
Adamson dissent, Justice Black had offered such a standard, viewing due process as requiring little more than an even-handed application of pre-existing
law." 5 Justice Black obviously believed that, with total incorporation making
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights available in state cases, the Court
would no longer find a need for a fundamental fairness view of due process
and would turn to his more narrow standard of due process.16 It was this
110. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41, and supra note 39.
11 . 322 U.S. at 74-75. Presumably Justice Black also considered the language sufficiently explicit to
be similarly understood by the state legislatures that ratified the amendment.

112. Id at 90.
113. See infra notes 265-301 and accompanying text.

114. 322 U.S. at 92.
115. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 153 (1938) (Black, J., concurring) (due process satisfied when defendant has by laws of state received a fair trial according to procedures applicable to case). Justice Black's narrow interpretation of the procedural requirements of due process was
not set forth as clearly in United Gas as in later cases, see infra text accompanying note 163, but his
position was well known to other members of the Adamson Court. See Yarborough, supra note 34, at
244-54 (discussing Justice Black's writing of his .4damson dissent and the response to it by the other
Justices).
116. Some commentators have viewed Justice Black's narrow view of due process as being part of
the total incorporation position, but there is nothing in the historical support for total incorporation
that ties it to such a limited view of due process. See Note, TheAdamson Case: A Studyin Constitutional
Technique, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 271 (1949).

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 269 1982-1983

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:253

assumption that led Justice Murphy to write a separate dissent in which he
expressed agreement with total incorporation, but noted that he was "not prepared to say" that the fourteenth amendment was "entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights." 1 7 "Occasions may arise," he noted, "where a
proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights."' "18
The majority opinion inAdamson, authored by Justice Reed, gave only brief
attention to the total incorporation position. Considering first the privileges
and immunities clause, Justice Reed noted that total incorporation was inconsistent with the interpretation of that clause that had prevailed since SlaughterHouse."t 9 That interpretation had been adopted by "justices whose own experience had given them contemporaneous knowledge of the purposes that led to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 0 Moreover, it reflected a viewpoint that had become "embedded in our federal system as a functioning element in preserving the balance between national and state power."' 2' The
conclusion of the prior cases simply would not be disturbed.
Turning to the possibility of incorporating the Bill of Rights under the due
process clause, Justice Reed noted that past decisions also foreclosed that alternative. The long line of cases applying the "fundamental fairness" standard
clearly was inconsistent with the view that the due process clause incorporated
the Bill of Rights.' 2 2 Although the majority did not refer specifically to Justice
Black's historical analysis, it obviously found that analysis unconvincing in
supporting total incorporation through the due process clause. "[N]othing has
been called to our attention," the majority noted, "that [suggests] either the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or the states that adopted [it] intended
its due process 23clause to draw within its scope the earlier amendments to the
Constitution." 1
Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurring opinion, offered a more extensive response to Justice Black. Justice Frankfurter suggested, in a single sentence, that the privileges and immunities clause was not at issue.' 24 He
apparently believed that a departure from the Slaughter-House view of that
117. 332 U.S. at 124.
118. Id See Yarborough, supra note 34, at 252-54 (discussing background of Justice Murphy's dissent). Although Justice Douglas joined Justice Black's dissent in Adamson, his subsequent opinions
indicate that his views were much closer to those expressed in Justice Murphy's dissent. See Poe v.

Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (due process includes first eight amendments
but is not confined to them). Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (opinion of Court joined
by Douglas, J.) (due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trials) with id at 377
(Black, J., dissenting) (due process does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt because not mentioned in Bill of Rights). Compare also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (opinion of
Court by Douglas, J.) (fundamental constitutional guarantees create zones of privacy not specifically
mentioned in Bill of Rights) with id at 521 (Black, J., dissenting) (no constitutional right of privacy),
See generally Karst, Individual Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the 'Watural-Law-

Due-ProcessFormula", 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969) (discussing Douglas' views of incorporation
from Adamson to Griswold).

119. 332 U.S. at 51-53.
120. Id at 53.

121. Id
122. Id
123. Id at 54.
124. Id at 61 ("I put to one side the Privileges or Immunities Clause of [the Fourteenth]
Amendment").
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clause would necessarily carry with it the protection of far more than the Bill
of Rights, as suggested by the Slaughter-House dissenters, 25 and would thus
open the door to "mischievous uses" that would be disowned by every member
a discusof the Court.' 26 Accordingly, his opinion was "concerned solely with
27
sion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Although much of Justice Frankfurter's opinion focused on the language of
the due process clause and the concept of "fundamental fairness" that it embodied, 28 other portions of his opinion challenged the total incorporation theory without regard to the clause of the amendment upon which it was based.
Like the majority, Justice Frankfurter stressed that total incorporation had
been rejected by "judges who were themselves witnesses of the process by
which the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution." 129 Arguments that the first eight amendments "were concealed within the historical
phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment were not unknown at the time of its
adoption," and a "surer estimate of their bearing was possible for judges at the
time than distorting distance. . .[was] likely to vouchsafe." 30 Those Justices
were well aware that what was submitted to the states for ratification was the
proposed amendment itself, not the "[r]emarks of a particular proponent of the
Amendment, no matter how influential."'131 Ratification of the amendment by
states whose own methods of prosecution were inconsistent with the fifth
amendment requirement of prosecution by grand jury indictment indicated
that the132states did not view the amendment as incorporating the Bill of
Rights.
Justice Frankfurter also stressed the practical consequences of total incorporation. Those "sensitive to the relations of the states to the central government
as well as the relation of some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
process ofjustice ' 133 could hardly insist upon state compliance with every procedural requirement constitutionally imposed upon the federal government.
Some of the Bill of Rights requirements "are enduring reflections of experience
with human nature," but others merely "express the restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods for ascertainment of
facts."134 Surely, he argued, "[to] suggest that it is inconsistent with a truly free
125. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
126. 332 U.S. at 61-62. See supra note 41 (discussing whether historical materials cited by Justice
Black would require that privileges and immunities clause be viewed as protecting "'natural law" rights
noted by Justice Washington in Co,56eld as well as guarantees in Bill of Rights). Justice Frankfurter
cited Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), as such a "mischievous use." 332 U.S. at 61-62. Colgate
held unconstitutional a state law that imposed different tax burdens on income earned from loans made
within and without the state. Five years after it was decided, Colgate was overruled by Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 78 (1940), in an opinion joined by all of the Adamson dissenters, including Justice
Black.
127. 332 U.S. at 61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, as noted in Landynski, supra note 22, at 30:
"[T]o some extent Black and Frankfurter were talking at cross-purposes [in Adamson]: Frankfurter
attributed to Black an interpretation of due process, which Black had in large measure assigned to

privileges and immunities."
128. For a discussion of the arguments relating to the language of the clause, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28. For a discussion of the development of the fundamental fairness concept, see infra
notes 143-301 and accompanying text.
129. 332 U.S. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130. Id (footnote omitted).
'131. Id
132. Id
133. Id at 63.
134. Id
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society to begin prosecution without an indictment, to try petty civil cases
without the paraphernalia of a common law jury, to take into consideration
that one who has full opportunity to make a defense remains silent is, in de
Tocqueville's phrase, to confound the familiar with the necessary."' 35 A long
line of Justices, including many whose "services in the cause of human rights
• . . are the most conspicuous in our history,"' 3 6 had refused to impose such
requirements on the states.
Without doubt, Justice Frankfurter's illumination of the practical consequences of total incorporation-particularly the imposition of the requirement
that states prosecute by indictment and provide jury trials in civil cases involving claims above twenty dollars-raised problems for the supporters of total
incorporation. Justice Black maintained, however, that the Bill of Rights was
not an "outworn 18th Century 'straight jacket.' "137 The federal government
had not been "harmfully burdened" by application
of the Bill of Rights guar138
antees; neither would the states be so burdened.
The dissenters in Adamson had the luxury of knowing that their position
would not immediately be adopted by the Court. Recognizing this, Justice
Frankfurter raised the question whether even the "boldest innovator" would
actually compel the states to bring their traditional procedures into compliance
with the fifth amendment grand jury and seventh amendment civil jury trial
guarantees.139 The answer to Justice Frankfurter's question came, perhaps, in
Ohio ex rel.Eaton v. Price.140 In Price Justice Brennan noted that neither he
nor Chief Justice Warren had either accepted or rejected the total incorporation position. 14 1 Justice Brennan advocated, however, the alternative of selective incorporation. 142 Through that doctrine the Court eventually could
impose upon the states all of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights
except for the grand jury indictment and civil jury trial requirements.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at

62-63.
62.
89 (Black, J., dissenting).
90. Supporters of total incorporation must have recognized that the practical difficulties

of total incorporation would be somewhat greater than Justice Black's statement suggested. In particular, literal application of the seventh amendment right ofjury trial in all cases involving more than $20
would impose intolerable strains on already overburdened state courts. The federal government had
avoided granting jury trials in minor civil cases by limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases
involving substantial monetary claims. The states could not realistically follow the same approach. Bul
see I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 487 (1965) (arguing that $20 threshhold could be ignored as "de minimis" requirement and that only "serious problem" posed by total
incorporation was fifth amendment grand jury requirement).
139. 332 U.S. at 64-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter suggested that total incorporation was not "unambiguously urged" by Justice Black. Id Justice Black's dissent noted that "whether
this Court ever will, or whether it now should, in the light of past decisions, give full effect to what the
Amendment was intended to accomplish is not necessarily essential to a decision here." Id at 75. To
sustain Adamson's claim, Justice Black noted, the Court did not need to go beyond holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the states. Justice Black also made it clear, however, that while he preferred selective incorporation to traditional due process analysis, he would rather
follow the "original purpose" and "extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the
Bill of Rights." Id at 89.
140. 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam) (4-4 decision).
141. Id at 274-75 (separate opinion by Brennan, J.).
142. Id at 275.
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B.

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

Unlike the doctrine of total incorporation, the fundamental fairness doctrine

rests solely on the due process clause. The doctrine has basically two elements.
First, the doctrine reads the due process clause as prohibiting state action that

violates those rights of the individual that are deemed to be "fundamental."
Over the years, the Court variously described the standard for determining

whether a particular right is fundamental. Due process was said to require
adherence to those "principles of liberty and justice"' 4 3 that are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"' 44 that are "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"'' 4 5 and that "lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions."'146 Due process also was
described as prohibiting state actions that "offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even
toward those charged with the most heinous offenses;" 147 that are "repugnant
to the conscience of mankind;"' t 48 or that deprive the defendant of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."' 14 9 Although these different phrasings arguably suggest some subtle variations in content, they
generally have been understood as expressing a single standard, frequently described in shorthand form as the "ordered liberty" or "fundamental rights"
standard.
The second element of the fundamental fairness doctrine concerns the relationship between the "ordered liberty" standard and the guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights. Simply put, it maintains that there is no necessary correlation between the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights and the requirements
of due process. The concept of due process has "an independent potency,"150
which exists apart from the Bill of Rights, although in a particular case it may
afford protection that parallels that of a Bill of Rights guarantee. It was this
second element of the fundamental fairness doctrine that led to its eventual
rejection. Accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court for almost one hundred years, the fundamental fairness doctrine was discarded in the 1960's when
the Court adopted through selective incorporation a quite different view of the
relationship between the Bill of Rights guarantees and the "ordered liberty"
standard of due process.
1. The Rationale of Fundamental Fairness
The fundamental fairness position proceeds from the premise that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause was designed to make applicable to the
states the same concept of due process that the fifth amendment's due process
143. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
144. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
145. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
146. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884); see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
106 (1908) (describing as "fundamental" a "principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very

idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government").
147.
148.
149.
150.

Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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clause traditionally had made applicable to the federal government. 15 At the
time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment there were only a few
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment's due process
clause, but the basic nature of the clause was well established. The concept of
due process dated back to the Magna Carta, and English and American commentators had discussed it at length.' 52 The proponents of fundamental fairness viewed those authorities as having established a flexible standard of
justice that focused on the essence of fairness rather than the familiarity of
form. Due process, under this view, was "a concept less rigid and more fluid
than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights."' 53 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter described it as "perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive
of powerful social standards of a progressive society." 154 Its basic objective was
to provide "respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has
evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization."' 55 Thus, it had a "natural law" background, 156 which extended beyond procedural
fairness and imposed limits as well on the substance of state
57
regulation. 1
Whether the drafters of the due process clauses of the fourteenth and fifth
amendments intended the clauses to have either the flexibility or the breadth
provided by the fundamental rights concept of due process is open to debate.
, Commentators have criticized the imposition of substantive due process limits
as beyond the purpose of the two clauses, 158 and some have argued that the
procedural protections of due process originally were viewed as more closely
related to historical usage. 159 Nonetheless, the Court persistently and almost
151. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884) (fourteenth amendment due process clause
restrains states in same way as fifth amendment due process clause restrains federal government);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (fourteenth amendment due

process clause has same potency in relation to states as does fifth amendment due process clause in
relation to federal government).
152. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (citing numerous commentaries and cases);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (same).
153. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
154. G iffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
155. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
156. See generally C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 104-165 (1930); Corwin,
The "HigherLaw" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928) (second

installment at 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1928)).
157. On the development of substantive due process, see L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at ch. 8 (describing
rise and 'fall of substantive due process protection of contractual liberty) and ch. 15 (discussing substantive due process protection of "rights of privacy and personhood"). Although due process decisions
applying nonprocedural constitutional specifics, such as the first amendment, are sometimes treated as
distinct from "substantive" due process, the early decisions clearly viewed those guarantees as merely
another element of the substantive law limitations imposed by the due process clause. See Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (due process applies to "matters of substantive
law as well as matters of procedure" and thereby encompasses right of free speech).
158. See Berger, 'Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1979); R. BERGER, supra
note 18, at 249-69; Grant, The NaturalLawBackgroundof Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931);
see also Monaghan, Of 'iberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411-14 (1977) (discussing

the historical origins of the "spacious conception" of liberty protected by the clause). But see R. MOTr,
DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 41-54, 62, 68 (noting colonial and early American support for substantive due
process); id § 113-21 (noting pre-civil war support).
159. See R. BERGER, supra note 18, at 193-214 (discussing intent of framers); Kadish, Methodology
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unanimously accepted the flexibility and breadth embodied in the "ordered
liberty" standard.1 60 Although Justices disagreed as to the protections required
by the ordered liberty standard, only Justice Black clearly rejected the use of
that standard to determine procedural requirements.1 6 Justice Black maintained that due process required only an evenhanded application of those procedures previously established by law in the particular jurisdiction. Looking
to the language of the Magna Carta that required adherence to the "law of the
land,"' 62 Justice Black read the due process clause as granting only a "right to
be tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established procedures
and applying valid pre-existing laws."' 63 Although the Court recognized that
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 321-25 (1957)
(discussing earlier due process decisions). Some find support for this view in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). The Court there stated that due process

"lookled] to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country."
Id at 277. This statement, however, can be read as merely indicating that such "settled usages" were in
accord with due process, not that departures from settled usages would necessarily violate due process.
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884). Moreover, Murray'sLessee also looked to then
current practice in the states, which might suggest that even initially accepted "settled usages," if subsequently rejected by many states as "unsuited" to the current "civil and political condition," could then
be found to violate due process.
160. As will be seen, infra text accompanying notes 302-14, the ordered liberty standard is used
under the selective incorporation doctrine as well as under the fundamental fairness doctrine. It apparently also would be retained for independent. application by those Justices, other than Justice Black,
supporting total incorporation. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing view that procedures not proscribed by specific Bill of Rights guarantees may fall so short of fundamental fairness as to
violate due process).
161. Perhaps the same can also be said as to substantive protections. Although several Justices have
criticized the concept of substantive due process, apart from its absorption of such Bill of Rights guarantees as the first amendment, it is not clear whether any Justice, aside from Justice Black, has gone so
far as completely to reject that concept. Consider, for example, the opinions of Justice Stewart in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 528 (1965) (dissenting) (criticizing doctrine of substantive due
process), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (concurring) (accepting doctrine in light of
Griswold).

162. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 424 (1765-1769).
163. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Other opinions by Justice Black expressing this position include North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 743-44 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (dissenting); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1,62 (1967) (concurring); and United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 151-52 (1938)
(concurring). See also H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 30-34 (1968); Haigh, Defining Due Process
of Law: The Case of Mr. Justice Hugo Black, 17 S.D.L. REV 1, 18-25 (1972).

When Justice Black spoke of the government's obligation to adhere to pre-existing law--e., to refrain from creating new law for the particular case-he assumed that the Bill of Rights guarantees were
part of that pre-existing law. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 382 (Black, J., dissenting) ("For me, the
only correct meaning of that phrase [due process] is that our Government must proceed according to
the 'law of the land'--that is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted
by court decisions"). The assumption that the Bill of Rights guarantees were part of the states' as well
as the federal government's pre-existing law followed from Justice Black's acceptance of the total incorporation doctrine. Using the Bill of Rights' specific guarantees, Justice Black frequently found unconstitutional the same actions that the majority held invalid under its "ordered liberty" concept of due
process. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (federal statutory presumptions analyzed by
majority under ordered liberty standard and by Justice Black under several guarantees, including sixth
amendment right to jury trial and fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination). However, if a
state practice did not violate a specific Bill of Rights guarantee, and the state had applied that practice
in an evenhanded manner, the practice could not be held unconstitutional under Justice Black's view,
even though it was contrary to basic traditions of American criminal procedure. See In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), in which Justice Black argued that the Constitution could not be interpreted to require
that proof of guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 377.
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evenhanded administration of preexisting procedures was an element of "ordered liberty,"' 6 it also consistently rejected Justice Black's contention that
required no more than regular adherence to the "law of the
due process
65
land."1
Proponents of the fundamental fairness position contend that once one accepts the flexible concept of due process embodied in the "ordered liberty"
standard, one must concede that the content of due process will not necessarily
be restricted to the Bill of Rights guarantees. Clearly, the proponents argue, as
a "standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a
free society,"' 166 due process may impose limits beyond those found in the specifics of the Bill of Rights. Even though a particular practice was historically
accepted as consistent with a specific Bill of Rights guarantee, changes in technology or "refinement[s] in our sense of justice" may render it contrary to the
"ordered liberty" standard as contemporarily interpreted. 167 The extension of
due process beyond the specifics of the Bill of Rights guarantees was implicitly
recognized, it 8is argued, by the inclusion of a due process clause in the fifth
amendment.16
Whether the fourteenth amendment due process clause provides protection
also encompassed under the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights (that is,
the guarantees other than the fifth amendment due process clause) is, perhaps,
a more troublesome issue. In one of the earlier fourteenth amendment cases,
Hurtado v. California,169 the Court suggested that due process encompassed
only safeguards other than those found in the specific Bill of Rights guarantees. Fourteenth amendment due process paralleled fifth amendment due process, the Court argued, and if the fifth amendment clause encompassed any of
the rights found in the remaining Bill of Rights guarantees, there would have
been no reason to add those other guarantees to the Bill of Rights.' 70 Thus, to
read the fourteenth amendment due process clause as encompassing rights protected by the specific Bill of Rights guarantees would be contrary to the "recognized canon of interpretation" that one of several interrelated provisions
should not be read to render the other provisions superfluous.' 7 1 The Hurtado
suggestion was short-lived, however, and the Court eventually found within
fourteenth amendment due process various rights also protected by specific
Bill of Rights guarantees.' 72 Because due process was such a vague guarantee,
164. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
165. Indeed, it is not clear that Justice Black always adhered to that viewpoint. See Henkin supra

note 5, at 76 n. 12 (citing cases in which Justice Black found state violations of due process that were not
covered by a specific Bill of Rights guarantee); Yarborough, supra note 34, at 254 n. 110 (same). Consider also Justice Black's joinder in the opinion of the Court in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(fifth amendment due process clause encompasses a concept of equal protection and thereby bars racially segregated schools in District of Columbia).
166. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
167. Schaefer, Federalismand State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1956).
168. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (framers of Bill
of Rights cannot be charged with writing into it a "meaningless clause").
169. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
170. Id at 534-35.

17h Id; see also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878) (fourteenth amendment due
process clause does not prohibit taking by state because, unlike fifth amendment, fourteenth amendment contains no taking clause).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 217-37 (discussing these various rights). The earlier opinions
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the framers of the Bill of Rights could well have thought it desirable to add
more specific provisions, even though the rights encompassed might also be
protected by the fifth amendment's due process clause. The canon of interpretation cited in Hurtado, the Court later noted, was simply an "aid to construction" that must yield to the "ordered liberty" standard of due process. 173 That
standard, by its very terms, encompasses all truly fundamental rights, regardthose rights are recognized in a particular Bill of Rights
less of, whether
174
guarantee.

Once it was acknowledged that the "ordered liberty" standard could encompass rights that were also protected by the Bill of Rights guarantees, the question arose as to how the Court was to determine which of those rights were
safeguarded by due process. The fundamental fairness position rejected the
assumption that a particular right was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" merely because it was recognized in the Bill of Rights. Not all of the Bill
of Rights guarantees could be deemed basic to a free society. Some, for example, merely reflected "the restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods for the ascertainment of facts." 7 5 States might adopt
other procedures, in light of current knowledge, and equally provide for fundamental fairness. In the case of still other guarantees, the core element of the
guarantee might be fundamental while its other aspects might constitute only
details of implementation that had come to be a part of the guarantee merely
by force of custom. Analyzed from the independent perspective of the "ordered liberty" standard, only the core element of the guarantee would be a
requisite of due process. In sum, under the fundamental fairness position,
some rights protected by the first eight amendments might be found totally
encompassed by fourteenth amendment due process, others partially encompassed, and still others completely excluded.
As it later developed, 176 a key element of the fundamental fairness doctrine
was its focus on the particular factual setting of the individual case. If a defendant contended that a state had denied him due process by failing to recognize a right protected by the Bill of Rights, the issue presented was not whether
that right, viewed in the abstract, was "implicit in the concept of ordered libsimply ignored the Hurado argument, and it was not until 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 6567 (1932), that it was openly considered and rejected.
173. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
174. Id This view of due process finds support in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), the leading decision on the scope of the fifth amendment's due
process clause at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. The Court there suggested that
in determining whether a particular procedure violated due process, the Court would first look to
whether it conflicted with any of the provisions of "the constitution itself." Id at 277. Of course, this
statement, taken literally, would go beyond the fundamental fairness doctrine to suggest "total incorporation" of at least the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See J. ELY, supra note 34, at 194 n.52
(noting this possibility, but also describing Murray'rLessee's comment in this regard as "unnecessary
and somewhat bizzare"). The Court in Murray's Lessee had also suggested, at an earlier point in the
opinion, that constitutional provisions other than those in the Bill of Rights also safeguarded rights
recognized in the Magna Carta, such as the right to jury trial, 59 U.S. at 276, and perhaps the Court's

reference may have been only to those constitutional provisions. In any event, the opinion clearly
suggested an overlap in the protections afforded by the due process clause and certain other procedural
provisions in the Constitution.

175. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 217-64 (discussing development of fundamental fairness doctrine after 1930).
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erty." Rather, the issue was whether the state's action had resulted in a denial
of fundamental fairness 177
in the context of the particular case. As the Court
noted in Betts v. Brady:'
[The] [a]sserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense ofjustice, may, in other circumstances,
and in the light of other considera78
tions, fall short of such denial.
Due process under this approach was to be defined on a case-by-case basis,
with "its full meaning. . . gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise."' 17 9
2. Application of Fundamental Fairness: Pre-1930's Cases
The Court's application of the fundamental fairness doctrine can be divided
roughly into two periods. During the first period, extending from the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment to the early 1930's, the Supreme Court reviewed
comparatively few state criminal cases. In those cases considered, the Court
generally ruled against the defendant's due process claim. Moreover, if the
claim was based on the state's refusal to recognize a particular aspect of a Bill
of Rights guarantee, the Court did not always limit its ruling to the aspect
relied on by the defendant. Rather, the Justices tended to speak broadly of the
state's ability to provide fundamental fairness without regard to any aspect of
the guarantee.
The first major due process ruling of this period was Hurtado v. Calfornia. 8 0 Hurtado had been tried for murder on a prosecutor's information, following a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing.' 8 Hurtado
claimed that fourteenth amendment due process required state authorities to
prosecute by grand jury indictment, as was required of federal authorities by
the fifth amendment. 8 2 With only Justice Harlan dissenting, the Court flatly
rejected Hurtado's claim. 8 3 As noted previously, the Hurtado majority initially suggested that the due process clauses should not be read as duplicating
the specific Bill of Rights provisions and thereby rendering those provisions
superfluous. 8 4 The Court then went on, however, to discuss the defendant's
claim using a traditional fundamental fairness analysis. The Court noted that
due process encompasses only those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"' 8 5 and
therefore emphasizes "the very substance of individual rights" rather than
"particular forms of procedure." 8 6 Focusing on the function of the grand jury
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id at 462.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1908).
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Id at 517-18.
Id at 520.

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id at 538.
See supra text accompanying note 171 (discussing the Hurado reasoning).
110 U.S. at 535.
Id at 532.
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rather than its form, the Court found that California had adopted a satisfactory substitute that "carefully considers and guards the substantial interest of
the prisoner."' 87 Justice Harlan's dissent relied on the recognition of the right
to grand jury indictment in both English practice and in the fifth amendment,' 88 but the majority stressed that traditional usage was not conclusive of
whether a right was fundamental. The Court noted:
The Constitution of the United States . . was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of many tongues. . . There is nothing
in [the] Magna Charta. .. which ought to exclude the best ideas of
all systems of every age.' 89
Thus, the Court concluded, "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion
of legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards
and preserves . . principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law."' 90
The classic fundamental fairness analysis expounded by the Hurtado Court
could readily be extended to encompass at least some aspects of specific Bill of
Rights guarantees. This extension could occur, however, only if the Court
rejected Hurtado's initial suggestion that due process does not overlap specific
Bill of Rights guarantees. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroadv. Chicago,' 9 1 decided in 1897, the Court did exactly that, freeing the fundamental
fairness doctrine from the limitation of Hurtado's initial suggestion. The Chicago RailroadCourt concluded that due process prohibited a state from taking
property without providing just compensation.' 92 Justice Harlan's opinion for
the Court mentioned neither Hurtado nor the fifth amendment's taking clause;
it merely noted that the right to compensation for appropriated property was a
and civilized govern"principle of natural equity, recognized by all temperate
' 93
ments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice.'
After Chicago Railroad,several Supreme Court opinions considered, but rejected, fourteenth amendment due process claims based upon procedural safeguards found in the fifth and sixth amendments. 194 The two cases giving those
claims the most extensive consideration were Maxwell v. Dow 195 and Twining v.
New Jersey.196 In Maxwell the defendant challenged the state's use of an eight
person jury, arguing that the fourteenth amendment, like the sixth amend187. Id at 538.
188. Id (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's dissent, although focusing on the history and im-

portance of the grand jury, suggested at one point that a right might be established as an essential

element of due process solely by virtue of its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Id at 546-48. That reasonig, of course, would have led to incorporation of all of the Bill of Rights as part of due process.

189. Id at 530-31.
190. Id at 537.
191. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

192. Id at 241. The Court held against the railroad, however, because the railroad failed to show
that compensation received fell short of "just compensation." Id at 247-56.
193. Id at 238 (citing Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent, C.)).
194. See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause ofthe FourteenthAmendment, 78 HARv. L. R. 746. 755-76 (1965) (citing cases); see also Maxwell

v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602-05 (1900) (same).
195. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
196. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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ment, required a jury of twelve.' 9 7 Using the fundamental fairness analysis of
Hurtado, the Court concluded that r"[i]f the State has the power to abolish the
grand jury. . . the same course of reasoning which establishes that right will
and does establish the right to alter the number of the petit jury from that
provided by the common law."' 198 The Court suggested, moreover, that the
right to trial by a jury in any form had never been viewed as a "necessary
requisite of due process."' 99
In Twining the defendant contended that fourteenth amendment due process
was violated by a jury instruction that allowed the jury to draw an unfavorable
inference from his failure to testify. 200 For the purposes of argument the Court
assumed that had the instruction been given in a federal prosecution it would
have violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 20 1 The Court also acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment could
encompass rights safeguarded in the Bill of Rights, but this was so "not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because
they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law."20° 2 Using traditional fundamental fairness analysis, the Court concluded that defendant's claim did not rest on such a right. The substantial
limits upon the'20privilege
against self-incrimination traditionally recognized in
"English law, 3 the rejection of the privilege in civilized countries "outside
the domain of the common law," 20 4 and the fact that "four only of the thirteen
original States insisted upon incorporating the privilege in the Constitution," 20 5 led the Court to conclude that the privilege against
self-incrimination
'20 6
was "not an unchangeable principle of universal justice.
Although the pre-1930's rulings consistently rejected procedural due process
claims invoking safeguards specified in the Bill of Rights, the Court did uphold a few due process claims based on other procedural defects. 20 7 In each
197. In both Maxwell and Twining, defendants relied on both the privileges and immunities clause
and the due process clause. See supra text accompanying notes 87-98 (discussing Maxwell and Twin.

ing). Justice Harlan dissented in both cases, relying primarily on the privileges and immunities clause.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
198. 176 U.S. at 602-03.
199. Id at 603-05. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (describing Maxwell
as a case "opinioning that States might abolish jury trial").
200. 211 U.S. at 83.
201. Id at 114.
202. Id at 99.
203. Id at 104-05 (noting particularly the English bankruptcy practice of compelling a bankrupt to
submit to examination).
204. Id at 113. The Court noted:
The wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended not as an unchangeable principle of
universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be expedient .

. .

. It has no place in

the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and it
is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth outside the administration
of the law.
Id
205. Id at 109.

206. Id at 113.
207. During the same period, convictions also were invalidated when defendants presented procedural claims not based on the due process clause. See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism,and State
Systems of CriminalJustice,8 DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 216-17 (1959) (citing cases in which Court held that

equal protection clause prohibits racial discrimination injury selection and that prohibition against ex
postfacto laws applies to certain retroactive procedural changes).
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instance the defendant stressed the basic unfairness of the state practice rather
than any parallel protection in the Bill of Rights. In Moore v. Dempsey, 20 8 a
case involving alleged domination of a trial by potential mob violence, the
Court reasoned that due process was violated because the "whole proceeding is
a mask-[in which]. . . counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by
an irresistible wave of public passion, and. . the State courts failed to correct
the wrong." 20 9 The Court in Moore emphasized the totality of the circumstances rather than the deprivation of specific safeguards such as an impartial
jury or effective assistance of counsel. In Tumey v. Ohio2 10 the Court held that
due process requires an impartial judge, 21 ' though that safeguard is not mentioned in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.2 12 After examining the
English and American common law, which established "the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest" in the trial judge, 2' 3 the
the
Court concluded that the defendant had been denied a fair tribunal 2where
14
trial judge received a fee only when he found the defendant guilty.
Tumey and Moore reflected a willingness of the Court to find due process
violations, without regard to the specifics of the Bill of Rights, when state practices directly threatened the accuracy of the fact-finding process. This willingness continued in the second major period of fundamental fairness analysis. 2 15
The significant change during that period, from 1930 to 1960, was in the
Court's approach to claims based on safeguards found in the Bill of Rights,
many of2 which did not relate directly to the reliability of the guilt-determining
process. 16
3. Application of Fundamental Fairness: The Post-1930's Cases
In applying the fundamental fairness doctrine from the early 1930's through
the early 1960's, the Court was far more willing to find within the due process
clause certain aspects of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The
Court viewed due process as encompassing many of the same basic principles
as the Bill of Rights guarantees, but generally assumed that due process limits
on state action derived from those principles were narrower than the limits
imposed on the federal government by the Bill of Rights. Powell v. Ala208. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
209. Id at 91.
210. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
211. Id at 531.
212. The sixth amendment refers only to an "'impartial jury." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
213. Id at 525. Tumey involved a misdemeanor charge tried before a local Mayor's Court, on which
the mayor served, in effect, as the justice of the peace. Id at 516. The Court examined the statutes and
cases dealing with the compensation of magistrates in both the United States and England. starting with
a 1388 statute and continuing to the date of the decision. Id at 524-31.
214. Id at 520.
215. See e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecutor's knowing reliance on perjured
testimony violates due process); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 13 (1955) (trial on contempt charge before
judge who conducted secret "one-man" grand jury proceedings in which contempt allegedly occurred

violates due process); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (conviction totally devoid of evidentiary support violates due process).
216. Why the Court turned to a more expansive view of due process during this particular time has
been a matter of very interesting speculation. See Allen, supra note 207, at 218-19 (suggesting, inter
alia, that the abuse of the criminal justice process in the emerging totalitarian regimes of the early
1930's made the Court more sensitive to the importance of the criminal justice process to the character
of the nation); Wiehofen, supra note 5, at 192-93 (noting changes in the Court's ability to control its
docket, and liberalization of habeas corpus procedure, leading to review of more criminal cases).
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bama,2 17 decided in 1932, was the first case to apply the fundamental fairness
doctrine in this fashion.
The defendants in Powell, nine young and illiterate blacks, had been convicted of rape, a capital offense. 21 s They had not been represented by counsel
of their own. 2 19 Instead, the trial judge had "appointed" all members of the
local bar to represent them, which resulted in representation that was insufficient by any standard. 220 The Supreme Court first concluded that due process
had been violated when the trial judge denied defendants an opportunity to
secure counsel of their own choice.22 1 Second, assuming that defendants would
have been unable to secure counsel, due process was violated by the trial
judge's failure to appoint counsel who would provide effective representation. 222 The Court based neither ruling on a simple reference to the sixth
amendment right to counsel, stating that the sixth amendment by itself did not
establish that the right to counsel was fundamental. 223 The Court looked beyond the sixth amendment to the development of the right to counsel in American jurisprudence. 224 It found that at least twelve of the thirteen original states
had recognized a defendant's right to representation by retained counsel in all
serious criminal prosecutions. 225 The right to appointed counsel followed from
the due process requirement of a fair hearing; when defendants, as those in
Powell, were incapable of representing themselves, appointed counsel was a
prerequisite for a fair hearing. This need was reflected in the "unanimous accord" among the226states in appointing counsel for indigent defendants, at least
in capital cases.
The Powell due process ruling on appointment was limited to the special
circumstances suggested by that case-"a capital case. . . where the defendant. . . is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy or the like. ' 227 Six years later, in Johnson v.
Zerbst,228 the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel required
22 9
federal courts to appoint lawyers for indigent defendants in all felony cases.
Defendants in state cases immediately argued that the due process right to
counsel should extend as far as the sixth amendment right. 230 Relying on a
fundamental fairness analysis, the Court rejected that contention in Betts v.
Brady,23 1 holding that the due process clause was "less rigid and more fluid"
217. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
218. Id at 50, 52.
219. Id at 49.
220. Id at 56.
221. Id at 71.
222. Id
223. Id at 66.
224. Id at 61-65.
225. Id at 64-65.
226. Id at 73.
227. Id at 71. Although there was language in Powell that could be read as extending the right to
appointed counsel beyond such circumstances, the Court carefully limited its holding. Id. C. Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright: The "rt"of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 236-37 (noting limitation in
Powell holding and criticizing Justice Black's failure to recognize that limitation in his Gideon opinion),
228. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
229. Id at 460, 463.
230. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1942).
231. 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942); see supra text accompanying note 178 (quoting Brady).
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than the sixth amendment. 232 The Court stated that the due process clause
indicated
required appointed counsel only when the facts of the particular 2case
33
that the assistance of counsel was needed to ensure a fair trial.

In the years following Powell, due process cases considering various Bill of
Rights safeguards used an approach similar to that taken in the right-to-counsel cases. In Wolf v. Colorado,234 for example, the Court held that the due
process clause encompasses the major element of the fourth amendment, but
not the amendment's full protection. The Wo/f Court initially concluded that
the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. . .[and]
therefore implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty.' "235 The Court then held,
however, that the fourth amendment remedy of excluding illegally seized evidence was not required by due process. 236 A review of contemporary practices
in the American states and the ten jurisdictions of the United Kingdom convinced the Court that the exclusionary rule was not essential to the implemenshould not be imposed on
tation of the protected right of privacy and therefore
237
the states through the fourteenth amendment.
In several other cases decided during the same period, the Court rejected
due process claims based upon a particular aspect of a Bill of Rights guarantee, but suggested that other aspects of the guarantee might be encompassed by
due process. Palko v. Connecticut2 38 is illustrative.239 In that case, defendant
challenged a Connecticut statute that permitted the state to appeal defendant's
initial acquittal, gain reversal on the basis of a trial court error, and then retry
the defendant on the same charge. 240 The Court assumed that a similar federal
24 t
practice would violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Applying fundamental fairness analysis, the Court framed the issue narrowly:
232. Id at 462.233. Id at 471-73; see also Israel, supra note 227, at 231-61 (discussing due process right to counsel
cases from Powell to Gideon). Factors establishing a right to appointed counsel included the seriousness of the offense, the complicated nature of either the offense or the possible defenses, events during
trial raising difficult legal questions, and the personal characteristics of the defendant, such as youth or
mental incapacity. Id at 249-52.
234. 388 U.S. 25 (1949).
235. Id at 27. Whether this language meant that due process protected against all searches that
violated the fourth amendment, or only against those searches that violated the "core" of that amendment, is unclear. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
FederalCourts,43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1101-08 (1959); Frank, The UnitedStates Supreme Court: 194849, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33 (1949).
236. 338 U.S. at 33.
237. Id at 29-3 1.
238. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
239. Other cases in the same category include Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1947) (due
process permits prosecution to comment on defendant's failure to testify, but might prohibit statute
declaring that "a permitted refusal to testify would compel an acceptance of the truth of the prosecution's evidence"); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (due
process permitted retrial of defendant after state-requested mistrial, but might be violated when trial
court clearly abused its discretion in declaring mistrial); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 463, 471,475-76 (1947) (combining the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions) (due process
did not bar second attempt at execution after first failed, but would forbid some cruel and unusual
punishments); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934) (described infra note 259).
240. 302 U.S. at 320-21. In Palko, defendant had been tried for first degree murder, convicted of
second degree murder, and then retried for first degree murder following the prosecution's successful

appeal. Id
241. Id at 322-23.

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 283 1982-1983

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:253

"Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected [defendant]
a hardhip so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?"242 The
answer here was "No," but the Court suggested that the answer might be
otherwise "if the state were permitted after a trial free from error to try the
accused over again. ' 243 The state in Palko was not "attempting to wear the
accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials," but simply seeking to obtain a single trial "free from the corrosion of substantial legal
error."244
In another set of cases decided during the same period, the Court found due
process violated by practices that arguably were contrary to a particular Bill of
Rights guarantee, but studiously avoided drawing an analogy to that guarantee. Thus, without mentioning the sixth amendment right to notice of the specific offense charged, the Court in Cole v. Arkansa 245 held that a state supreme
court violated the due process clause when it affirmed the conviction of defendants charged and tried for one offense on the ground that they had actually committed another offense. 24 6 Similarly, although the Court in Twining
had said that the privilege against self-incrimination was not a part of due
process, 247 the Court, without mentioning the privilege, developed a standard
barring state use of coerced confessions that was based on the same underlying
values as the privilege. 248 In the first due process confession cases of this period, the Court barred the use of confessions obtained through police techniques, such as physical abuse of the defendant, that were likely to produce
statements of doubtful reliability.24 9 But the Court gradually came to bar confessions whenever police interrogation methods had "critically impaired" the
defendant's "capacity for self-determination," 250 without regard to whether
those methods were likely to produce an untrustworthy statement. 25 ' Police
242. Id at 328.
243. Id; see also Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (state would offend due process "by brutal subjection of an individual to successive retrials
on a charge on which he has been acquitted").
244. 302 U.S. at 328.
245. 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
246. Id at 202. The Supreme Court in Cole held that the state court, on review of defendant's con-

victions for promoting an unlawful assembly, could not affirm the convictions under another section of
the same statute prohibiting the entirely separate offense of use of force to prevent another from engaging in a lawful vocation. Id The indictments referred only to the unlawful assembly offense, and the
jury had been charged only for that offense. Id at 197-99.
247. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1938) (dicta) (citing Twining); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (dicta) (citing Twining).
248. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing various due
process confession cases and noting their failure to mention fifth amendment); see also Y. KAMISAR,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-25 (1980) (discussing historical development of confessions standard up to 1964); 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 31-62,
90-1 19 (1973) (same).
249. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (whipping); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 226, 239-40 (1940) (persistent interrogation during a week of incommunicado detention);
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (194Z) (techniques confusing and implicitly threatening to prisoner).
250. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); see also Watts v.lndiana,
338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (statement produced by sustained police pressure does not issue from free choice
and therefore must be barred from evidence).
251. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (official pressure, fatigue, and ploy on friendship); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1954) (interrogation by psychiatrist who misrepresented
himself as doctor called to treat defendant's sinuses); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 321-22
(1963) (drug acting as truth serum).
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coercion violated due process, the Court noted, because the "ordered liberty"
standard required adherence to an "accusatorial" rather than an "inquisitorial" system of proof, with the state lacking the power to force a defendant to
convict himself "out of his own mouth. ' 252 The same concept of an accusatorial system also underlies the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina253
tion, although the Court did not draw the analogy until many years later.
By the late 1950's the Court had indicated, either through holding, dictum.
or implication, that the due process clause included elements of most of the
criminal procedure guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. The ordered liberty
standard encompassed at least one aspect of each of the following guarantees:
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches, 254 the fifth
amendment double jeopardy bar, 255 the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination, 256 the sixth amendment right to a public trial, 257 the sixth

amendment right to notice,258 the sixth amendment right to confrontation of
opposing witnesses, 25 9 the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel, 260 and the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 261 The Court also had held, however, that the ordered liberty
252. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,54 (1949); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)
(citing other confession cases that recognize this principle). The due process cases also suggested that
the admissibility of confessions depended in part upon the offensiveness of the police conduct in each
case. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 248, at 10-25. But the Court apparently found police conduct short of
physical abuse offensive because it was inconsistent with an accusatorial system. See Townsend v.
Sain,372 U.S. 293, 307-09 (1963) (if drug acting as truth serum given to defendant, confession inadmissible even if police unaware of drug's effect).
253. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). The fifth amendment privilege as understood during this
period arguably would not have been the basis for excluding coerced confessions even in a federal case.
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), treated the police coercion of confessions as an aspect of
fifth amendment law, id at 542, but the prevailing view was that the compulsion referred to in the fifth
amendment was only that produced by a court order to testify--that is, the compulsion resulting from
subjecting a witness to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). It was not until Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). that
the Court removed this traditional limit on the privilege's scope and held that nonjudicial compulsion
violated the privilege. Id at 467. See Y. KASIMAR, supra note 248, at 35-37, 48-68 (discussing-and
criticizing-various authorities supporting pre-Miranda view that fifth amendment does not extend to
police station and therefore only due process clause covers coerced confessions).
254. Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (due process clause forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures, but does not require exclusionary rule).
255. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (dictum) (due process clause may bar some
retrials of defendant on same charge); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953) (due process clause may bar some retrials after mistrials).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 247-53 (due process clause bars use of coerced confessions).
257. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Oliver involved an unusual proceeding-a summary
contempt proceeding held before a one-man grand jury acting in secret session. Id at 258-59. The
Court found the contempt proceeding analogous to a criminal trial, stressed the fundamental nature of
the right to a public trial, and held that the secrecy of the proceeding resulted in a denial of due process.
Id at 265-73.
258. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). For a discussion of Cole, see supra notes 245-46 and
accompanying text.
259. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), finding no due process violation when a jury
viewed the scene of a crime in the absence of defendant, id at 108, but noting that due process requires
defendant's presence when necessary to secure a "fair and just hearing," id at 107-08, and citing the
right to confrontation as one justification for requiring defendant's presence. Id at 106.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 217-33 (discussing due process right to counsel).
261. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, 471, 475-76 (1947) (combining the
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions) (due process clause forbids some cruel and unusual
punishments).
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standard did not encompass various other aspects of these same guarantees 262
and did not require prosecution by indictment, as the fifth amendment requires in federal prosecutions, under any circumstances. 263 Although the
Court's partly-in and partly-out treatment of most of the criminal procedure
guarantees followed logically from traditional fundamental fairness analysis,
other Bill of Rights guarantees found to be fundamental were treated differently. In holding that the due process clause afforded protection against the
taking of property without providing just compensation and the abridgment of
the freedoms of speech, press, and religion, the Court had indicated that these
equal in scope to their counterparts in the fifth and first
protections were
264
amendments.
4.

Subjectivity and Fundamental Fairness

In Adamson v. California26 5 Justice Black, in the course of urging adoption
of total incorporation, 266 launched a vigorous attack against the alleged subjectivity of the fundamental fairness doctrine. Although Justice Black could
not convince a majority of the Court to adopt total incorporation, his criticism
of the fundamental fairness doctrine contributed substantially to the development of selective incorporation, the eventual majority position. A major argument advanced in favor of selective incorporation was that it would offer far
less potential for a subjective application of the ordered liberty standard than
did the fundamental fairness doctrine.267 Justice Black's criticism also may
have contributed, in part, to the development of per se rules in some of the
262. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937) (due process clause allows government
appeal and new trial that would be prohibited by fifth amendment double jeopardy clause); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, 56 (1947) (due process clause allows comment on defendant's failure to
testify that would be prohibited by fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-65, 471 (1942) (due process clause does not always require appointment of
counsel in felony cases; sixth amendment requires appointment of counsel in all federal felony cases).
263. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Hurtado was reaffirmed in numerous cases,
including Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 589 (1933), and Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86
(1928).
264. Although Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), did not state that due process
protection against takings without compensation would be equal in scope to the fifth amendment protection, subsequent cases drew no distinction between takings by state and federal governments. See
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (discussing fifth and fourteenth amendment
protections against takings without compensation as if equivalent); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (applying fifth amendment precedent to a takings claim brought under fourteenth
amendment). Similarly, while early opinions had suggested that due process protection of freedom of
speech might not be as extensive as first amendment protection, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), subsequent cases indicated that the same standards applied to both
state and federal cases involving first amendment freedoms. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 162 (1943); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). A few Justices continued to
maintain, however, that fourteenth amendment protection of the freedom of speech and press might not
be as broad as first amendment protection. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 182, 190 (1969) (citing opinions of Justices Holmes, Harlan, and Jackson). See also
infra notes 437-42 (discussing the first amendment precedent).
265. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 106-18 (discussing Justice Black's dissent in Adamson).
267. See infra text at notes 464-75 (discussing the subjectivity argument). Of course, Justice Black
would have abandoned the ordered liberty test altogether, see supra notes 161-63 and accompanying
text, but the supporters of selective incorporation would not have gone that far to avoid subjective
adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 474-75. Indeed, neither would the other Justices supporting total incorporation have gone that far. See supra note 118 (other Justices favored retaining due
process concept for cases not covered by Bill of Rights).

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 286 1982-1983

1982]

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION

1950's decisions applying the fundamental fairness doctrine. 26 8
Justice Black contended in Adamson that the fundamental fairness doctrine
permitted the Court to "substitut[e] its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights. ' 269 Application of the
fundamental fairness standard, he noted in a subsequent case, "depend[ed] enrather than upon
tirely on the particular judge's idea of ethics and morals" '270
Although Jus"boundaries fixed by the written words of the Constitution.
tice Black thought that many fundamental fairness decisions reflected this idiowere the
syncratic approach to adjudication, 2 71 perhaps his prime examples
273
decisions in Rochin v. California272 and Irvine v. California.
In Rochin the police, having "some information" that defendant was selling
narcotics, entered his home without a warrant and forced open the door to his
bedroom.274 When the surprised defendant immediately shoved two capsules
believed to be narcotics into his mouth, the police grabbed him and attempted
to extract the capsules, but the defendant then swallowed them.2 75 The police
then took the protesting defendant to a doctor, who forced an emetic solution
2 76
into defendant's stomach, causing him to vomit the morphine capsules.
277
the
Describing the police action as "conduct that shocks the conscience,"
Court held that due process no more permitted the use of the capsules in evidence than it would a coerced confession.2 78 "Due process," the Court added,
was a principle that "precludes defining . . . more precisely than to say that
convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of

justice.'

"279

In Irvine, although the plurality described the police action as flagrant and
deliberate misconduct, 280 it held that the conduct did not reach the level of
offending that sense of justice.2 8 1 The police there had made repeated illegal
entries into defendant's home to install secret microphones, including one2 in
82
his bedroom, with which they listened to his conversations for over a month.
The plurality distinguished Rochin as a case involving "coercion, violence
[and] brutality to the person" rather than, as in Irvine, a "trespass to property,
plus eavesdropping." 283 Justice Frankfurter, however, who had written the
268. Consider, for example, the right to counsel decisions discussed in Israel, supra note 227, at 24245, 249-51 (discussing unqualified right to hired counsel in all cases and to appointed counsel in capital
cases).
269. 332 U.S. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
270. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
271. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 79-91 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing cases in
which Court applied fundamental fairness standard); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952)
(Black, J., concurring) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514-16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (same).
272. 342 U.S 165 (1952).
273. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
274. Id at 166.
275. Id
276. Id
277. Id at 172.
278. Id at 173.
279. Id
280. 347 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion).
281. Id at 133.
282. Id at 132.
283. Id at 133.
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opinion of the Court in Rochin, concluded that the two cases were not distinguishable. Although "[t]here was lacking [in Zrpine] physical violence, even to
the restricted extent employed in Rochin," the police had engaged in "a more
powerful and offensive control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited trespass. ' 284 Justice Black argued, in a subsequent case,28 5 that this division of the
Court in Irvine revealed that the "adhoc approach" of the Court in Rochin
and Irvine consisted of no more than determining whether "five justices are
to "shock [the police action] into
sufficiently revolted by local police action"
286
the protective arms of the Constitution."
In both Rochin and Irvine Justice Frankfurter took sharp exception to Justice Black's characterization of the Court's fundamental fairness analysis as
basically subjective. Justice Frankfurter admitted that the case-by-case application of the ordered liberty standard required the exercise of judicial judgment in an "empiric process" for which there was no "mechanical
yardstick. 28 7 This lack of fixed standards did not mean, however, that judges
were "at large" to draw upon their "merely personal and private notions" of
justice.28 8 In each due process case, the Court was required to undertake a
"disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science. '28 9 Past cases illustrated
that this inquiry looked not to personal preferences, but to external evidence of
permanent and pervasive notions of fairness, such as the positions taken in the
federal constitution and early state constitutions, the standards currently applied in the various states, and the viewpoints of other countries with similar
jurisprudential traditions.2 90 Moreover, in evaluating that evidence and reaching its conclusion, the Court was limited by the traditional standards of judicial review, requiring reasoned results that build upon prior decisions.2 9 1 Thus,
284. Id at 145 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
285. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
286. Id at 665 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark,

J., concurring)). Another case often cited along with Rochin and Irvine as illustrating the subjectivity of
fundamental fairness analysis is Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Court there held that
the taking of a blood sample from an unconscious driver, who had been involved in a fatal accident and
was believed to be intoxicated, did not violate due process. 352 U.S. at 433-35. The majority stressed

that the taking of a blood sample had become "routine in our everyday life," and the interests ofsociety
in gaining scientific evidence of intoxication, to help deter "the increasing slaughter on our highways,"

outweighed "so slight an intrusion" of a person's body. Id at 436, 439. In dissent, Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black and Douglas, argued that reversal was required if Rochin "is to retain its

vitality and stand as more than an instance of personal revulsion against particular police methods." Id
at 440. See also Kamisar,Due Processand CriminalProcedure, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HANDBOOK

1, 35 (National Colleges of District Attorneys ed. 1977) ("[ilt is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
only personal reaction to the stomach pump, the blood test and electronic surveillance in a bedroom
can distinguish the results in Rochin, Breithaupt and Irvine. The Breithaupt and Irvine dissenters cer-

tainly thought so").
287. 347 U.S. at 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

288. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170 (Frankfurter, J.)
289. Id at 192.

290. See Kadish, supra note 159, at 329-33. Professor Kadish noted four different sources that the
Court frequently considered in seeking to establish prevailing moral judgments: (1) the opinions of the
progenitors of American institutions (e.g., colonial history, early state constitutions, and federal constitutions); (2) the implicit opinions of the policy making organs of state governments; (3) the explicit
opinions of other American courts; and (4) the opinions of other countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Id. at 329-33. Professor Kadish concluded that due process determinations did lend themselves to
rational inquiry, although the Court's institutional limitations posed difficulties in pursuing an appropriate inquiry. Id at 346-63.
291. Id at 358-63.
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while the fundamental fairness standard might require a more finely tuned
analysis than other areas of constitutional adjudication, it rested on a process
of rational inquiry entirely consistent with the "nature of our judicial
process." 292
Justice Black's criticism of the fundamental fairness doctrine also rested in
part on his assumption that the alternative of relying upon the "clearly marked
constitutional boundaries" of specific Bill of Rights guarantees would offer far
less room for subjective judgments. 293 Justices favoring the fundamental fairness doctrine challenged this assumption. Justice Harlan, for example, argued
that Justice Black's formula for achieving judicial restraint was "more hollow
than real." 294 Justice Harlan suggested that the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights often were as amenable to a subjective interpretation as the fundamental fairness standard of due process. 2 95 Under Justice Black's position, the focus of judicial inquiry would be shifted from the flexible concept of ordered
liberty to equally flexible terms found in most of the amendments. Terms like
"probable cause," "unreasonable search," and "speedy and public trial" are
hardly self-defining. 2 96 Justice Harlan acknowledged that reliance upon the
specifics of the Bill of Rights was likely to produce different results from reliance upon the fundamental fairness doctrine, 297 but the analysis involved
would be no less subjective.
Indeed, Justice Black's own position in Rochin supports Justice Harlan's response. Justice Black agreed that there had been a constitutional violation in
292. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170-71 (Frankfurter, J.).
293. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black did not go
as far as to suggest that reliance on the specific guarantees would totally eliminate subjectivity. His
theory merely was that "unfettered judicial subjectivity [was eliminated] by pinning down constitutional adjudication to the interpretation of specific written language." Kadish, supra note 159, at 337.
He recognized that not all of the specific guarantees were stated in "absolute and unqualified language," that provisions like the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches did "require courts to choose between competing policies." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952)
(Black, J., concurring). The fourth amendment, however, itself directed the Court to make such
choices; "no express constitutional language grant[ed]. . . judicial power to invalidate every state law
of every kind deemed 'unreasonable' or contrary to the Court's notion of civilized decencies." Id (emphasis in original). But cf.J. ELY, supra note 34, at 14-41 (discussing impossibility of "clause bound
interpretism" in light of open-ended provisions such as due process clause, equal protection clause, and
ninth amendment).
294. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan concluded that judicial restraint was best achieved by "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings
of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the
great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and
preserving American freedoms." Id; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172-83 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
295. Grinvold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
296. See Friendly, The Bill ofRights as a Code of CriminalProcedure,53 CALIF. L. Rev.929, 937
(1965). Judge Friendly notes:
There is grave risk of self-delusion in the reiterated references to the declarations of fundamental principles in the Bill of Rights as "specifics". . . . The Court ought never to forget
the reminder of one of its greatest members: "Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy
throughout the law." [Texas v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).]
However ardent the desire may be, no facile formula will enable the Court to escape its assignedtask of deciding just what the Constitution protects from state action. ...
Friendly, supra.
297. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 172 (1968).
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Rochin, but he based that conclusion on the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination rather than on the "evanescent" standard of fundamental
fairness. 298 To find that the privilege had been violated, however, Justice
Black arguably had to make value judgments very much like those required by
a fundamental fairness analysis. To treat the stomach pumping as compulsory
self-incrimination, Justice Black had to conclude that the privilege extended to
obtaining nontestimonial evidence, as well as testimonial evidence, and prohibited physical compulsion, as well as the compulsion of a court order. The
highly debatable nature of the first proposition, in particular, is evinced by
later cases indicating that a majority of the Court, unlike Justice Black, would
not have accepted it.299 Moreover, as Justice Black's own dissent in one of
those later cases indicates, to justify applying the fifth amendment to the compulsion of nontestimonial evidence, one must turn to basically the same kind
of analysis of the nature of society's "respect for the dignity of the individual '300 as was employed in Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in
Rochin.301
II. THE ADVENT OF SELECTIVE INCORPORATION
A.

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND SELECTIVE INCORPORATION: SIMILARITIES
AND DIFFERENCES

During the 1960's the prevailing due process theory shifted from the fundamental fairness doctrine to the selective incorporation doctrine. The two doctrines are much alike in several respects. Both read the due process clause as
encompassing only those rights deemed fundamental under an "ordered liberty" standard. Both recognize that the "ordered liberty" standard includes
substantive as well as procedural rights and is not limited to rights established
by historical usage at the time of the Constitution's adoption. 30 2 Both agree
that the "ordered liberty" standard may encompass rights that extend beyond
298. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175-77.
299. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (extraction of blood sample from injured
person over his objection does not violate fifth amendment privilege). The majority held that the privilege only prohibits compelling a person "to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." Id Blood test evidence, "although an incriminating product of compulsion," was not testimonial and did not "relat[e] to some communicative act or
writing" of the defendant. Id at 765. Justice Black dissented in Schmerber and other cases resting on
the distinction between physical and testimonial evidence. Id at 773-78 (Black, J., dissenting); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 277-78 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
The Schrmerber majority accepted the Rochin precedent-based upon due process considerations,
rather than upon the fifth amendment privilege-but found, on the basis of Breithaupt v. Abram, discussed supra note 286, that the case before it "did not offend 'that "sense ofjustice"' of which we spoke
in Rochin . California,342 U.S. 165.'" 384 U.S. at 760 (quoting Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435).

300. See Kadish, supra note 159, at 347 (suggesting that respect for individual dignity is one value
inherent in due process and reflected in self-incrimination privilege).
301. CompareRochin, 342 U.S. at 173 ("[t]o attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call 'real
evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions") with
Schmnerber, 384 U.S. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "shadowy distinction" drawn by the
majority between "physical evidence" and testimonial evidence, and challenging the "hierarchy of values that allows the State to extract a human being's blood to convict him ... but proscribes compelled
production of his lifeless papers").
302. See supra text accompanying notes 153-60 (discussing concept of a flexible, evolving due process that encompasses both procedural and substantive rights and is not tied to historical practice).
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the specific Bill of Rights guarantees, as well as rights found within those
guarantees.
There is a crucial disagreement, however, about how the "ordered liberty"
standard should be used in identifying fundamental rights. Initially, the two
doctrines differ in the scope of the right assessed under the "ordered liberty"
standard when that right is found in a Bill of Rights guarantee. The fundamental fairness doctrine focuses on that aspect of the guarantee that was denied by a state in a particular case and often assesses the significance of that
element of the guarantee in light of the special circumstances of the individual
case. 30 3 The selective incorporation doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on the
total guarantee rather than on a particular aspect presented in an individual
case. It assesses the fundamental nature of the guarantee as a whole rather
than any one principle based on the guarantee. For example, in Palko v. Connecticut3 4 the Court asked whether the ordered liberty standard required freedom from "that kind of double jeopardy" imposed upon the defendant
Palko.30 5 In a selective incorporation inquiry the Court would ask whether the
double jeopardy is "fundamental to the American
general prohibition30against
6
scheme of justice."
The difference in the scope of the right assessed carries over to the scope of
the rulings under the two doctrines. Theoretically, fundamental fairness rulings should go no further than to establish due process protection parallel to
the one aspect of the Bill of Rights guarantee presented in the particular
case.30 7 Selective incorporation, however, judges the guarantee as a whole and
produces a ruling that encompasses the full scope of the guarantee. Under
selective incorporation, when a guarantee is found to be fundamental, due process "incorporates" the guarantee and extends to the states the same standards
that apply to the federal government under that guarantee. Thus, under selective incorporation a ruling that a particular guarantee is within the "ordered
liberty" concept carries over to the states the "entire accompanying doctrine"
interpreting that guarantee. 30 This has led some commentators to describe selective incorporation as giving a "wholesale character" to each such ruling. 30 9
303. The fundamental fairness rulings varied in the weight they gave to the special circumstances of
the case and arguably were not always consistent in this regard. For example, Kamisar, supra note 235,
at 1101-02, notes that the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), apparently gave no
consideration to the facts of the illegal search, which suggests that no exclusion of illegally seized evidence would be required no matter how egregious the invasion of privacy. On the other hand, in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the offensiveness of the police methods in that case was key
to the finding of a due process violation. Id. at 172-74. The Court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954), again considered the particular police conduct in that case, but found no violation. Id. at 133.
See also supra text accompanying notes 234-37, 272-86 (discussing Wo/f,Rochin, and Irvine).
304. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
305. Id. at 327. See supra text accompanying note 242 (discussing application of fundamental fairness doctrine in Palko).
306. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).(discussed infra in text accompanying notes
311-13, 357-59).
307. Not all fundamental fairness rulings were so limited, however. See, for example, the rulings on
first amendment rights and the right to just compensation for appropriated property, discussed supra in
the text accompanying note 264 and infra in the text accompanying notes 437-43. See also the positions
taken by Justices Clark and Stewart, discussed infra in the text accompanying note 375.
308. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
309. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 294-95; see also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 488 (10th ed.
1980) (discussing "wholesale" approach of Court).
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The selective incorporation doctrine also departs from the fundamental fairness doctrine in its analysis of the "ordered liberty" concept. Whereas the fundamental fairness doctrine asks whether a "fair and enlightened system of
justice" would be "impossible" without a particular safeguard, 310 the selective
incorporation doctrine "proceed[s] upon the. . . assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems
bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been
developing contemporaneously in England and in this country."' 3 11 Accordingly, it directs a court to test the fundamental nature of a right within the
context of that common law system of justice, rather than against some hypothesized "civilized system" or a foreign system growing out of different traditions.3 1 2 The question to be asked, the Court has noted, is whether a
procedure "is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. '31 3
Consistent with this approach, the Court gives considerable weight to the very
presence of a right within the Bill of Rights because that presence reflects an
important body of opinion as to the need for such a right in a common law
system. 3t4
B.

THE DECISIONS OF THE SIXTIES

The shift from fundamental fairness to selective incorporation began with a
series of Supreme Court majority opinions sufficiently ambiguous to make it
uncertain whether the Court had adopted selective incorporation as the majority position. The Court's failure to explicitly recognize the new doctrine probably stemmed in part from the composition of the majority in those earlier
cases. In each instance, the opinion for the Court was joined by at least one
Justice who did not accept the new doctrine, but apparently found equally
broad protection of the particular right under a very liberal view of the fundamental fairness doctrine. 3 15 In addition, two Justices joining the majority, Jus310. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
311. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
312. Id
313. Id at 150 n.14. The emphasis on applying the "ordered liberty" standard in the context of an
Anglo-American system of justice is found primarily in cases dealing with procedural rights. The Anglo-American process of adjudication does, of course, differ in many respects from the civil law systems
found in many other countries. Arguably, the uniqueness of America's traditions, political structure,
and institutions should lead to a similar emphasis on an American concept of justice in evaluating
matters of substantive due process. In assessing the fundamental nature of those substantive limitations
that have a direct bearing upon the criminal justice process, for example, the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court has looked to American traditions. See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (noting general recognition in this country that persons addicted to drugs
are "in a state of mental and physical illness").
314. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (inclusion of right to confront witness in sixth
amendment indicates it is fundamental); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (court has "increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to determine whether a state
criminal trial was conducted with due process"); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (Bill of Rights is guide for content of due process); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 183 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing selective incorporation cases for having defined "fundamental" as meaning basically "'old,' 'much praised' and 'found in the Bill of Rights' ").
315. Justice Stewart joined the opinion of the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
wrote the opinion for the Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and joined the plurality
opinion in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). He wrote separately, however, rejecting selective
incorporation, in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Stewart, J., concurring), and joined Justice
Harlan's dissents criticizing the selective incorporation doctrine in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
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tices Black and Douglas, probably had not yet3 16relinquished their hope of
gaining majority support for total incorporation.
The first of these cases that arguably produced the complete incorporation
of a Bill of Rights guarantee was Mapp v. Ohio,3 17 which overruled in part
Woff v. Colorado31 8 and held that due process required exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence. 31 9 Noting that Wolf had recognized that due process encompassed the "basic search and seizure prohibition" of the fourth
amendment, 320 the Court reasoned that it logically followed that due process
should enforce that prohibition through the one remedy that was equally a
part of the fourth amendment. 32' Mapp made it clear that the fourth amendment right of privacy protected by due process would be enforced by "the
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. '322 It
was unclear, however, whether that right of privacy incorporated precisely the
same standards for judging the constitutionality of state searches as were applied under the fourth amendment. Although Mapp's description of Wolf
seemed to support the view that the same standards should be applied,32 3 Wolf
itself had been decided under a fundamental fairness analysis that might give a
narrower scope to what the Court in Woff described as that privacy "at the
core of the Fourth Amendment. ' 324 Two years after Mapp, however, in Ker v.
Calfornia325 the Court erased any doubts as to whether Mapp fully incorporated the fourth amendment. The constitutionality of state searches, the Court
held, should be judged under precisely the same standards applied to federal
171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting). Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1969), stated: "I
think this theory is incorrect as a matter of constitutional history, and that as a matter of constitutional
law it is both stultifying and unsound." Id. at 143 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the plurality
opinion in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), but joined Justice Harlan's dissent criticizing selective
incorporation in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
316. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 345-47 (Douglas, J., concurring). The votes of Justices
Black and Douglas were crucial to the support of selective incorporation throughout the 1960's because
no more than four other Justices supported the doctrine at any one time. From 1962 to 1965 additional
support came from Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Goldberg, and White. Justice Fortas,
who replaced Justice Goldberg in 1965, did not support the doctrine in its entirety. See infra text
accompanying notes 376-81 (discussing Justice Fortas' views). Justice Marshall, however, who replaced
Justice Clark in 1967, fully supported the doctrine. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
(Marshall opinion applying selective incorporation doctrine).
317. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
318. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
319. 367 U.S. at 655-56.
320. Id at 654 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).
321. 367 U.S. at 655. Justice Black joined the majority opinion, providing the necessary fifth vote,
but he noted in a concurring opinion that he viewed the exclusionary rule as required by "the interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," rather than the fourth amendment alone. Id at
662 (Black, J., concurring).
322. Id at 655.
323. The Mapp Court noted that Wolf had rendered "the Fourth Amendment's, right of privacy"
enforceable against the states and had extended "the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal." Id at 655-56. Earlier in Mapp, however, the
Court described Wolf as applying the "basic search and seizure prohibition" of the fourth amendment
to the states. Id at 654 (emphasis added) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).
324. 338 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); see also supra note 235 (discussing scope of due process protection under Wol).
325. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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searches under the fourth amendment. 3 26
The year following Mapp, in Robinson v. California,32 7 the Supreme Court
held that due process was violated by a state statute making it.a crime to be
addicted to narcotics. 328 Any punishment of the mere status of addiction, the
Court found, constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '329 Justice Stewart, who had not yet taken a firm position on the selective incorporation doctrine, wrote the opinion for the
Court. 330 His opinion indicated that at least certain violations of the eighth
amendment would also violate due process, 331 but left uncertain whether due
process prohibited all punishments that would violate the eighth amendment.
In later years, however, the
Court read Robinson as having decided that due
3 32
process does exactly that.
Gideon v. Wainwright,333 decided the next year, arguably was the first case to
explicitly adopt the selective incorporation analysis. 334 Justice Black's opinion
for the Court in Gideon, however, was not without ambiguities. Overruling
Betts v. Brady,335 Gideon held that the fourteenth amendment requires appointment of counsel in state courts under the same standard that the sixth
amendment imposes on federal courts. 336 Justice Black read the prior due process cases as holding "that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair triar is made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. '337 The Brady Court had erred, he argued, when it
concluded that
the sixth amendment right to counsel was not such a funda338
mental right.
In suggesting that the full guarantee was "made obligatory upon the states,"
Justice Black's analysis was clearly contrary to the fundamental fairness doctrine. His opinion, however, failed to acknowledge the true fundamental rights
analysis of Betts v. Brady. That case had not totally rejected the fundamental
character of the sixth amendment right to counsel; rather, it had found that the
326. id at 30-31. The reference was to constitutional standards alone. The Court noted that there
were additional "principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials," imposed

pursuant to the Court's "supervisory authority over the administration ofjustice in the federal courts,"
that related to federal searches. Id at 31.
327. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

328. Id at 667.
329. Id

330. See supra note 315 (discussing Justice Stewart's participation in apparently conflicting opinions
on selective incorporation); infra text accompanying note 375 (same).
331. Justice Stewart did not discuss the issue of incorporation, but merely cited Louisiana ex rel
Francisv. Resweber, discussed supra at note 239, in concluding that punishment of a disease "would
doubtless be... an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 370 U.S. at 666. Francis was based upon a fundamental fairness analysis and did
not suggest that eighth and fourteenth amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment
were necessarily coextensive.
332. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-41, 257-58 n.l (1972) (Brennan &
Douglas, JJ., concurring).
333. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
334. See L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 161 (1975) (Gideon "inaugurated the process of selective
'incorporation' ").
335. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 232-33 (discussing Bells v. Brady).
336. 372 U.S. at 342.
337. Id

338. Id
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right was fundamental under some circumstances and not others. 339 The doctrinal significance of overruling Brady was therefore muddied. Justice Harlan,
in a concurring opinion, noted his understanding that the Court had not departed from the fundamental fairness principles of Palko v. Connecticut,340 nor
embraced the concept "that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the
Sixth Amendment as such." 34 1 Justice Douglas, in a separate concurrence, disagreed. 342 He described the fundamental fairness approach as reflecting a
"view that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights that is made applicable to the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of the same
Government" and noted that that view
guarantee as applied to the Federal
'343
simply "ha[d] not prevailed.
The following year, in Malloy v. Hogan,344 the Court clearly indicated that
Justice Douglas' response to Justice Harlan was the majority view. 345 Malloy
held that the privilege against self-incrimination was a fundamental right and
therefore safeguarded against state action under the applicable federal standard of the fifth amendment. 346 Rejecting the prosecution's contention that
due process protection might be "less stringent" than that provided by the fifth
amendment itself, the Court noted that cases such as Ker v. Caiffornia347 and
Gideon had "rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
the States only a 'watered-down,' subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. ' 34 8 Once the Court had determined, upon analysis of
an entire guarantee, 349 that it protected a fundamental right, that guarantee
"[was to] be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the350 same standards that . . . [protect] against federal
encroachment."
Malloy left no doubt that selective incorporation had become the prevailing
doctrine, and a series of cases decided during the remainder of the decade
reaffirmed that position. Those cases held applicable to the states, under the
same standards applied to the federal government, the sixth amendment rights
to a speedy trial, 351 to a trial by jury,352 to confront opposing witnesses, 353 and
to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, 354 and the fifth amendment
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (discussing Brady).
See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text (discussing Palko).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id at 345 (Douglas, J., concurring).

343. Id at 346-47 (Douglas, J., concurring).
344. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
345. Id at 10-11.
346. Id at 3.
347. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
348. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11 (quoting Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)).
349. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10. In determining that the fifth amendment privilege was fundamental,
Malloy did not look to the particular fifth' amendment standard involved in the particular case, the
standard requiring a judge to accept a claim of the privilege unless it is "perfectly clear" that the
witness' answer "cannot possibly" furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute. Instead,
Malloy considered the entire privilege, noting its recognition in past cases as an "essential mainstay" of
an accusatorial system of justice, and determined that it was obligatory on the state. Id at 7-8.
350. Id at 10.
351. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
352. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
353. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
354. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
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prohibition against double jeopardy. 355 In each of these cases the Court applied a selective incorporation analysis, and in two instances it overruled longstanding' fundamental fairness decisions. 356 Moreover, in Duncan v. Louisiana357 the Court noted that it had narrowed the focus of the inquiry under the
"ordered liberty" standard; the crucial issue was not whether a particular right
was "fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be
imagined," but whether it was "fundamental in the context of the criminal
processes maintained by the American States. '358 The Duncan Court recognized that this approach, along with the focus on the nature of the right as a
whole,3 59 was far more likely to produce a finding that a particular right was
3 60
implicit in the concept of "ordered liberty."
By the end of the decade the Court had, as Justice Brennan later noted,
changed the "face of the law."' 36 1 The decisions of the 1960's had selectively
incorporated all but four of the Bill of Rights guarantees relating to the criminal justice process: public trial, notice of charges, prohibition of excessive bail,
and prosecution by indictment. Of these four remaining guarantees, it seemed
likely that all except prosecution by indictment would be held to be fundamental once they were squarely presented for decision. In re Oliver,362 a 1948 ruling that found a due process violation in a denial of a public trial, had been
described in dictum as having selectively incorporated that sixth amendment
guarantee. 363 Because Oliver also spoke of due process protection of "[a] person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, ' '3 64 a similar reading
355. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
356. Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 395 U.S. at 794. Duncan overruled
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 391 U.S. at 155. See also note 419 (discussing selective incorporation overrulings).
357. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
358. Id at 149 n.14. See supra text accompanying notes 310-14 (discussing narrowed analysis of
"ordered liberty" concept under selective incorporation doctrine).
359. Although the precise issue posed in Duncan was whether due process was violated by the failure
to provide a jury trial on a misdemeanor charge punishable by two years imprisonment, the Court's
analysis of the fundamental nature of the sixth amendment right treated the importance of the right to
jury trial in general. 391 U.S. at 146-57. Only after the Court held that the sixth amendment right was
fundamental did it consider whether the right applied to a two year misdemeanor charge. Id at 159-62.
360. Id at 150, n.14. The Court stated:
When the inquiry is approached in this way the question whether the States can impose criminal punishment without granting a jury trial appears quite different from the way it appeared
in the older cases opining that States might abolish jury trial. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900). A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to
imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the
purposes that the jury serves in the English and American systems. Yet no American State
has undertaken to construct such a system. . . . In every State. . . the structure and style of
the criminal process--the supporting framework and the subsidiary procedures-are of the
sort that naturally complement jury trial, and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial.
Id
361. Brennan, State Constitutionsandthe Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493
(1977) (also referring to cases of the same period expanding the scope of particular guarantees).
362. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
363. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (listing public trial as one of the sixth amendment rights "held applicable to the States" and citing Oliver); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
(1968) (including right to public trial among list of incorporated rights and citing Oliver).
364. 333 U.S. at 273 (1948).
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seemed likely concerning the notice provision of the sixth amendment. 365 Possible incorporation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of excessive bail
was perhaps more questionable, but early in the 1970's the Court indicated
that it was likely to deem that provision fundamental also. 366 The only guarantee that appeared unlikely to be incorporated was the fifth amendment requirement of prosecution by indictment; Hurtado v. Calfornia, 36 7 which held that
not obligatory on the states, 368 continued to be
prosecution by indictment was
369
challenge.
without
accepted
The selective incorporation opinions of the 1960's were never unanimous.
Justice Harlan was the most persistent objector. He could find "no support
either in history or reason ' 370 for what he described as "little more than a
diluted form" of the previously "discredited" total incorporation theory. 37 1 He
urged continued application of the traditional fundamental fairness approach,
although he apparently had no quarrel with Duncan's insistence that the fundamental nature of a right be determined within the context of an "AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty." 372 Justice Harlan reached the same result as the Court in several cases, 3 7 3 but he stressed that his rulings were limited to the particular aspect of the Bill of Rights guarantee presented in the
individual case. 374 On occasion Justices Stewart and Clark joined Justice
Harlan's criticism of the selective incorporation doctrine; they also joined
opinions, however, in which the Court indicated that the due process clause
365. Without mentioning the sixth amendment, the Court in Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948),
also found that notice of the specific charge is a constitutional right of every accused in state and federal
courts and that denial of notice is a violation of due process. Id at 201. See notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing Cole).
366. In Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), the Court found it unnecessary to reach that issue, but
noted that "[b]ail, of course, is basic to our system of law. . . and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id at 365.
367. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
368. Id at 538; see also supra text accompanying notes 180-90 (discussing Hurlado).
369. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962) (noting consistent denial of grand jury
for state prosecutions since Hurtado); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1932) (federal concepts of "grand jury" not obligatory on states); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 102, 119 (1975) (approving
prosecution by information). See also supra note 263 (citing earlier decisions reaffirming Hurtado).
370. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
371. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
372. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 179 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 313 (describing Anglo-American approach to ordered liberty concept). In applying the fundamental fairness doctrine, Justice Harlan looked to Anglo-American sources, but gave much less
weight than the majority to a particular prohibition's inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 179 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Benton, 395 U.S. at 808 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's
use of Bill of Rights in determination of fundamental rights); supra note 314 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's reliance on Bill of Rights to determine fundamental rights).
373. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinions in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967),
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,408 (1965), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963). Justice
Harlan continuously stressed, however, that the difference between a fundamental fairness approach
and a selective incorporation approach "is not an abstract one whereby different verbal formulae
achieve the same results." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
374. See, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (denial of defendant's right to
call codefendant as witness violates due process); Pointer, 382 U.S. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(use of preliminary examination testimony of witness not subject to cross-examination violates due
process); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring) (indigent defendants in felony cases have a
due process right to appointed counsel).
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made a particular guarantee fully applicable to the states. 37 5 They apparently
believed that the fundamental fairness standard, as to that guarantee, required
protection parallel to that provided against the federal government.
Justice Fortas expressed perhaps, the most significant disagreement with the
majority, from the viewpoint of its subsequent impact, in Duncan v. Louisiana.376 Unlike Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Clark, Justice Fortas apparently
accepted selective incorporation as the general ru.le. 377 A guarantee like the
jury trial provision, however, required a different approach. Justice Fortas
noted that the Court here was concerned with "more than a principle ofjustice
applicable to individual cases. '3 78 The sixth amendment also imposed a "system of administration"; it prescribed, for example, the size of the jury (twelve)
and the form of their verdict (unanimous). 379 Such requirements, he argued,
might very well not be fundamental and, therefore, should not be' applied to
the states. 380 It was not necessary to adhere so "slavishly" to the selective incorporation doctrine as to impose upon the states the total sixth amendment
guarantee, including "all its bag and baggage, however securely or insecurely
affixed they may be by law and precedent . ... ,381
Responding to Justice Fortas' concern, as well as to Justice Harlan's warning
against incorporation "jot-for-jot and case-by-case," 38 2 the Duncan majority
acknowledged that previous interpretations of the sixth amendment, relating to
such matters as jury size, may have been influenced by the fact that they would
apply only in the "limited environment" of the federal courts, where "uniformity is a more obvious and immediate consideration. '383 The Court noted, however, that "our decisions
interpreting the Sixth Amendment are always subject
38 4
to reconsideration."
C.

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION IN THE

POST-1960'S

In the years since the 1960's the battle over selective incorporation has been
fought primarily in cases in which a substantial number of Justices believed
that a pre-incorporation precedent interpreting a particular guarantee should
not be applied to the states. The choice posed for those Justices has been between a route the Duncan majority seemed to suggest and a return to fundamental fairness analysis. If they chose the route suggested by Duncan, they
could reconsider the past precedent and hold it no longer to be required by the
guarantee, thus avoiding application to the states while adhering to the concept
375. See supra note 315 (reviewing votes of Justices Stewart and Clark on selective incorporation

issues).

376. 391 U.S. 145, 211 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).

377. Justice Fortas joined the opinions for the Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In Duncan he noted his agreement with the
incorporation of the first amendment, the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment rights to counsel and to confrontation. 391 U.S. at 214
(Fortas, J., concurring).
378. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 214 (Fortas, J., concurring).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
381. Id. at 213-14 (Fortas, J., concurring).
382. Id. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 158 n.30.

384. Id.
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of full application of all incorporated guarantees. If they chose to return to
fundamental fairness, they could retain the prior interpretation, but discard the
concept of full application, and hold that the interpretation related to a matter
not sufficiently fundamental to extend to the states. In each instance, the majority of the Court favored the Duncan alternative and adhered to the concept
of full application of all incorporated guarantees.
The first case to present this choice was Williams v. Florida,38 5 which challenged the sixth amendment requirement of a twelve-person jury.386 The majority adhered to full incorporation of the sixth amendment right to jury
trial,38 7 but found that earlier cases assuming that a jury must contain twelve
persons had gone beyond the basic protection provided by the jury trial guarantee.388 Justice Harlan argued that the Court had taken a "circuituous route"
to reach a result proper in a state case, but not in a federal case. 389 He urged a
return to the fundamental fairness doctrine because that route would permit
the states to retain six-person juries, while giving full recognition to the history
juries. 390 Jusof the sixth amendment, which clearly mandated twelve-person
39 '
tice Harlan stood alone on this approach, however.
Two years later, in a very similar case, again only one Justice expressed a
preference for the fundamental fairness doctrine, although that preference determined the outcome of the case. Apodaca v. Oregon 392 presented the question whether a state could allow a less than unanimous jury verdict. 393 Eight
Justices proceeded from a selective incorporation viewpoint and treated the
question as requiring an interpretation of the sixth amendment, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Four Justices concluded
it
that the sixth amendment required unanimity,3 94 and four concluded that395

permitted nonunanimous verdicts of the type involved in the Apodaca case.

385. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
386. The issue in Williams was whether a state could use a six person jury to try a noncapital felony

offense. Id.
387. Id.
388. See id. at 90-103 (discussing history of twelve person jury and holding six person jury

constitutional).
389. Id. at 118-19 (Harlan, J., concurring).

390. Id. at 129-38 (Harlan, J., concurring).
391. Justice Stewart, who had joined Justice Harlan's dissent in Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), joined the majority opinion in Williams, 399 U.S. at 78, apparently because he felt bound
by the Duncan precedent. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(relying on Duncan in concluding unanimous verdict required). Chief Justice Burger also did not join
Justice Harlan in Williams, 399 U.S. at 117 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, he later advocated a
return to the fundamental fairness doctrine in at least some settings. See infra notes 399 & 401 (discussing opinions joined by Chief Justice Burger that argue against selective incorporation).
392. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
393. Id. at 406. Apodaca involved a 10-2 verdict in a felony case. A companion case, Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), upheld a 9-3 verdict in a felony case. Id. at 363. Jdhnion had arisen
before Duncan and therefore was decided on the basis of the due process clause without reference to an
incorporated sixth amendment. Id at 358-59.
394. These dissenting Justices inApodaca were Justice Douglas, 406 U.S. at 381, Justice Brennan, id.
at 396, Justice Marshall, id. at 400, and Justice Stewart, id. at 414. Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stewart also dissented in Johnson, discussed supra note 393, and thus found nonunanimous jury verdicts. unconstitutional with or without incorporation of the sixth amendment. Justice Douglas relied
upon the sixth amendment in both cases.
395. Id at 406. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id
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Justice Powell argued that this was an appropriate situation for application of
the more flexible fundamental fairness doctrine.39 6 Applying that doctrine, he
would hold that a state could utilize nonunanimous jury verdicts, 397 although
he would reach the opposite result for federal cases under the sixth amendment. 398 Because Justice Powell contributed the deciding vote in the case, the
state's use of nonunanimous verdicts was therefore upheld, even though the
same Court would have reached a different result in a federal case under the
sixth amendment.
Justice Powell persisted in the position he urged in Apodaca and subse3 99
quently gained the support of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
In Crist v. Bretz4 °° Justice Powell extended that position to a double jeopardy
problem, arguing that the due process standard for when double jeopardy attaches should be more flexible than the fifth amendment standard previously
applied in federal cases. 40 1 As in Apodaca, however, the majority adhered to
selective incorporation and held that the attachment
of jeopardy occurred at
40 2
the same point in both federal and state cases.
Even if the challenge presented to the selective incorporation doctrine in
cases such as Apodaca and Crist had been successful, it would not have destroyed the heart of the doctrine. Justice Powell's opposition to "jot-for-jot"
incorporation is very much like that of Justice Fortas.40 3 Although he has carried his opposition beyond the jury trial right, Justice Powell has expressed
concern only about applying to the states requirements that he characterizes as
"details" of constitutional administration. 4°4 He has not suggested that the
Court return to a fundamental fairness doctrine in dealing with search and
seizure, speedy trial, or various other criminal procedural rights. 40 5 Justice
Rehnquist has suggested that he would like a broader return to fundamental
396. Id at 373 (Powell, J., concurring).
397. Id

398. Id at 371 (Powell, J., concurring).
399. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), in which Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, expressed his opposition to "full incorporation of the Sixth Amendment," but agreed that a five member jury violates due process. Id at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
See also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 632 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (fourteenth amendment right to jury trial not same as sixth amendment right).
400. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
401. Id at 52-53 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, argued that attachment of jeopardy under the fifth amendment did not occur until the first
witness was sworn. Id at 51-52. If it did occur, however, with the empanelment of the jury, as prior
federal cases suggested, then the swearing of the first witness should still be a satisfactory starting point
in state cases under a more flexible due process standard. Id at 52-53. On this issue, Justice Powell
noted, there was "no basis" for "jot-for-jot" incorporation under the fourteenth amendment. Id at 53.
402. Id at 38.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 376-81 (discussing Justice Fortas' disagreement with selective incorporation doctrine).
404. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to "details of the Federal Sixth
Amendment standards").
405. See Israel,supra note 3, at 1331 (Justice Powell applies same constitutional standards for search
and seizure and speedy trial in federal and state proceedings); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 440 n.23 (1974) (Justice Powell applied federal fourth amendment
terms to state search and seizure issues); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 n.15 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring) (rejection of incorporation of sixth amendment right to jury unanimity does not
require rejection of every incorporation precedent).
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fairness analysis, 4 °6 but has yet to advocate an across-the-board rejection of
selective incorporation. Thus, at least for the near future, a full scale revival of
the fundamental fairness versus selective incorporation controversy is unlikely.
To appreciate why the doctrine remains stable, notwithstanding a Court composition considerably different from that of the 1960's, closer attention must be
given to the rationale underlying the selective incorporation doctrine.
III.

THE RATIONALE OF SELECTIVE INCORPORATION

In 1965 Judge Henry Friendly, speaking of selective incorporation, noted
that "it does seem extraordinary that a theory going to the very nature of our
Constitution and having such profound effects for all of us should be carrying
the day without ever having been explicated in a majority opinion of the
Court.

' 40 7

Although selective incorporation continues to "carry the day," the

Court has yet to offer a full-fledged exposition of the doctrine's underlying
justifications. Although numerous opinions have described the doctrine's apLouisiana40 9 explained the shift in the focus of the
plication,40 8 and Duncan v. 410
"ordered liberty" standard,
no majority opinion has set forth in detail the
rationale that supports the doctrine as a whole. Indeed, there are those who
argue that the doctrine has no coherent constitutional rationale.4 1' They contend that it constitutes no more than a result-oriented modification of the total
incorporation theory-an attempt to achieve total incorporation, minus the
civil jury trial and grand jury guarantees. 4 12 The Court simply wanted to expand fourteenth amendment protection of civil liberties by applying to the
states all but two of the constitutional guarantees, and selective incorporation
was created as a doctrine that would eventually lead to exactly that result.
Selective incorporation, they argue, is a doctrine that lacks the textual and
or fundamental fairness and is
historical support of either total incorporation
4 13
justified only by its end product.
406. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's
view is that "not all the strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are carried over
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather it is only the 'general principle' of free
speech ... that the latter incorporates." Id
407. Friendly, supra note 296, at 934. Graham states that
[t]his process has been called "selective incorporation," "absorption," "inclusion," and other
names by various legal scholars, who have been unable to agree on a label for the theory
because the Supreme Court has never explained it in detail in a majority opinion and thus has
had no occasion to give it a name. While this is only a minor embarrassment to the Supreme
Court, it permits critics to point out that, however handy or beneficial the "selective incorporation" theory has been as an instrument of legal change, there seems to be no clear constitutional rationale for it.
INFLICTED WOUND 44 (1970).
408. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (describing application of the doctrine in
various 1960's cases); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968) (same).
409. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
410. Id at 149 n.14; see supra notes 310-14, 357-60 and accompanying text (discussing emphasis on
role of the guarantee within an "Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty").
411. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400,409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); L. LusKy, supra note 334, at 163; Henkin, supra note 5, at
77.
412. L. LUSKY, supra note 334, at 163.
413. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176, 180-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Henkin, supra note 5, at 77-78. Professor Henkin argues that

F. GRtAAM,THE SELF

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 301 1982-1983

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:253

Although the Court has not responded to such criticism, individual Justices
have. They have set forth in their separate opinions several justifications for
the shift from fundamental fairness to selective incorporation. 41 4 Together
they offer four reasons why selective incorporation provides a truer application
of the "ordered liberty" standard than a fundamental fairness analysis: (1)
selective incorporation is consistent with the earlier due process decisions,
which recognized that "ordered liberty" looked to the "absorption" of individual guarantees;41 5 (2) selective incorporation reduces the potential for "impermissible subjective judgments" in defining due process; 4 16 (3) selective
incorporation promotes certainty in the law and thereby facilitates state court
enforcement of due process standards; 41 7 and (4) selective incorporation places
in more appropriate perspective the "legitimate interests of federalism. 4 1 8 It is
not clear whether each supporter of selective incorporation would accept all
four of these interrelated justifications. It is certain, however, that they all have
relied upon at least one of the four.
A.

PRIOR PRECEDENT AND THE "ABSORPTION"

OF INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES

It may seem strange that a doctrine that resulted in the overruling of so
many decisions 41 9 has been justified by reference to prior precedent, but sev[s]elective incorporation finds no support in the language of the amendment, or in the history
of its adoption. Indeed it is more difficult to justify than Justice Black's position that the Bill
of Rights was wholly incorporated. There is some evidence that some persons associated with
the adoption of the amendment contemplated that it might apply the Bill of Rights to the
states. There is no evidence, and it is difficult to conceive, that anyone thought or intended
that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation. . . . It is conceivable, again, that the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" might
include a reference to the whole Bill of Rights. Surely there is no basis for finding that some
"specifics" of the Bill of Rights are, while others are not, privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Even the phrase "due process of law" might conceivably be a short-hand expression for the whole Bill of Rights. It is hardly possible to see in that phrase some purpose to
select some specifics of the Bill of Rights and an insistence that they be selected whole.
Id
414. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411-14 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (selective
incorporation, consistent with earlier due process decisions, promotes predictability in state law enforcement, reduces subjectivity in defining due process, and enhances "legitimate interests of federalism"); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 157, 158-59 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (selective
incorporation, consistent with earlier due process decisions, reduces subjective determinations of due
process); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (selective incorporation consistent with earlier due process decisions).
415. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (comparing subjectivity of
fundamental fairness doctrine); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 157 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(same); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (same, but arguing
primarily for total incorporation).
concurring); Cohen v. Hurley, 366
416. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
U.S. 117, 158-59 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ohio ex. rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-75
(1960) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
417. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,concurring).
418. Id at 413-14 (Goldberg, J.,concurring).
419. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held the exclusionary rule applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, overruling in part Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held the sixth amendment right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases applicable to the states, id at 339, 342, overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); and Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), which held the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, id
at 787, overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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eral Justices have offered precisely that justification for the selective incorporation doctrine. 420 They point to statements in various earlier opinions, written
before selective incorporation was adopted, describing certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights as having been "absorbed" by due process or "made applicable"
to the states by due process. 42' They cite, in particular, Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut,422 the opinion that coined the "ordered liberty" phrase. 423 In the course of rejecting defendant's double jeopardy
claim, the Palko opinion noted that due process afforded protection against
state violations of those rights "which the First Amendment safeguards against
encroachment by Congress," as well as the "right of one accused of crime to
the benefit of counsel." 424 These safeguards, Justice Cardozo stated, had been
"taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought
within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. '425 Justice
Brennan has argued that this statement "more accurately and frankly" describes what occurred in the earlier "ordered liberty" cases than does the fundamental fairness doctrine. 426 The "absorption process" looked to the entire
guarantee, as does the selective incorporation doctrine.4 27 Justice Black agreed
that "[n]othing in the Palko opinion requires that when the Court decides that
a Bill of Rights' provision is to be applied to the States, it is to be applied
piecemeal. '428 Justice Goldberg similarly argued that reference to an "absorption process .. . make[s] clear that what is protected by the fourteenth
amendment are 'rights,' which apply in every case, not solely in those cases
420. See the opinions cited supra note 414.
421. Pointer,380 U.S. at 411 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Cohen, 366 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting);.Adamson, 332 U.S. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting); cf.Frankfurter,supra note 194, at 747 (collecting
Supreme Court opinions stating first amendment "made applicable" to states by process of "absorption" into fourteenth amendment).
422. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see Pointer,380 U.S. at 411 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Cohen, 366 U.S. at
157 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 4danzson, 332 U.S. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg argued
that the recognition of a process of absorption had "its origins at least as far back as Twining v. New
Jersey." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 412 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908), the Supreme Court stated that "it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law." Id. at 99. Justice Black,
however, argued that Palko's reference to the process of absorption was inconsistent with Twining's
"refus[al] to hold that any one of the Bill of Rights' provisions was made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment," and that Palko "must be read as overruling Twining on this point." Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163 (1968).
423. Id. at 325; see Henkin, supra note 5, at 80 (discussing Palko and Justice Cardozo's coining of
"ordered liberty").
424. 302 U.S. at 324; see supra text accompanying notes 238-44 (discussing Palko).
425. 302 U.S. at 326.
426. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 157 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
427. Justice Frankfurter, however, pointed out that in none of
these opinions is the word "incorporation," or any closely related term, used. The cases say
the First is "made applicable" by the Fourteenth or that it is taken up into the Fourteenth by
"absorption," but not that the Fourteenth "incorporates" the First. This is not a quibble. The
phrase "made applicable" is a neutral one. The concept of "absorption" is a progressive one,
ie., over the course of time something gets absorbed into something else. The sense of the
word "incorporate" implies simultaneity. One writes a document incorporating another by
reference at the time of the writing.
Frankfurter, supra note 194, at 747-48.
428. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 86 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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where it seems 'fair' to a majority of the Court to afford the protection. '42 9
As several commentators have noted, however, any support for selective incorporation that may be derived from the reference in Palko and similar cases
to an "absorption process" rapidly disappears when one reads those cases in
their entirety.4 30 Earlier opinions used terms like "absorption" simply as shorthand descriptions for the end result of a fundamental fairness analysis that
ordinarily fell far short of the incorporation of a total guarantee. The Supreme
Court in Palko, for example, recognized that although certain aspects of the
double jeopardy prohibition were not fundamental, other aspects might be
fundamental. 4 3 1 Moreover, the right to counsel as interpreted in Powell v. Ala433
bama432 was among the Palko opinion's illustrations of "absorbed" rights.
Yet, the Powell Court specifically limited absorption of that right, at least with
respect to appointed counsel, to the special circumstances of that case. 43 4 Quite
clearly, due process could "absorb" or "make applicable" only certain aspects
of a Bill of Rights guarantee and, even then, do so only under special circumstances. Justice Brennan derogatorily characterized such limited holdings as
applying "a watered down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights." 435 Those rulings, however, were not deviations from the
Palko analysis, as Justice Brennan asserted;4 36 rather, they were the logical
products of that analysis.
On the other side, the Justices favoring selective incorporation could point to.
a line of cases that appeared to "absorb" certain Bill of Rights guarantees,
whole and intact, notwithstanding the fundamental fairness doctrine. Opinions treating the several guarantees of the first amendment and the just compensation provision of the fifth amendment frequently indicated that those
guarantees were fully embodied in due process and enforced against the states
under the same standards applied to the federal government. 4 37 Theoretically,
429. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).

430. Henkin, supra note 5, at 80, 84 (noting that Justice Cardozo in Pal/ko "quite clearly rejected"
idea that specifics of Bill of Rights must be incorporated completely); Landynski, supra note 22, at 22-

23 ("misconception" that Judge Cardozo advocated selective incorporation; "abundantly clear" no intention for provisions of Bill of Rights to be "swallowed whole"); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I,
23-24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("apparent that Mr. Justice Cardozo's metaphor of 'absorption'

was not intended to suggest the transplantation of case law surrounding the specifics of the first eight
Amendments") (emphasis in original).

431. 302 U.S. at 328; see supra text accompanying notes 238-44 (discussion of Palko and Court's
suggestion that result might be different if state permitted to retry defendant after trial free from error).
432. 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
433. 302 U.S. at 324.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 217-33 (discussing Powell decision). The Palko Court itself

stated:
The decision fPowell] did not turn upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would have been
guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment if they had been

prosecuted in a federal court. The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a
hearing.

302 U.S. at 327.
435. Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., separate

opinion).
436. Id at 274-75 (arguing that Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), deviated from Palko).

437. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
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fundamental fairness analysis would dictate that a ruling in a case involving a
single principle of freedom of speech (for example, the prohibition against
prior restraints) go no farther than to hold that principle alone to be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." 43 8 Yet, free speech cases decided during the
same period as Palko and similar fundamental fairness cases regularly suggested that all aspects of the first amendment, not merely that aspect presented
in the case before the Court, were embodied in due process. 439 The Court commonly began an opinion by noting that the fourteenth amendment made the
first amendment applicable to the states and then proceeded to discuss the issue presented solely in terms of the history and policy of the first amendment. 440 The Court majority never once stopped to consider whether a
particular principle might not be essential to "ordered liberty." 44 1
Although there were fewer cases dealing with the other guarantees of the
first amendment, the analysis in those cases was quite similar to that in the free
speech cases.442 In cases dealing with the fifth amendment right to just compensation, on the other hand, the Supreme Court was not nearly as open in
recognizing full absorption. The Court's opinions did not describe the relationship between the fourteenth amendment and the fifth amendment guarantee, but frequently cited federal and state cases interchangeably, never
suggesting that the protection afforded by the two amendments might differ.443
If the due process clause could, in effect, "incorporate" the whole of the first
amendment and the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, would
that not provide adequate precedent for selectively incorporating other guarantees as well? Admittedly, Palko, Powell, and other fundamental fairness rulings adopted a quite different approach, but what distinguished one line of
cases from the other? Were these simply two lines of inconsistent precedent,
with the Court free to choose one over the other, or was there some rational
basis for distinguishing those cases that totally absorbed particular guarantees?
The Court itself had suggested only one such ground of distinction and that
related to the special treatment of first amendment rights.
In the course of distinguishing between those guarantees that had been
438. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
439. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (providing list of cases

in which first amendment held applicable to the states "in all its particulars"); Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117, 156, (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing "decisions since 1925 [that] have extended against
state power full panoply of First Amendment protections"); supra note 264 (discussing free speech and
just compensation cases indicating that same standards applied to both state and federal cases).
440. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 518
(1945); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
441. Individual Justices, however, have suggested that not all first amendment principles are equally
applicable to the states. Justice Harlan took that position in obscenity cases. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 706-08 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,
456 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-04 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson advanced a similar position in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287
(1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting), which dealt with a state statute prohibiting group libel. Id at 251. The
majority, however, rejected that view in each instance. Hill, supra note 264, at 190.
442. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (listing cases involving freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, and free exercise of religion); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (establishment clause of first amendment).
443. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 85 (1962) (discussing what constitutes a
taking); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (same); McGovern v. New York,
229 U.S. 363, 369 (1913) (discussing what constitutes just compensation).
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444
"brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption
and those that had not, the Court in Palko noted especially the unique role of
freedom of speech and thought."45 That freedom, the Court noted, "is the ma446
trix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."
The Court subsequently spoke of the "preferred position" of all first amendment rights, including freedom of religion. 447 This statement suggests that the
Court considered first amendment guarantees so important that it automatically deemed each and every aspect of those guarantees essential to ordered
liberty. This assumption involved more than simply deciding initially what
would eventually have been concluded after a case-by-case analysis under the
traditional fundamental fairness analysis. For among those first amendment
guarantees made automatically applicable to the states were several that rested
on quite fine and448highly debatable distinctions of a type not usually recognized
by due process.
The preferred position doctrine distinguished the first amendment cases, but
failed to explain the absorption of the fifth amendment right to just compensation. The just compensation cases, however, arguably did less to undermine
the traditional fundamental fairness cases because the Court studiously
avoided any language stating that it was absorbing or making applicable the
fifth amendment guarantee. 449 The Justices supporting selective incorporation
never claimed that the just compensation
cases did more than recognize by
450
implication the absorption concept.
444. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
445. Id at 327.
446. Id
447. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Other cases taking this position, although
not necessarily using the "preferred position" language, are collected in I.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 75, at 719 n.3.
448. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402-08 (1953) (first amendment guarantees of
free speech and religion not violated by city ordinance requiring license because state supreme court
construed ordinance to allow licensing officials no discretion; distinguished from licensing systems
based on broad criteria and thereby allowing discretion to deny a license for reasons unrelated to
proper regulation); Zorack v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09, 311-12, 315 (1952) (first amendment guarantee of freedom of religion and establishment clause not violated when state laws permit students to
leave school during school hours to attend religious activities outside school grounds; distinguished
from "released time" program in which religious instruction took place in public school classrooms);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-83, 89 (1949) (first amendment guarantee of free speech not violated
by city ordinance prohibiting sound trucks broadcasting in "loud and raucous" manner in "city
streets"; distinguished from ordinance barring all sound amplification without permission of police

chief).
449. The opinions in these cases, in fact, made little if any reference to the fifth amendment, focusing
instead on the fourteenth. See, eg., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 85 (1962) (issue whether
county "has taken an air easement ... for which it must pay just compensation as required by Fourteenth Amendment"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S 393, 415 (1922) (fifth amendment
presupposes that property is taken for public use, but still requires compensation, and "similar assumption is made in these decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment"); McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S.
363, 371, 373 (1913) (compensation awarded did not reflect such a "disregard of plain rights" as to
constitute "a denial by the State of due process of law"); Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 228 (1897) (" 'due process of law' requires compensation to be made or secured to owner of private
property taken for public use"). Apart from a single reference to the fifth amendment in Pennsylvania
Coal, quoted supra, the only indication given that the Court was applying fifth amendment principles
was its reliance on federal cases decided under the fifth amendment. See Griggs, 369 U.S at 88; McGovern, 229 U.S. at 372.
450. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 155 (1961) (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (ChicagoRailroad "in
fact if not in terms, applied the Fifth Amendment's just-compensation requirement to the States").
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Perhaps the best analysis distinguishing both the just compensation cases
and the first amendment cases from traditional fundamental fairness cases was
proposed by Professor Henkin in an article written in 1963.451 Professor Henkin argued that a distinction should be drawn between substantive and procedural Bill of Rights guarantees. 45 2 Both the first amendment guarantees and
the fifth amendment just compensation provision would fall in the substantive
category, as would the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.
Selective incorporation was appropriate for such substantive rights, Professor Henkin argued, because of the nature of the standards applied in defining
such rights. 45 3 Those standards commonly reflected "developing values, developing attitudes on the relation of government and individual, of order and
liberty, applied to the issues of a new day." 454 Because the Court considered
phrases like "freedom of speech," "unreasonable searches," and "establishment of religion" sufficiently flexible to permit "standards reflecting respective
needs of order and of liberty," there was no reason to assume different values
would apply to the actions of the states as opposed to the federal government. 455 The same basic touchstones were involved whether the Court was
looking to the "ordered liberty" standard or to the particular substantive guarantee. The procedural provisions of the Bill of Rights, on the other hand, contained "considerable specificity, including the accretions those amendments
'456
have acquired in the history of their application to the federal government.
Thus, the standards for interpreting the guarantee and the standards of "orapplication of traditional fundered liberty" were quite different, requiring the
457
damental fairness analysis to each state case.
The distinction offered by Professor Henkin went a considerable way toward
explaining the pre-1960's cases. Not all substantive rights had been fully absorbed within the fourteenth amendment, but the cases did appear to reflect his
procedural/substantive distinction.4 5 8 The Court's opinions, however, failed to
make any reference to the distinction. This may be explained, in part, by the
fact that no Justice was likely to concede that all substantive guarantees were
as flexible as Professor Henkin suggested. A few Justices, in fact, would proba451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

See Henkin, supra note 5.
Id. at 84-88.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.

457. Id.
458. The first amendment cases and the just compensation rulings clearly fit the distinction. See
supra text accompanying notes 437-43 (discussing first amendment and fifth amendment right to just
compensation as fully embodied in due process). The search and seizure cases and cruel and unusual
punishment cases pose more difficulty. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the court refused to
absorb the exclusionary rule into the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 33. Wo'f could be viewed as having absorbed the fourth amendment standard for unreasonable searches and as having rejected simply
the procedural rule that was "not a necessary incident of the substantive protection." Henkin, supra
note 5, at 87 n.45. The court in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), held that
electrocuting a defendant a second time was not a violation of due process, id. at 463, but indicated that
due process prohibited at least some cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 462. Thus, it certainly had
not closed the door to complete incorporation of the eighth amendment guarantee.
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bly have said that no substantive guarantees were that flexible. Justice Black,
for example, certainly would not have agreed with Professor Henkin's comments that any substantive guarantee was "specific only in identifying the right
protected, but not as to elaborating the standard of protection . . .[for] the
latter must derive from contemporary enlightenment. ' 45 9 Although other Justices probably would have accepted Professor Henkin's characterization for
most aspects of a substantive guarantee, they probably would have rejected it
for others. For example, the Court viewed the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment, a substantive guarantee, as a fairly specific provision, largely controlled by historical practice. 460 Some Justices also would probably have rejected Henkin's view of procedural rights, at least for those procedural
guarantees that had been modified considerably in light of contemporary values. The Court had extended the sixth amendment right to counsel, for examto reflect contemporary values relating to the
ple, far beyond historical practice
46
Court's treatment of indigents. '
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the distinction between substantive
and procedural guarantees, taken as a rough dividing line, offered a convincing rationale for the differences found in the two lines of pre-1960's cases. That
distinction also offered the strongest foundation, in terms of analysis of past
precedent, for adoption of a selective incorporation rationale, although that
foundation was limited. It would not have supported the selective incorporation decisions of the463 1960's beyond those incorporating the fourth 462 and
eighth amendments.
B.

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING SUBJECTIVITY

Taking a page from Justice Black's argument favoring total incorporation,464 opinions supporting selective incorporation argued that selective incorporation avoids much of the subjectivity inherent in the fundamental fairness
doctrine.465 Selective incorporation reduces subjectivity because the circum459. Henkin, supra note 5, at 86. Professor Henkin recognized that Justice Black did not find this
degree of flexibility in the first amendment. Id. at 86 n.42. For a discussion of Justice Black's views on
the first amendment, see generally Black & Calm, Justice Black and First Amendnent "Absolutes'" A
PublicInterview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962). Justice Black also did not find such flexibility as to the
other amendments. See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960) (Bill of
Rights contains absolute guarantees, not mere admonitions). For an example of Justice Black's views
on evolution and flexibility in the fourth amendment, see his dissenting opinion in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which he rejected the majority's holding that electronic eavesdropping
constituted a search. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
460. See Gouled v. United States, 288 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (warrants may be issued only for fruits,
instrumentalities, or contraband, not "mere" evidence); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927) (no seizure unless item described in warrant). The Court's construction of other aspects of the
fourth amendment was similar. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (no search or
seizure unless physical trespass occurs); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959) (no warrant requirement for health inspection of dwelling).
461. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (sixth amendment right to counsel requires
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in all felony cases) with the historical practices on the
appointment of counsel described in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-66 (1932) (no general right to
appointed counsel at common law) and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-71 (1942) (same).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 317-26 (discussing Mafpp v. Ohio and Ker P. California).
463. See supra text accompanying notes 327-32 (discussing Robinson P. Calfornia).
464. See supra notes 266-86 and accompanying text.
465. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 158 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (only impermissible
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stances of each particular case are irrelevant to the determination of whether a
right is necessary to "ordered liberty." Thus, the doctrine avoids the "extremely subjective and excessively discretionary" judgments that result from
evaluating a right only as it bears on particular factual circumstances. 4 66 Selective incorporation also reduces subjectivity by focusing on the fundamental
nature of the Bill of Rights guarantee as a whole, rather than on a particular
aspect of the guarantee: "[Only impermissible subjective judgments can explain stopping short of the full sweep of the specific [guarantee] being absorbed. ' 467 Finally, once the Court holds a guarantee fundamental, discretion
is reduced because the Court's analysis focuses on the language and history of
the guarantee. There is no need for reference, in case after case, to the standard of "ordered liberty." This is significant even if one assumes, as Justice
Frankfurter argued, that the determination of fundamental fairness is guided
by objective evidence of pervasive notions of justice.4 68 Selective incorporation, once applied, has the advantage of "avoid[ing] the impression of personal, ad hoc adjudication by every court which attempts to apply the vague
contours of 'ordered liberty' to every different case that comes
contents and
'
before it."469
Critics of selective incorporation rejected the assumption that fundamental
fairness is substantially more subjective than application of a specific guarantee.470 Moreover, they noted, even if that assumption is accepted, it does not
necessarily follow that selective incorporation is preferable to fundamental
fairness. A judgment still must be made whether the additional potential for
subjectivity in the fundamental fairness doctrine is justified by other attributes
of the doctrine.
The critics argued that proponents of selective incorporation, by choosing
selective over total incorporation, implicitly recognized that eliminating subjectivity should not necessarily be the controlling factor in a choice between
fourteenth amendment doctrines. 47 1 Selective incorporation does not eliminate
subjective judgments prevent total incorporation of particular guarantee); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400,413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (fundamental fairness causes subjective determination of due
process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (selective incorporation

"keeps judges from roaming").
466.
467.
468.
469.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 158 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 287-92 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's position).
Henkin, supra note 5, at 77. One commentator notes:

When the Supreme Court injects itself into the eminently local function of maintaining law

and order by overturning a state criminal conviction, it is more likely to arouse public denunciation for "handcuffing the police" and helping criminals, than praise for protecting constitutional liberties-especially when the decision rests not on any specific constitutional

prohibition, but on the vague strictures of the due process clause.
Wiehofen, supra note 5, at 194.
470. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra note 296,
at 935-36; see supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's position).
471. In general, supporters of the fundamental fairness doctrine argued that none of the doctrines
was less subjective than the other. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text (noting their response to contention that total incorporation was less subjective). They also noted, however, that sup-

porters of selective incorporation, who complained of subjectivity in fundamental fairness analysis,
were nevertheless adopting part of that analysis--the ordered liberty standard-rather than discarding
it completely by turning to total incorporation. See Friendly, supra note 385, at 935-97 (quoted infra
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completely the subjectivity that supposedly is inherent in the "ordered liberty"
standard, because the selective incorporation doctrine still applies that standard to determine whether a particular guarantee is fundamental. Admittedly,
the "ordered liberty" standard is applied less frequently than under the fundamental fairness doctrine, but the quality of the decision is the same. 472 Indeed,
one might add that aside from Justice Black, 473 Justices supporting selective
incorporation would not eliminate the use of a fundamental fairness analysis
tied to circumstances of the particular case; they accept the view that due process protection extends beyond the specifics of the Bill of Rights, 474 though the
extent of such additional protection often depends on precisely that type of
4 75
analysis.
C.

FACILITATING STATE ENFORCEMENT OF DUE PROCESS STANDARDS

The movement from the fundamental fairness doctrine to selective incorporation was also justified as necessary to ensure effective state court enforcement
of due process limitations. Critics of the traditional fundamental fairness doctrine argued that it produced due process standards too uncertain to be applied
consistently by state courts.476 Supreme Court decisions tied to the totality of
the circumstances of the individual case had failed to provide a "substantial
yardstick for the states. '477 For example, the "case-by-case approach" of the
Supreme Court rulings on confessions left the state courts free to "find authornote 472 as to parallel in judgments made under fundamental fairness and selective incorporation). Cf.
the authorities cited supra note 413.
472. Thus, Judge Friendly stated:
[I]n Mr. Justice Brennan's phrase, "only impermissible subjective judgments can explain stopping short of the incorporation of the full sweep of the specific being absorbed." With all
respect I do not find this last proposition self-evident. It is not obvious to me why determining
which of the interests protected by the Bill of Rights against the nation shall also be protected
against the states, or holding that the amendments mean something hardly suggested by their
text, are permissible objective judgments, but deciding whether the interests selected for protection against the states ought to receive precisely the same protection that they do against
the nation would be an "impermissible subjective" one.
Friendly, supra note 296, at 935-36.
473. Consistent with his narrow view of due process, see supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text,
Justice Black, concurring in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), stated: "The selective incorporation process, if used properly, does limit the Supreme Court in the Fourteenth Amendment field to
specific Bill of Right protections only and keeps judges from roaming at will in their own notions of
what policies outside the Bill of Rights are desirable and what are not." Id at 171 (emphasis added).
474. See, for example, the cases cited infra in note 475 and supra in the second paragraph of note
163. Cf. supra notes 116-18 (discussing positions of Justices Murphy, Rutledge, and Douglas in
Adamson).
475. See, e.g., United'States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1977) (Court using fundamental fairness analysis to decide whether pre-indictment delay violates accused's due process rights; issue outside
of scope of sixth amendment guarantee to speedy trial, which only applies after formal indictment or
information); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788, 790 (1973) (Betts v. Brady case-by-case analysis
should be used to determine whether due process requires right to counsel at probation hearing);
Shepphard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (totality of circumstances analysis applied to find due

process violation resulting from trial and pretrial publicity).
476. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussing difficulties
faced by states attempting to apply rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1945), and support of state

attorneys general for a flat requirement); Green, The Bill ofRights, The FourteenthAmendment andthe

Supreme Court, 5 MICH. L. REv. 869, 897 (1948) (fundamental fairness analysis has left state courts and
prosecutors uncertain about powers and duties).
477. Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PUB. L. 53, 61 (1963).
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ity for affirming or rejecting almost any type of confession.

'47 8

Admittedly, the

Court did not stress the special circumstances of each individual case in all of
its fundamental fairness rulings relating to the criminal justice process, 479 but
even if the Court suggested that a particular aspect of a guarantee was fully
embodied in due process, that still left unsettled the treatment of various other
aspects of that same guarantee. The end result, as Justice Goldberg put it, was
to "require. . .[the] Court to intervene in the state judicial process with considerable lack of predictability and with a consequent likelihood of considerable friction. ' 480 Moreover, at a time when the criminal side of the Court's
docket was growing more and more active,4 81 it was unclear whether the Court
had the capacity to develop both a general body of principles interpreting specific guarantees for federal criminal cases and a second-level,
"shadow" group
482
of principles for all of the issues posed in the state cases.
Compared to the fundamental fairness doctrine, the "practical utility" of
selective incorporation was "undeniable. '483 Once the Court held a particular
guarantee fundamental, state courts were directed to the specific language of
that guarantee and to the various decisions interpreting that language in the
context of federal prosecutions. 484 Precedent then clearly resolved numerous
issues and offered basic guidelines for the resolution of others.
Of course, the value of the federal precedent in this regard varied with the
subject matter. There were areas in which the federal decisions were not at all
predictable. 485 Other guarantees had been an infrequent subject of federal litigation, producing no more than a few very general discussions of the basic
content of the guarantee. 486 There was also a question whether "rules which
[bore] a constitutional label may in fact have been the expression of a supervisory power of the federal courts over federal law enforcement at a time when'48it7
was not necessary to differentiate between Constitution and supervision.
Nevertheless, overall, reference to precedent interpreting the incorporated Bill
478. Id.
479. See supra note 303 (examples of fundamental fairness rulings that varied in weight accorded
special circumstances of case). Consider also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), in which the Court
held that a defendant's right to secure counsel of his own choice is not limited to cases involving special

circumstances.

480. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413-14 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
481. See Green, supra note 476, at 897 (by 1948 two-fifths of cases before Court were reviews of state

criminal convictions, with ratio increasing each year).

482. See Amsterdam, supra note 405, at 440 n.23 (discussing "intolerable confusion" that would
result if second-level "shadow" fourth amendment construed to govern states); Green, supra note 476,
at 897 (case-by-case review under Fair Trial Rule placed unsupportable burden upon Court).
483. L. LusKv, supra note 334, at 163.
484. See Israel, supra note 3, at 1328-29 (noting that issues presented in cases like Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964), Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), could be resolved by reference to federal precedent once Court determined relevant Bill of
Rights guarantee applicable to states).
485. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (referring to Court's decisions interpreting the fourth amendment search and seizure provision); see also Amsterdam, supra note
405, at 349 ("[flor clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's
most successful product").
486. See Israel, supra note 3, at 1329 n.40 (noting limited federal precedent dealing with sixth
amendment's compulsory process clause).
487. Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13, 19 (1965); see also Friendly, supra note
296, at 938 (distinguishing standards that rest on Constitution from ones derived from other sources of
federal power).
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of Rights guarantees provided substantially more certainty for state courts
than the fundamental fairness rulings that preceded incorporation. 48 8
The advantage of facilitating state enforcement of constitutional standards
was not lost upon the Justices opposing the selective incorporation doctrine.
Justice Harlan in Gideon v. Wainwright48 9 relied on precisely that factor in
agreeing to a due process standard requiring appointment of counsel in all
felony cases. 490 Justice Harlan was aware that the. previous state enforcement
had been problematic because of the rule that due process required appointed
counsel only when special circumstances indicated that the assistance of counsel was needed to ensure a fair trial. 49 1 Past decisions of the Court had liberalized the special circumstances rule of fundamental fairness to the point that a
serious criminal charge in itself constituted special circumstances. 492 That
"evolution," however, had not been "fully recognized by many state courts"
that were "charged with the front-line responsibility for the enforcement of
constitutional rights. '493 The time had come, Justice Harlan concluded, to
abandon the special circumstances rule in favor of a standard that left no
doubt as to the state's obligation to appoint counsel in serious criminal
cases. 494 To do otherwise would, in the long run, do a "disservice to the federal
system. 4 95
Gideon was for Justice Harlan, however, a special case. To adopt a due
process standard that parallelled the sixth amendment guarantee did not, in
reality, extend the state's obligation beyond what had been required under a
case-by-case analysis of fundamental fairness. 496 In such an instance facilitating convenience of administration coincided with the interests of federalism.
The same was not true when application of a Bill of Rights guarantee went
substantially beyond what was required by a fundamental fairness due process
analysis. 497 Professor Gunther asks whether the unpredictability of the fundamental fairness approach "[is] more harmful to state autonomy concerns than
a more rigid-possibly more interventionist, yet also more certain" selective
488. The benefit was not only to the state courts. Professor Lusky stated that

[t]his availability of accumulated case law also results in a corresponding economy of effort on
the part of defense counsel and thus facilitates constitutional defenses in the general run of
criminal cases. Indigent defendants in such cases (which is to say, most persons accused of

serious crime) are represented by lawyers serving pursuant to judicial appointment or as employees of a legal service organization. Incorporation enables these hard-pressed lawyers to
cite controlling precedents; they need not start from scratch, approaching the elusive issue of
fundamental injustice as an original proposition in each case.
L. LusKy, supra note 334, at 164.
489. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
490. Id at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan would include all cases carrying the "possibility of a substantial prison sentence," which apparently would encompass all felonies. Id
491. Id The Court had created the "special circumstances" rule in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text
(discussing Powell and Bells and special circumstances rule).
492. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
493. Id
494. Id
495. Id
496. See id at 351 (Gideon ruling does no more than "make explicit something that has long since
been foreshadowed in our decisions").

497. Id at 352 (applying entire body of federal law to states would "disregard the frequently wide
disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal Government").
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incorporation approach.498 Justice Harlan would have answered no on two
grounds. First, he believed that fundamental fairness was no more uncertain
than selective incorporation. 499 Indeed, because the Court's interpretations of
Bill of Rights guarantees were not always clear, the states sometimes would
encounter more uncertainty if they were forced to apply those guarantees fully
incorporated. 500 Second, he believed that the key to the Constitution's recognition of state autonomy lay in allowing the states to develop their own rules for
obtaining fundamental fairness, "not [in] achieving procedural symmetry or
.. . serving administrative convenience." 50'
As suggested by Justice Harlan's second point, whether one views the administrative advantage of selective incorporation as a sufficient justification for
the adoption of that doctrine depends, in large part, on how one measures the
doctrine's impact upon what Justice Goldberg described as the "legitimate interests of federalism." 50 2 The doctrine's advantage in facilitating state court
administration was not likely to be a convincing factor for a Justice who believed selective incorporation undercut basic principles of federalism. The
same was true of the alleged advantage of selective incorporation in reducing
the potential for subjective, ad hoc adjudication (or, at least, in countering the
impression of subjectivity). These were not new justifications to the Justices
who had applied the fundamental fairness doctrine over the years. They had
been suggested in various dissents criticizing the fundamental fairness doctrine, initially by the first Justice Harlan 503 and later by Justice Black.5 0n The
key factor, if there was one other than the results produced, 50 5 in the persuasiveness of the other elements of the rationale underlying the selective incorporation doctrine was a different perception of the "legitimate interests of
federalism." Once the Court concluded that the principles of federalism were
498. G. GUNTHER, supra note 309, at 487. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413-14 (1975)
(employment of same standard would eliminate uncertainty and reduce state-federal friction, thus promoting "legitimate interests" of federalism); Amsterdam, supra note 405, at 441 n.23 (application of
different standards for federal and state search and seizure cases "would produce and perpetuate intolerable confusion and. . . do more damage to the substantial interest of the state than is done by the

theoretical trauma of incorporation"). •
499. See Justice Harlan's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which argues
that specific constitutional provisions are as susceptible to a judge's personal interpretations as the due
process clause. Id at 501.

500. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), which notes
that application of fourth amendment standards to the states would place "the states, more likely than
not, in an atmosphere of uncertainty since this Court's decisions in the realm of search and seizure are
hardly notable for their predictability." Id at 45 (Harlan J., concurring).
501. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 682 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan was responding
to the majority's argument that application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states
would promote "[flederal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards...
if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria." Id at
658 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176-77 (1967) (fundamental
fairness standard imposes a "more discriminating" and "difficult" process of adjudication, but is required by interests of federalism).
502. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
503. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 546 (1884) (H.arlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
singling out certain principles of liberty as fundamental for no "satisfactory" reason).
504. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing Justice Black's
justification for total inorporation); see suipra text accompanying notes 265-68 (discussing Justice
Black's dissent in Adamson).
505. See supra text accompanying notes 411-13 (discussing argument that selective incorporation
solely result-oriented).
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as well served by selective incorporation as by fundamental fairness, 50 6 the
doctrine's advantages with respect to subjectivity and administrative convenience could prevail.
D.

THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF FEDERALISM

Reviewing the Supreme Court's due process decisions for a twenty-five year
period immediately following Powell v. Alabama,5°7 Professor Allen noted that
"the first and most striking fact to emerge from a survey of the Court's opinions. . . is the obvious importance of the Court's interpretation of the obligation of federalism in the development of the applicable constitutional
doctrine." 508 Although the opinions rested primarily on the historical development of the concept of due process, they rarely failed to note the need to respect the "sovereign character of the several states" 50 9 by giving the states the
widest latitude consistent with assuring fundamental fairness.5 10
This concern for the principle of federalism was hardly a new development
in the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. The Slaughter-House majority5 1 referred to the "whole theory of the relations of the state and federal
government" in rejecting a broad reading of the privileges and immunities
clause. 5 12 Equal protection rulings relating to state procedures noted the importance of leaving the states free to prescribe their "own modes of judicial
proceedings. ' '5 13 In addition, early due process decisions that refused to hold
particular guarantees part of ordered liberty frequently stressed that to decide
otherwise would intrude upon "the full power of the state to order its own
5 14
affairs and govern its own people."
Although most fundamental fairness opinions did not attempt to identify the
interests at stake in intruding upon state authority, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan did so in several separate opinions that responded to the possible adoption of a total or selective incorporation doctrine. Those opinions tended to
identify three concerns of federalism. First, rulings that went beyond the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness would undermine the values of
local control of the criminal justice process.5 15 Second, application of the same
506. Proponents of selective incorporation argued that it better served principles of federalism, by
eliminating friction between federal and state courts, supra notes 414 & 498, and by promoting federalstate cooperation, supra note 501.
507. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see supra text accompanying notes 217-27 (discussing
Powell).
508. Allen, supra note 207, at 25 1.
509. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 157 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

510. See G.

GUNTHER,

supra note 309, at 487 ("consciousness of federalism concerns and respect for

state policy-makers permeate the majority positions of the Palko-Adanson traditions"); Way, supra
note 477, at 56 (Court's decisions replete with expressions of deference to states' right to control own
systems of justice).
511. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
512. Id at 78; see supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (discussing Slaughter-House).
513. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1878); see also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)

(state may vary among judicial districts number of peremptory challenges; matter wholly under control
of state legislature).
514. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908); see also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605
(1900) (states have right to "decide for themselves what shall be the form and character of the procedure in ... trials").
515. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (states are best able to deal
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constitutional standards to the federal and state government would ignore major differences between the federal and state criminal justice systems.5 1 6 Third,
incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees would fail to leave adequate room
for the diversity and experimentation needed to eventually devise a wiser and
fairer criminal justice system. 5 17 Opinions supporting selective incorporation
recognized all three of these concerns, but either rejected or downgraded them.
The legitimate interests of federalism were far narrower for the selective incorporation Court of the 1960's than they had been for the Courts that applied the
fundamental fairness doctrine.
1. The Values of Local Control
The principle of federalism preserves local control of government by respecting the autonomy of the states. Preserving local control has various advantages: it avoids centralized power and the potential for abuse inherent in
the concentration of governmental authority; it promotes democracy by allowing decisions to be controlled by the population most directly affected; it
permits laws to be formulated in accordance with local conditions and to be
enforced by persons who are familiar with local concerns; and it permits the
diversity necessary for the survival of pluralism. These advantages arguably
have special significance as applied to the criminal justice field. Despite expansion of federal legislative power, the enactment and enforcement of criminal
laws remains primarily the responsibility of the states. Within the states, the
traditional policy has been one of widely dispersed enforcement authority, as
evidenced by division
of police and prosecutorial authority among numerous
5 18
local agencies.
The Justices supporting the fundamental fairness doctrine feared that imposition of federal constitutional limitations might destroy the advantages of local control. 519 The Supreme Court, far removed from the local scene, had to
exercise caution, limiting its authority to the imposition of those "principles of
decent procedure" that were basic to a free society and therefore accepted by
the vast majority of local communities. 520 Indeed, if the states' power to deal
with local crime was "unduly restricted," responsibility for local crime control
bringing closer "the monolithic society
might shift to the federal government,
'52 1
which our federalism rejects."
The Justices supporting the selective incorporation doctrine had an entirely
different perspective. They did not see the limitations imposed by the Court as
interfering with the true interests of local control. To them, what was occurring was quite different from the usual transfer of state authority to the federal
government. The Court's rulings did not take enforcement responsibility from
with own peculiar law enforcement problems); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (same).
516. See infra note 533 (citing cases in which Justice Harlan articulated this concern).
517. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (incorporation
would deprive states of opportunity to reform legal process to extend area of freedom).
518. See H. KERPER & J. ISRAEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 407-08, 426-27

(2d ed. 1979).
519. See infra note 533 (citing opinions making this argument).
520. Allen, supra note 207, at 253.
521. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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local police agencies and place it in the hands of a national police agency. Nor
did the rulings take the responsibility for defining crime from local legislatures
and place it in the hands of Congress. The Court was acting only to protect the
individual, and the Justices saw in that purpose a crucial distinction. Thus,
Justice Goldberg reasoned that
to deny the States the power to impair a fundamental constitutional
right is not to increase federal power, but, rather, to limit the power
of both federal and state governments in favor of safeguarding the
fundamental rights and liberties of the individual. In my view this
promotes rather than undermines the basic policy of avoiding excess
concentration of power in government,
federal or state, which under5 22
lies our concepts of federalism.
The distinction drawn by Justice Goldberg speaks to only one of the values
served by local control-the avoidance of excess concentration of power. Did
the Court fail to recognize others, such as the advantage of local control over
policy-setting agencies? It seems unlikely. Those advantages, more likely,
were simply viewed as subordinate to safeguarding the rights and liberties of
the individual. The Court in the past had subordinated those same values to
its enforcement of other constitutional safeguards. Applying the first amendment to the states, it had intervened in such traditional areas of state regulation
as education5 23 and the licensing of professions.5 24 The Court had rejected
local community policies dealing with such obvious matters of local concern 526
as
door-to-door solicitations 52 5 and the use of parks for public assemblies.
Thus, the Court viewed protection of first amendment rights as a matter of
national concern, outweighing considerations ofjudicial self-restraint and deference to the values of local control.
For the Justices supporting the selective incorporation doctrine, protection
of the rights of the accused fell in the same category: a national concern outweighing considerations of judicial deference to local control. The Justices
might have concluded, as observers have noted, that the increased mobility of
the population had "made America too much one country" 527 to justify the
deference to local diversity that had produced a "checkerboard of human
522. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
523. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (state supported schools providing
religious instruction in their classrooms violate first amendment establishment clause).

524. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1961) (discussing first amendment limitations upon state bar
admission standards); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1971) (same).
525. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (local ordinance prohibiting door-to-door

distribution of handbills violates first amendment freedom of speech clause).
526. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (city's arbitrary denial of permit to religious organization to conduct Bible meeting in park violates first and fourteenth amendments; constitu-

tional guarantees have "firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing
body").
527. Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards Some Notes on Adudcalion, 83 YALE L.J., 221, 274 (1973). Professor Wellington argues that

contemporary technology, a population moving frequently across state lines, and the expanding role of the federal government in law enforcement have made America too much one

country for considerations of federalism to sustain at a constitutional level any dramatic difference between the procedural safeguards afforded criminal defendants in federal and state

proceedings.
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rights" in the field of criminal procedure.5 28 Perhaps they viewed local authoriby their continued failties as having forfeited any right to judicial deference
5 29 An often cited passage 530
ure to control lawlessness in law enforcement.
from an article by Illinois Supreme Court Justice Schaefer provides still another explanation for the subordination of the values of local control:
Considerations of federalism of course remain important. But in the
world today they must be measured against the competing demands
arising out of the relation of the United States to the rest of the world.
The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law. That measurement is not taken merely in retrospect by social historians of the
future. It is taken from day to day by the peoples of the world, and to
them the criminal procedure sanctioned by5 3any of our states is the
procedure sanctioned by the United States. '
It may be too extreme to say that the Justices supporting selective incorporation believed federalism was "dead," 532 but certainly they would no longer
place federalism on the plane it once occupied. When it came to balancing
society's need for protection from crime against the interests of suspected and
accused persons, the states were to receive no greater deference for their judgments than the federal government.
2. Differences in State and Federal Criminal Justice Systems
Even accepting the subordination of values of local control, it was still possible to argue that the different problems faced by the state criminal justice system required more flexible standards than those applied to the federal system.
528. F. GRAHAM, supra note 407, at 39-40. Graham notes that
if a person had driven across the country at that time from New York to San Francisco, he
would have passed through four states (Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and California) in which
the police would have been unlikely to search him or his car without probable cause, since
their courts would not have permitted the fruits of the search to be used in evidence. In eight
others (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kansas, Colorado, Utah and Nevada)
officers could have made a search which did not measure up to Fourth Amendment standards
and could have used the findings against the traveler in court. In a nation where state lines
had otherwise become so unimportant, this checkerboard of human rights had to be shortlived.
Id; see also Davidow, One Justice For411" 4 Proposalto Establish by Federal Constitutional4mendment, 4 NationalSystem For CriminalJustice, 51 N.C.L. REV. 259, 259 (1972) (proposing a uniform

system of administration of criminal justice by federal courts).
529. Justice Brennan stated that

[flar too many cases come from the states to the Supreme Court presenting dismal pictures of
official lawlessness, of the illegal searches and seizures, illegal detentions attended by prolonged interrogation and coerced admissions of guilt, of the denial of counsel and downright

brutality. Judicial self-restraint which defers too much to the sovereign powers of the states
and reserves judicial interference for only the most revolting cases will not serve to enhance
Madison's priceless gifts of the "great rights of mankind secured under this Constitution."

Brennan, supra note 3, at 778.

530. The passage is cited, for example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1965), Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S 438, 449 (1961), and Chase v. Page, 343 F.2d 167, 171 (10th Cir. 1965).
531. Schaefer, Federalismand State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 26 (1956).
532. See Kurland, supra note 43, at 414 ('[flederalism is dead, if by federalism we mean the reten-

tion by the states of areas of government in which they are sovereign").
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Justice Harlan advanced that argument in several opinions, 53 3 and the positions taken by
Justices Fortas and Powell in the jury trial cases rested partly on
534
that ground.
What were the relevant differences that might have supported separate constitutional standards for federal and state proceedings? First, the character of
the laws enforced was different. State police "enforce a far wider spectrum of
laws varying from minor traffic infractions to major crimes, many of which are
uncovered by chance or on emergency pleas for assistance; the federal officers
handle much more specialized kinds of crimes which, typically, involve substantial, deliberate investigation. '53 5 Second, the caseloads of federal and state
systems were substantially different. Many state prosecuting agencies and
courts had to deal with far more cases per official than federal agencies, yet the
states had far fewer resources at their disposal. 536 Finally, differences were evident in the quality and training of state and federal officials. Although F.B.I.
officers were college graduates and received extensive training, states insisted
53 7
on no more than a high school diploma and provided very limited training.
In addition, the state system of electing prosecutors and judges produced officials whose credentials often could not match those of federal appointees. 53 8 In
sum, the states had to do more with less and hence required standards that
gave them more leeway in implementing the basic principles underlying the
Bill of Rights guarantees. A "jot-for-jot" application of standards developed
differing
in the context of federal proceedings would put "the States, with their
539
law enforcement problems . . . in a constitutional straight jacket."
The Justices supporting selective incorporation responded to this argument
in a somewhat indirect fashion in Duncan v. Louisiana.540 The state in Duncan
argued that the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was unsuited to state
proceedings, particularly in its requirements of twelve person juries and unanimous verdicts. 54 ' The Court acknowledged that those requirements had been
developed in the somewhat different context of federal judicial proceedings,
but noted that most of the states had jury trial provisions equal in breadth to
533. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (expanded

warrant requirement forced on state officials "facing widely different problems of local enforcement");

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (imposition of sixth amendment
on states ignores local variations); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (in-

corporation disregards "all relevant differences which may exist between state and federal criminal law
and its enforcement"); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (extension of
federal power over state unwise because "[sitates, with their differing law enforcement problems should

not be put in a constitutional straitjacket").
534. See supra text accompanying notes 377-81 and 392-401 (discussing respectively Justice Fortas'
and Justice Powell's incorporation views).
535. Weinstein, Local Responsibilityfor Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 150, 166 (1962); see also F. GRAHAM, supra note 407, at 29 ("states' 99.6 per cent of the

offenses include almost all the rapes, murders, muggings and other forms of voilence").
536. See H. KERPER & J. ISRAEL, supra note 518, at 199 (discussing caseloads handled in the state
systems).

537. Id at 411-12 (discussing varying entrance and training standards).
538. Id at 429, 446-47 (summarizing criticism of state selection system); Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1121-24 (1977) (noting reasons, including selection process, for generally "higher level of talent" on federal bench).
539. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
540. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
541. Id at 158 n.30.
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the sixth amendment.5 42 Only four states used juries of fewer than twelve persons in felony cases.5 43 Moreover, the pre-incorporation sixth amendment rulings were "always subject to reconsideration."' 544 Indeed, the Court
reconsidered those rulings in the later cases ofApodaca v. Oregon54 5 and WilStates of the requirements of unanimous
liams v. Florida546 and relieved the
547
verdicts and twelve person juries.
Duncan suggests that the Court accepted the possibility that constitutional
cases might create an intolerable
standards developed in pre-incorporation
"straight jacket" for the states, 548 but thought that, instead of rejecting selective incorporation, it should reexamine the constitutional grounding of preincorporation precedents. As Justice Harlan noted, that response had its
costs. 549 If the Court were to apply the same constitutional standards to both
state and federal governments, while making those standards more flexible to
avoid unduly restricting the states, the end result would be a "watering down
[of] protections against the Federal government. ' 550 Justice Harlan expressed
concern, in particular, about the possible "derogation" of standards applied to
federal law enforcement officers. 55 1 Several majority opinions indicated, however, that the Court did not see the need for a wholesale reexamination of preincorporation standards to meet the special demands of the state criminal justice systems. 552 The Court was not necessarily suggesting that the unique practical problems faced by state criminal justice systems were irrelevant to the
shaping of constitutional standards, but it apparently viewed the differences
systems as less substantial than proponents of sepabetween federal and state5 53
rate standards suggested.
542. Id
543. Id The Court assumed that the requirement of a twelve person jury applies only to "serious
criminal cases." Id
544. Id
545. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
546. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
547. See supra text accompanying notes 385-98 (discussing holding and rationale of 4podaca and
Wf
illiams).
548. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
549. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
550. Id
551. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (federal/state standards might be diluted in interest of promoting state flexibility); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 116 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(same).
552. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,34 (1963) (state may develop workable rule governing search
and seizure to meet "practical demands" of law enforcement and investigation so long as consistent
with Constitution); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (suggesting that application of federal
exclusionary rule would not render state police ineffective). In various other cases in which the dissenters pointed to differences in the state and federal systems, see supra note 533, the majority did not
respond. See, eg., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that majority
did not address differences between state and federal criminal law and its enforcement).
553. Opinions have often emphasized that newly imposed standards were consistent with realities of
law enforcement. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 23 (1968) (stop and frisk standards should not
create unreasonable risks to police); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) (limits imposed on
interrogation should not create undue interference with proper system of law enforcement); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (application of federal exclusionary rule to state will not "fetter" law
enforcement).- Although Justices Black and Douglas have suggested that the "practical effects" of a
ruling are irrelevant, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111 (1970) (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court as a whole has not shared that view-at least where the
"constitutional command" is not "unequivocal." Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980)
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This view was entirely tenable. Federal constitutional standards developed
in pre-incorporation cases applied to the full range of federal law enforcement
activities. Although the FBI often dealt with cases permitting a more thorough
and planned investigation than typical state cases, federal police agencies in
the District of Columbia and in federal enclaves had primary responsibility for
enforcement of the full spectrum of criminal laws. 554 The enforcement
problems faced in the District of Columbia, in particular, were similar to those
faced in most large urban communities.5 - 5 The police there dealt with the
same distribution of offenses and faced the same difficulties in recruiting and
training qualified personnel. 556 The courts and prosecutors handled the same
problems of heavy caseloads and limited resources. 557 Moreover, the Justices,
through their docket and their local newspapers, were obviously aware of those
problems. 55 8 If the pre-incorporation standards of federal cases were consid(practical considerations of hampered law enforcement must give way to "unequivocal constitutional
commands"). See generally Elson, Balancing Costs in Constitutional Construction: The Burger Courl'

ExpansiveNew pproach, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 160 (1979) (Burger Court giving broader consideration to practicality concerns when determining scope of constitutional right).
554. In addition to law enforcement responsibilities in the District of Columbia, federal agencies
have enforcement authority in national parks and Indian reservations. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT-FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES 338-343 (1972); see INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE

STATES 105-14 (1957) (discussing exclusive and concurrent federal jurisdiction over private and federally owned lands). Thus, the federal system, as well as the states, faces the special problems of administering justice in sparsely populated regions. The logistical problems in summoning jurors, for example,
could bear as heavily upon the federal court in Montana as it could upon the Montana state courts.
555. At the time of the adoption of selective incorporation, the District of Columbia accounted for
approximately 1300 of 38,000 federal felony filings. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-

MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 131 (1963).
556. See generally U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT

142-229 (1966) (evaluating organizational components of metropolitan police departments), In fact,
from 1960 to 1965 the increase in the total FBI index offenses for the District of Columbia was more
than twice that of cities ranging in population from 500,000 to one million. Id at 105.
557. Id at 235-37, 248-69; see also H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INA METROPOLITAN COURT-THE
PROCESSING OF SERIOUS CRIMINAL CASES INTHE D.C. COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS 112-17 (1966).
Admittedly, unlike many of their state counterparts, the United States Attorney for the District and
the judges of the two courts trying criminal cases (District Court for felonies and serious misdemeanors,
and Court of General Sessions for minor offenses) were appointed rather than elected. Arguably, this
difference made them more able to cope with higher federal standards. On the other side, however, the
element of community pressure introduced by the election process cautioned against allowing a lesser
standard for state proceedings. Cf.Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[s]tate judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting popular pressures not experienced by

federal judges given lifetime tenure designed to immunize them from such influences"). But see Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32 (1949) (lessjustification for exclusionary rule in state proceedings because
"public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the
part of police directly responsible to the community itself"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (local invasions of liberties more amenable to political correction).
Interestingly, in 1970 there was a complete reorganization of the District of Columbia court system,
with the Superior Court replacing the United States District Court as the court of general jurisdiction.
Superior Court judges lack the tenure and salary protections of article III judges, although they are still
appointed rather than elected. United States v. Palmore, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973). Their susceptibility
to community pressures is now similar to that ofjudges in those states that use an appointment system
for selecting judges. See id at 418-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting); H. KERPER & J. ISRAEL, supra note 518,
at 445-48.
558. As in any community, the local criminal justice system manages to receive a fair amount of
attention in the Washington papers. It may safely be assumed that most, if not all, of the Justices were
familiar with that coverage. In any event, a significant number of each year's certiorari petitions
presented cases from the District, and several of the Court's more significant rulings in the criminal
justice field were cases from the District. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957)
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ered appropriate for the realities of enforcement in the District, as well as in
other parts of the varied federal system, they were likely to be appropriate for
the state systems as well.559 That numerous states already were following the
federal standards under local law also suggested that those standards met the
practicable needs of the state systems.5 60 If a few of those standards failed to
meet such needs, then reexamination was appropriate for both the federal and
state systems. The residents of the nation's capital were as much entitled to
effective law enforcement as the residents of any of the states.
3. Diversity and Experimentation
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebman56 ' Justice Brandeis admonished the Court
not to unduly interfere with state experimentation:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory;. and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is
(lengthy detention following arrest without taking accused before available magistrate or informing of
right to such hearing violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) and requires exclusion of confession); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (implied acquittal through jury's decision to
convict only on second degree murder barred reprosecution on first degree charge following appellate
reversal); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1959) (motion to suppress standing available to
defendant without possessory interest in place searched). As a result, the role of the District in the
federal criminal justice system probably loomed larger than its contribution to the total number of
felony prosecutions, 1300 out of 3800, supra note 555, might suggest. At least, that was the author's
impression while clerking during the 1959 and 1960 terms.
559. It should be noted that this analysis of the Court's assumptions about the suitability of preincorporation standards rests primarily on the author's speculation. There was no reference to the
parallel between the District of Columbia and the typical state system in any of the selective incorporation opinions. Apart from Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the only responses to arguments
concerning the "constitutional straightjacket" on local law enforcement were the comments in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1967), and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). In Mapfp the Court
suggested that the federal experience and the experience of those states that had adopted the exclusionary rule indicated that application of the rule would not render state police ineffective. 367 U.S. at 659.
In Ker the Court noted:
The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests,
searches and seizures to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and
law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . Such a standard implies no derogation of uniformity in applying federal constitutional guarantees but is only a recognition that
conditions and circumstances vary just as do investigative and enforcement techniques.
374 U.S. at 34.
560. Several of the major incorporation opinions pointed to the large number of states that would
have rejected, under local law, the practice being rejected under an incorporated constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ("movement toward rule of exclusion has been
halting but seemingly inexorable"); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219 (1967) (rejecting
North Carolina rule that right to speedy trial does not afford protection against unjustified trial postponement when accused discharged from custody; noting that rule rejected by every other state court);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17 n.4 (1967) (no laws in other jurisdictions cited by counsel or
found by Court that disqualify coparticipants in crime from testifying for each other).
561. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. .... But in the exercise of
this high power, we must ever be on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we 5would
guide by the light of
62
reason, we must let our minds be bold.
One of the major justifications advanced for the fundamental fairness doctrine is that it pays heed to Justice Brandeis' admonition by providing ample
room for diversity (and thus experimentation) in state procedure. Indeed, the
importance of allowing leeway for experimentation was noted in the first of the
fundamental fairness opinions, Hurtado v. California 63 The Court stressed
that due process ought not to preclude a state, if it so desires, from looking
beyond the common law and basing its process on "the best of all systems of
every age," letting the "new and various experiences of our own situation and
system mold and shape it into less uniform forms." 564 In subsequent years, the
fundamental fairness cases continued to reflect this philosophy, which was best
summarized by Justice Frankfurter. 565 The Supreme Court's mood, he noted,
had been "insistently cautious. ' 566 This was proper because the fourteenth
amendment should not be "the basis of a uniform code of criminal procedure
federally imposed. . . . Alternative modes of arriving at truth" should not be
barred.5 67 As in the area of economic regulation, "Here too, freedom must be
left for new, perhaps improved, methods 'in the insulated chambers afforded
by the several states.'!"58
When the Court shifted to selective incorporation, Justices critical of the
new doctrine argued that the majority was failing to take into account the
value of experimentation, as expressed by Justice Brandeis.5 69 Justice
Goldberg responded that although the Brandeis admonition had relevance to
the application of the doctrine of substantive due process in the area of social
and economic rights, recognition of the state's capacity to experiment did not
extend to "experiment[s] with the fundamental liberties of citizens safeguarded
by the Bill of Rights. '570 Justice Black offered a similar response. 57 1
The rejection of the Brandeis admonition by Justices Goldberg and Black
suggests a position that absolutely refuses to give weight to the value of experimentation whenever a state innovation alters the traditional rights of the ac-562. Id at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
563. 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
564. Id at 531.
565. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court Writes on Man'r Rights, in LAW AND POLITICS 192 (A. MacLeish & E. Prichard eds. 1939).
566. Frankfurter, supra note 565, at 192.
567. Id
568. Id at 193 (quoting Justice Holmes's dissent in Traux v. Corrigan, 237 U.S. 312, 344 (1921)).
The Holmes dissent criticized the "use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion

of its words to preveat the making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the states." Id
569. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 376 & n.16 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133

(Harlan, J., concurring) (incorporation fails to leave enough room for governmental and societal

-

experimentation).
570. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
571. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), Justice Black stated, "I have never believed that
under the guise of federalism the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded our
citizens through the Bill of Rights." Id at 170 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 386-87 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (construing Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment

to permit states to experiment with basic rights of people opens veritable "Pandora's box").
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cused. 57 2

This absolutist position would deny leeway for experimentation even
when the experiment did not challenge the basic values underlying a constitutional guarantee, but sought only to establish a new, equally effective mode of
implementing those values. Concerned that the selective incorporation doctrine would be so construed, Justice Fortas argued, in the context of the jury
trial guarantee, that the doctrine might actually do a disservice to the basic
values protected by the constitution.5 73 Surely, he noted, "[W]e should be
ready to welcome state variations which do not impair-indeed which may
advance-the theory and purpose of trial by jury."574 Justice Powell similarly
noted that given the increasing importance of empirical study as a basis for
decisionmaking, it would be foolhardy to prevent the states from experimenting with variations injury trial procedure.5 75 The "same diversity of local
legislative responsiveness that marked the development of economic and social
reforms. . . might well lead to valuable innovations with respect to determin576
ing-fairly and more expeditiously-the guilt or innocence of the accused."
The decisions in Williams v. Florida577 and Apodaca v. Oregon,5 78 holding
that the sixth amendment requires neither twelve person juries nor unanimous
verdicts, 79 suggest that, Justices Goldberg and Black notwithstanding, the
Court did not intend selective incorporation to preclude giving weight to the
value of experimentation. In both cases, Justices supporting selective incorporation were willing to grant leeway to states to conduct experiments aimed at
achieving greater efficiency without subordinating the policies of the jury trial
guarantee. Unlike other experiments that the Court had rejected, the states
here were not arguing that the values underlying the guarantee had to be sacrificed to interests of expediency.5 80 Instead, they maintained, and the Court
agreed, that their innovations safeguarded the values underlying the sixth
amendment to the same extent and with the same degree of effectiveness as the
requirements imposed by the pre-incorporation cases. 58 ' Williams and
572. Of course, to say that there can be no experimentation with "fundamental liberties" does not

answer the question whether a particular state experiment implicates such a liberty. See Friendly,
supra note 296, at 955. Justices Goldberg and Black certainly meant to say that they would not construe the fourteenth amendment narrowly in order to provide leeway for experimentation. Cf. supra
note 565 (Justice Holmes' view on experimentation). And they may have meant to say that any experimentation even remotely affecting fundamental liberties was impermissible.
573. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213414 (Fortas, J., concurring).
574. Id at 214-15.
575. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
576. Id
577. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
578. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
579. Williams, 399 U.S. at 101-02;/Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410-11.
580. Compare with WlMliams and .4podaca, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (rejecting state's refusal to provide juries for one-year misdemeanors tried in New York City), and Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (rejecting state law permitting adverse comment by court or
prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify). The state in Baldwin argued that the state's interest in
administrative convenience overcame the jury trial requirement imposed by pre-incorporation cases.
See 399 U.S. at 72-73. There was no suggestion, however, that the state practice provided the accused
with the same degree of protection as the pre-incorporation cases.
581. Williams, 399 U.S. at 101-02 (no difference in results reached by twelve and six person juries,
and loss in community representation "negligible"); .podaca, 406 U.S. at 410-14 (although unanimity
requirement would produce hung juries in 10-2 verdict case and juries permitted to split would reach
verdict in such case, difference does not adversely affect interests protected by jury trial guarantee).
Arguably, the conclusion in 4podaca that split verdicts were no less effective than unanimous verdicts
was not shared by the majority, because the deciding vote was cast by Justice Powell, who applied a
fundamental fairness standard. Supra text accompanying note 396-97. Justice Poweli, however, also
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Apodaca indicate that when the state maintains the basic policy of a particular
guarantee and simply seeks to provide the same degree of protection in a different form, selective incorporation will permit experimentation with the rights
afforded the accused.
Although selective incorporation does not, viewed in this light, require a
complete rejection of Brandeis' admonition, it does treat experimentation
somewhat differently than the fundamental fairness doctrine. First, under selective incorporation, the Court holds that the relevant Bill of Rights guarantee, not just the due process clause, allows a particular experiment. That
holding, therefore, extends the opportunity to conduct that experiment to the
federal government as well as the state. After Williams, for example, the sixth
amendment prohibited neither the federal government nor the state from using
six person juries. Tying together state and federal experimentation in this
fashion does not present the difficulties in criminal procedure that it would
elsewhere. In the social and economic context considered by Justice Brandeis,
state experimentation was preferred over federal experimentation.5 8 2 The social or economic experiment of an individual state was "without risk to the rest
of the country,"'58 3 but federal legislation applied throughout the nation. In
the field of criminal procedure, however, experimentation by the federal government affects only one of fifty-one criminal justice systems: the federal system. The state systems, which handle the vast bulk of all criminal
prosecutions, 584 are not subjected to the federal innovation.
Selective incorporation differs from the fundamental fairness doctrine secondly in the scope of experimentation it permits. As Williams and Apodaca
demonstrate, selective incorporation permits only experiments that provide alternative forms of protection without detracting from the basic values of the
particular guarantee. Fundamental fairness, on the other hand, allows experimentation that fails to implement those values as. effectively, at least when the
values are not substantially undercut.5 8 5 Moreover, earlier fundamental fairness cases indicate that the doctrine could allow a complete trade-off of the
basic elements of a particular guarantee for a new procedure providing an
alternative route to fundamental justice. In Hurtado v. California,5 8 6 for example, the state was allowed to substitute a probable cause review by a magistrate
concluded that there was "no reason to believe that a unanimous decision of 12 jurors is more likely to
serve the high purpose of jury trial." 406 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
When the Court later found that neither a smaller jury nor a split-verdict of a six person jury would
as effectively serve the purposes of the sixth amendment, it struck down the state experiment. See
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (rejecting five-to-one jury vote for nonpetty offenses);
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (rejecting five person jury).
582. See supra text accompanying note 562 (discussing Justice Brandeis' position on
experimentation).
583. Id
584. H. KERPER & J. IsRAEL, supra note.518, at 74-75.
585. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 55-58 (1946) (under fundamental fairness doctrine, state law permitting adverse comment on defendant's silence held not to violate due process since
it merely draws to jury's attention an inference logically arising from defendant's failure to explain or
deny the prosecutor's incriminating evidence) with Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (under
selective incorporation doctrine, state law permitting adverse comment on defendant's silence held to
violate privilege against self-incrimination by imposing penalty for exercise of privilege); see also

Friendly, supra note 296, at 938-40 (criticizing Grffin and noting that "most informed professional
opinion" approved allowing limited comment).
586. 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see supra text accompanying notes 180-90 (discussing Hurfado).
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for a grand jury review.58 7 And in Missouri v. Lewis588 the Court suggested
that a state would not violate the fourteenth amendment by substituting the
its methods of procedure" for the common law system of
"civil law and
5 89
adjudication.
Consider, in this light, the proposal that arrested persons be given complete
protection from police interrogation, but be subjected to interrogation by a
magistrate in a public proceeding, with their refusal to respond creating an
adverse inference. Such a proposal would have been acceptable constitutionally under even the later fundamental fairness cases. 590 Yet, under the selective
incorporation doctrine and the current interpretation of the self-incrimination
clause, the same proposal faces constitutional problems that are "formidable." 5 91 Certainly it would not pass muster simply because it is an even-handed
approach-adding protection at one point and subtracting protection at an"the 'immutable principles of justice' as conother-entirely consistent with
'592
ceived by a civilized Society.
IV.

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION AND THE CURRENT COURT

Commenting on the "pendulum of federalism" in the Supreme Court, Professor Howard wrote that
[i]t is striking, perhaps surprising, that the Burger Court, having
slowed the momentum of the "criminal justice" revolution of the
1960's, has at the same time stuck to the basic premise of the incorporation doctrine: that when a procedural guarantee is applied to the
the same force as when it is applied to the
states, it is applied with
593
federal Government.
As Professor Howard suggests, the continued adherence to selective incorporation is hardly an action that follows automatically from the composition of
the current Supreme Court. There clearly are major differences in philosophy
separating the Burger Court majority of the last decade from the Warren
Court majority that adopted selective incorporation. It generally is agreed that
the Burger Court is less receptive to claims of the accused than its predecessor,
587. 110 U.S. at 538.
588. 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
589. Id at 31; see supra note 20 (discussing Lewis).
590. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (court allowed prosecutor to comment on defendant's failure to testify); see also Kauper, JudicialExamination ofthe Accused-A Remedy Forthe
ThirdDegree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224, 1239-44 (1932) (proposal for judicial interrogation of criminal
defendant with refusal to answer magistrate's questions admissible against accused at trial); Kamisar,
Kauper's "JudicialExaminationoftheAccused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments On A Remarkable
Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15, 22-25 (1974) (discussing Kauper's proposal in light of later precedent).
591. Kamisar, supra note 590, at 33. Kasimar makes a valiant attempt to find constitutional support
for such a proposal, notwithstanding Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), which rejected a
state law permitting adverse comments on defendant's failure to testify. Kasimar, supra note 590, at 33
n.70. See also Frankel, FromPrivateFightstowardPublicJustice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 516, 529-30 (1976)
(suggesting that Griffin ruling "not so central and inevitable as to preclude restudy in an altered

context").
592. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). On the other hand,
an even-handed approach might induce the Court to reconsider and reject its Griffin ruling, at least in
this context. See Frankel, supra note 591, at 531 (suggesting same).
593. Howard, The Supreme Court and Federalism,in THE ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
CONFERENCE REPORT, THE COURTS: THE PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM

49, 54 (1979).
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although the precise extent of that difference is a matter of dispute.5 94 More
significantly, the Burger Court has exhibited a "renewed sensitivity to the prerogatives of the states. ' 595 That sensitivity to states' rights is reflected in various rulings relating to criminal procedure.5 96 For example, the Burger Court
rulings on federal habeas corpus review of state convictions have substantially
restricted, if not overruled,
the Warren Court's liberal "deliberate by-pass"
597
standard of Fay v.

Noia.

Overall, the current Court's views on the obligations of federalism appear to
come closer to those of Justice Harlan than to those of the Warren Court majority that adopted selective incorporation over Justice Harlan's rigorous opposition.5 98 Why then, has the Court nevertheless continued to adhere to the
selective incorporation doctrine?
Although respect for precedent may have played a role in preserving the
doctrine, that factor has not likely been controlling in itself. On an issue that
has been described as "going to the very pulse of sound constitutional adjudication," 599 the principle of stare decisis hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to change.60 0 Selective incorporation never had a firm base in prior
precedent, 60 ' and the Burger Court has not hesitated to chip away at other
Warren Court decisions that it viewed as unjustified departures from the lessons of history.60 2 It would not have been difficult for the Court to at least
reject "jot-for-jot" incorporation in selected areas, as urged by Justice
594. Compare L. LEvy, AGAINST THE LAW (1974) (Burger Court has consistently departed from
major Warren Court precedents) with Chase, The Burger Court, the Individualand the CriminalProcess:
Directionsand Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518, 519 (1977) (Burger Court has retreated from
Warren Court's expansive view of fourth and fifth amendments) with Israel, supra note 3, at 1349 (in
some areas Burger Court has been even more protective of criminal defendants than Warren Court).
595. Developments in the Lawn-The Interpretation fState ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. Rcv.
1324, 1329 n.22 (1982). See generally Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism", 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 39, 43-47 (summer 1980) (discussing "Burger Court's brand of federalism" as it
relates to access to federal courts to challenge state criminal proceedings).
596. Consider, in addition to the cases cited infra note 597, the Burger Court's imposition oflimits on
federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings, discussed in Howard, supra note 593, at 60-6 1,
and Monaghan, supra note 595, at 43-47.
597. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (liberal federal habeas relief available absent knowing and deliberate
failure to raise constitutional contention in state proceeding). Compare with Fay v. Nola, Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (no habeas review ofclaims if petitioner failed to lodge timely objection
under state contemporaneous objection rules unless petitioner shows sufficient cause for failure to raise
claim and resulting prejudice; Fay v. Noia not applicable), and Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572
(1982) (cause and prejudice test of Wainwright v. Sykes also applies to constitutional claims relating to
factual guilt).
The Court has also limited the range of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas review. See Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1977) (when state provided opportunity for full and fair litigation,
habeas petitioner may not raise claim that evidence obtained in unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at trial). See Popper, De-Nationalizingthe Bill of Rights, in THE ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN CONFERENCE REPORT, THE COURTS: THE PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM 81 (1979) (discussing Stone and related cases).
598. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1972) (described supra note 597) with Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466-67 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for similar bar to habeas relief based
on defendant's failure to raise proper objection in state courts).
599. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
600. Id at 119-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
601. For an analysis of the rationale of selective incorporation, see supra text accompanying notes
407-592.
602. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1972) (restricting "deliberate by-pass"
habeas rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1971) (narrowly construing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) on availability of injunction against state
criminal proceeding); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518, 520-21 (1976) (expressly overruling Amal-
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Powell.
Selective incorporation was most likely saved by its workability. It provides
exceptional administrative convenience at a very low cost to the underlying
concerns of the Court's renewed interest in federalism. Although selective incorporation does not provide a symbol of respect for state sovereignty, as did
fundamental fairness, it does provide sufficient flexibility to avoid the disastrous consequences to state criminal justice systems that had been predicted by
those who opposed its adoption.
A.

PRESERVING ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE

Selective incorporation was adopted, in part, because the Court thought it
provided a clearer guideline for state courts than the fundamental fairness doctrine. 6° 4 The Burger Court arguably is less concerned that state officials will
purposefully misuse vague constitutional standards. 60 5 That, however, does
not eliminate the need to provide substantial direction in a matter of everyday
concern to those officials. If selective incorporation offered a significant advantage in providing such direction in the 1960's, it offered an even greater
advantage a decade later. Over that decade the Court issued over 200 rulings
in the field of constitutional criminal procedure. 606 State cburts have been able
to rely on each of these rulings regardless of whether the case involved a federal or state proceeding. A return to fundamental fairness would raise doubts
about the continued vitality of many of those cases as applied to those states.
Those cases that arose in the federal system would automatically be suspect,
and even cases involving state proceedings could be questioned: Might the
Court have reached a different result if it had looked to a fundamental fairness
concept of due process rather than a specific guarantee?
Arguably, the impact of the shift back to the fundamental fairness doctrine
could have been limited by confining that shift to a particular type of constitutional standard. Justice Fortas in a sixth amendment case suggested that fundamental fairness analysis was most appropriately applied to standards
prescribing a "system of administration." 60 7 That suggestion, however, likely
left open the possibility of encompassing various guarantees besides the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial. Could not a fourth amendment standard relating to standing or a fifth amendment standard governing the judge's role in
assessing a claim of self-incrimination also be categorized as a standard of
administration, as opposed to a standard defining the basic right? For that
reason the distinction drawn by Justice Fortas, and perhaps supported by Jusgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); no first amendment right
to picket in shopping center).
603. See supra text accompanying notes 403-05 (discussing Justice Powell's opposition to "jot-forjot" incorporation).
604. See supra text accompanying notes 476-506.
605. Howard, supra note 593, at 56.
606. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 79 (1st ed. 1971).
607. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213-14 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 376-81). Compare Professor Hill's criticism of the failure of Justices both supporting and opposing selective incorporation to ask "whether the case presents an issue of definition (including minimum degree of implementation), or is one in which there is an issue of implementation but
no real disagreement over definition of the right." Hill, supra note 264, at 192.
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tice Powell, 60 8 might have created only slightly less confusion than a complete
rejectiqn of selective incorporation.
The administrative costs of overturning selective incorporation would have
been substantial, but perhaps not so great as to preclude rejection of the doctrine if it had produced the disastrous results predicted by those who opposed
it. Critics argued that selective incorporation would produce rulings that either
60 9
hamstrung the effective administration of the state criminal justice systems 6 0
or "watered down" the protections afforded against the federal government. 1
The key to the retention of selective incorporation probably lies in the Court's
belief that neither of these consequences is inevitable-that the doctrine provides sufficient flexibility in the interpretation of individual guarantees to give
appropriate consideration to the needs of the state systems and that the Court
has sufficient authority to impose higher standards upon the federal system
when appropriate.
B.

AVOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRAIGHTJACKET

1. The Problem of "Peripheral Accretions"
By the 1970's even the most vigorous opponents of selective incorporation
acknowledged that the core values of the various incorporated guarantees
should be applied to the states. 6 "1Justice Harlan, for example, although he
contested incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, rejected the notion that all elements of the privilege were beyond the
requirements of fundamental faimess. 6 12 Due process, he stated, clearly would
prohibit a state "from imprisoning a person solely because he refused to give
614
evidence which may incriminate him. '6 13 Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana
the dissenters argued only that due process permitted the state to dispense with
a jury trial for the "simple battery" involved in the case, not that it permitted
the state to
convict defendants on serious felony charges without the protection
6 15
of a jury.
The "constitutional straightjacket" 61 6 that was the predicted product of selective incorporation stemmed primarily from what Professor Henkin described as the "peripheral survivals or accretions in the Bill of Rights. ' 61 7 The
608. See supra text accompanying notes 403-05 (discussing Justice Powell's concern about applying
to states requirements focusing on details of administration).

609. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (Harlan, J., concurring) (selective incorporation will place
states in "constitutional straight jacket").
610. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
611. But see Black, supra note 459, at 878 (suggesting that some Justices would balance even core
values against the convenience of law enforcement and eliminate those values when unduly
burdensome).
612. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15 (1964) (Harlan, J. dissenting). But see Twining v. New

Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 112-13 (1908) (suggesting all aspects of privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to states under fundamental fairness doctrine).
613. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
614. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
615. Id at 171-72 (Harlan, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices assumed that the
"simple battery" was not within the petty offense category and that application of the sixth amendment
therefore would require a jury trial. Id
concurring).
616. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
617. Henkin, supra note 5, at 83. The "peripheral survivals or accretions in the Bill of Rights" are
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specific guarantees supposedly were encrusted with various detailed standards
for their implementation that were unduly rigid and burdensome as applied to
a state system. 61 8 To eliminate those standards would be most difficult because
history of the particular
they usually were established by the common law
61 9
guarantee as well as pre-incorporation precedent.
The decisions inApodaca v. Oregon620 and Williams v. Florida62' suggested,
however, that removal of such "peripheral accretions" was far from an impossible task. 22 Of course, there was disagreement about exactly which standards
were needed to ensure the integrity of the guarantee and which reflected no
more than one convenient mode of implementation.6 2 3 Surely, many standards
retained to ensure the integrity of a specific guarantee would have been rejected under the fundamental fairness doctrine. Under the fundamental fairness doctrine, the individual in effect bore the burden of showing that justice
could not be served without the application of the right in question. A Court
could hold a long-standing interpretation of a guarantee inapplicable to the
states because it was not clearly recognized as essential to safeguarding the
core values of that guarantee.6 24 Selective incorporation, on the other hand,
placed the burden on the state to show that the long-standing interpretation
was beyond the needs of the guarantee. Selective incorporation gave the Justices less flexibility in dealing with what they viewed as outmoded or unnecessary standards of implementation, 625 but it still left them sufficient leeway to
specifics in the Bill of Rights that may be anachronistic and therefore should not be imposed on the
states through selective incorporation. Id
618. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 143 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Those advancing this
argument did not deny that these same standards may have been burdensome for the federal system as
well, but because they were intended by the framers, the federal system had no alternative but to accept
them. Id
619. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 126 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (sixth amendment
requirement of 12 person jury dictated by both precedent and pronouncements of Court).
620. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).

621. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
622. See the discussion of Apodaca and Williams supra text accompanying notes 385-98.
623. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (discussed supra note 401); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 392-98); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 615 (discussed supra note 585).
624. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949) (fourth amendment right against unreasonable
search and seizure not applicable to states under fourteenth amendment).
625. Perhaps for some Justices, both the fundamental fairness and selective incorporation doctrines
would be equally flexible. Justice Douglas reported that Chief Justice Hughes once told him that at "the
constitutional level. . . ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies
the reasons for supporting our predilections." W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 8 (1980). From that

perspective, the same result might be reached whether the Justice looked to the fundamental fairness
standard or one of the more specific Bill of Rights guarantees. Yet, for other Justices there are various
issues-at least those where the emotions are not so strong-on which the language, history, and precedent under a specific guarantee demand a result that would not be reached under a fundamental fairness test. The dissenting opinions of Justice Harlan in several of the selective incorporation cases are
illustrative. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Justice Harlan was willing to argue that (1)fundamental fairness did not require a particular procedure, and (2) if the specific guarantee were applied to
the states, it also did not require that procedure. Id at 15-16 (rejecting application to states of federal
standard for privilege against self-incrimination). In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), however, although Justice Harlan was willing to hold a procedure unnecessary under the fundamental
fairness standard, he could not reach the same result under the specific guarantee. See id at 118
(Harlan, J. dissenting) (applying fundamental fairness standard, jury trial unnecessary for misdemeanors, but if specific guarantee applied, petty offense limitation prevailed and jury trial required). See also
supra note 615 (discussing dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana).
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act when they
believed such standards would impose a substantial burden on
626
the states.
2. Considering Local Circumstances
Another element of the predicted "constitutional straightjacket" was the rigidity of selective incorporation, which would require the same pattern of proceedings for all fifty-one jurisdictions. 627 There. supposedly would be no
opportunity to take account of the diverse settings in which state criminal justice systems operate, and application of a single constitutional standard would
undercut effective local traditions, particularly those relating to judicial proceedings. 628 Here again, however, selective incorporation proved more flexible
than its critics had suggested. Post-incorporation rulings established that states
could justify local variations based on their particular needs.
In North v. Russell, 6 29 for example, a two-tier trial system for misdemeanors,
with nonlawyer magistrates operating at the first level, was sustained as an
appropriate balance of the limited resources of rural communities and the
rights of the defendants. 630 The Court pointed to "the interest of both the
defendant and the State, to provide speedier and less costly adjudication" and
the "convenience to those charged to be tried in or near their own community
rather than travel to a distant court where a law trained judge is provided."'6 3'
It was sufficient that a full fledged trial, with a jury and lawyer-judge, was
available at the second tier and could be reached by
the defendant without
632
suffering any substantial imposition at the first tier.
Similarly, in Shadwick v. Tampa633 the Supreme Court recognized the "stiff
and unrelenting caseloads" borne by many municipal courts and held that the
626. For instance, in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court did not require the states to
adopt the federal standard of a twelve person jury, which it termed "a historical accident, unnecessary
to effect the purposes of the jury system." Id at 102. Significantly, the Court noted that at least nine

states provided for less than twelve person juries. Id at 99 n.45. It is likely that the Court acted at least
partly to avoid burdening those states with an unnecessary standard.
Conversely, when all but a few states already followed a standard, the Court found no state interest
requiring it to discard years of pre-incorporation precedent supporting the standard, even when the
standard was not essential to protect the basic guarantee. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970),
for example, the Court held unconstitutional New York's failure to provide jury trials for misdemeanors with maximum sentences of one year imprisonment. Id at 73. The traditional six month limitation
on the petty offense exception to the jury trial guarantee was no less the product of "a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system," Williams, 399 U.S. at 102, than the twelve
person jury. The line could just as readily have been drawn at one year, the traditional cut-off point for
misdemeanors. New York State, however, stood alone with the one year misdeameanor dividing line,
and even New York employed it only in New York City. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71-72. Although the
New York City criminal justice system obviously faced an exceptionally heavy caseload, there was no
reason to believe that it could not accommodate a dividing line that was being applied in all of the'
other large cities in the United States. Id See generally Smith and Pollack, The Courts StandIndictedin
New York CiQy, 68 J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 252 (1977) (commentary on inadequacies of city's
criminal courts).
627. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 214 (1968) (Fortas, J. concurring).
628. Id
629. 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
630. Id at 336.
631. Id
632. Id at 334; see also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 630 (1976) (upholding two-tier system with right to jury trial only at second tier when state allowed defendant to move to that tier without
presenting defense at first level).
633. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
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fourth amendment was not violated by the issuance of arrest warrants for municipal ordinance violations by nonlawyer clerks of the court. 634 Justice Poweli's opinion for a unanimous Court noted that the issuance of warrants by
judges or lawyers was preferred, but then, in language reminiscent of earlier
fundamental fairness opinions, it added:
But our federal system warns of converting desirable practice into
constitutional commandment. It recognizes in plural and diverse
state activities one key to national innovation and vitality. States are
entitled to some flexibility and leeway in their designation of magisand capable of the
trates, so long as all are neutral and detached 635
probable-cause determination required of them.
North, Shadwick, and various search and seizure opinions recognizing the
special problems of local law enforcement indicate there is a substantial potential for accommodation to community diversity within a framework of selective incorporation. 636 Of course, not all claims for accommodation have been
successful. 637 There probably is somewhat less ro6m for accommodation than
would be available under a fundamental fairness standard, 638 but there clearly
is sufficient flexibility to recognize most claims for variation that are based on
substantial local concerns.
3. Allowing for Innovations
Critics of selective incorporation also argued that the selective incorporation
doctrine would preclude innovative experiments that might otherwise improve
634. Id at 353.
635. Id at 353-54.
636. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (recognizing difficulties of
securing impounded automobiles against theft and therefore upholding routine inventory searches as
reasonable); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 436 (1973) (upholding warrantless search of auto
towed to private garage; noting police acted to protect public safety because driver may have left gun in
car); Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1973) (upholding right to search auto without
seeking consent; noting impracticability of requiring advice as to rights before search following traffic
stop).
In Cady the Court noted that earlier cases involving automobile searches had focused on problems
faced by federal officers, whose contact with cars "usually, if not always, involves the detection or
investigation of crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle." 413 U.S. at 440. As a result of Mapp,
however, the Court now had to reassess the justification for automobile searches in light of the activities
of local officers, who "have more contact with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of vehicles
themselves." Id. at 441. That activity suggested that the mobility of the vehicle-the factor stressed in
the cases involving federal officers-was not the only justification for warrantless searches of
automobiles. The need for local officers to make searches independent of criminal investigations, for
community caretaking functions, suggested a broader basis for such searches. Id. at 441-42.
637. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (state could not utilize traditional local rule that
jeopardy did not attach until first witness sworn); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969) (when
accused person imprisoned in another jurisdiction demanded speedy trial, state's failure to comply not
justified by transportation costs or special problems involved in seeking temporary release from other
jurisdiction for purposes of trial). Compare Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (indigent
defendant has right to appointed counsel for petty offense if sentenced to imprisonment on that charge)
and id. at 40 (Brennan, J., with Douglas & Stewart, JJ., concurring) (suggesting law students may
provide representation for indigent defendants) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (Court
would not "create confusion and impose unpredictable, necessarily substantial costs" by extending
.4rgersingerand requiring sixth amendment right to court appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases not
involving actual jail sentence).
638. See supra note 625 (discussing comparative flexibility of doctrines of fundamental fairness and
selective incorporation).
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the criminal justice process. 639 Reference to the specific guarantees, as opposed
to a fundamental fairness standard, would "retard development in the field of
criminal procedure by stifling flexibility." 640 Here again, however, the adverse
impact of the selective incorporation doctrine has not been nearly as substantial as the critics suggested.
Selective incorporation undoubtedly precluded some of the more dramatic
experiments envisaged by the earlier cases. 64 1 Yet, past history suggests that
the states were unlikely, in any event, to adopt changes that altered the basic
structure of the process. 64 2 The states have not hesitated, however, to adopt
less sweeping innovations even when they have been constitutionally suspect.643 Moreover, the Court has upheld many of those innovations. In Zicarelli v. New Jersey Commission of Investigation6 4 the Court upheld an
immunity statute limited to use and derivative use immunity as co-extensive
with the privilege against self-incrimination. 645 In Calfornia v. Green64 6 the
Court held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated
by admitting a witness' out-of-court statements as substantive evidence if the
647
witness testifies at trial and is subject to full, effective cross-examination.
6
8
The Court in Chandler v. Florida held that, subject to certain safeguards, a
639. See supra note 569 and accompanying text.
640. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138 (1970) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
641. See supra notes 586-89 and accompanying text (discussing experiments allowed by early fundamental fairness cases).
642. A thumbnail sketch of the American criminal justice system might describe it as an accusatorial
adversary system that seeks to avoid the conviction of the innocent and to respect the dignity of the
individual. The most significant procedural reforms of the last several decades have not sought to alter
that structure. See generally F. FEENEY, THE POLICE AND PRETRIAL RELEASE (1982) (discussing use of
police citations or summonses requiring subsequent appearance as viable alternative to arrest); W.
THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976) (tracing progression of bail reform movement and its accomplishments); Burpo, ElectronicSurveillance by Leave of the Magistrate:the Caseforthe Prosecution,
38 TENN. L. REV. 14 (1970) (electronic surveillance under title III affords law enforcement officials
effective investigation tool without jeopardizing constitutional right to privacy). Although the recent
movement for preventive detention may be challenged as inconsistent with that structure, it is defended
by its supporters as entirely consistent with the basic precepts of the American system. See Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the ConstitutionalityofPretrialDetention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969) (arguing that
preventive detention is consistent with presumption of innocence, due process, and historical practice).
Commentators have discussed proposals that would incorporate some features of the continental system. See generally Weigand, ContinentalCuresforAmerican Alments: European CriminalProcedureAs
A Model ForLaw Reform, in 2 N. MORRIS & M. TONRY, CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 381 (1980). But those proposals have not been carried beyond the stage of law review
discussions.
643. Recent state innovations that may be constitutionally suspect include preventive detention
measures, see Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1165 (8th Cir. 1981) (classification of sex offenses as nonbailable violates excessive bail clause), vacatedas moot sub nom; Murphy v. Hunt, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1182
(1982) (per curiam), and provisions authorizing detention on less than probable cause to obtain identification evidence. See Israel, LegislativeRegulation ofSearchesand Seizures: The Michigan Proposals,73
MICH. L. REV. 221, 238-41 (1974) (citing authorities).
644. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
645. Id. at 476. A similar immunity statute was upheld the same day in Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
646. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
647. Id. at 164. Use of a witness' out-of-court statements as impeachment evidence was well established, but the California Evidence Code permitted use of such statements to show the truth of the
matter asserted therein, a position advocated by the Model Code and Uniform Rules, but adopted (at
that time) by only a small number ofjurisdictions. Id. at 154-55.
648. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
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state can permit the televising of a trial over the defendant's objection. 649
Not all innovations presented to the Court have been upheld, 650 but the Justices have had no difficulty in giving weight to the value of experimentation.
In Chandler, for example, the Court noted that Florida adopted guidelines permitting televising trials after a carefully reviewed pilot program had proven
successful. 65' Eighteen other states had adopted guidelines allowing televised
'652
judicial proceedings with several still "experimenting with such coverage.
The issue was under study in yet another dozen states. 653 This strong display of
state interest, supported by their generally careful and cautious approach,
worked in Florida's favor. The Court stated that because it could not say that
the state activity automatically denied due process, it would be guided by Justice Brandeis' admonition in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman6 54 to respect state
experimentation. 655 In restoring the relevance of Justice Brandeis' admonition,
by the earlier rejection of
Chandler may have put to rest the concerns created
656
that admonition by Justices Goldberg and Black.
C.

PRESERVING FEDERAL LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE

In Williams v. Florida65 7 Justice Harlan warned the Court that selective incorporation had placed it on the horns of a dilemma.6 5 8 To "[w]iggle free" of
the "constitutional straightjacket" of selective incorporation, it would have to
develop flexible standards for individual guarantees that allowed the states
"more elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems. ' 659 In many instances, however, those flexible standards would dilute the constitutional protections that the framers intended to apply to the federal system. 660 The result
was not only an inappropriate use of judicial review, but a policy that would
649. Id. at 582.

650. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state statute providing for exclusion of general public and press from trials on rape charges
involving victim under age of 18); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1972) (holding unconstitutional state law designed to extend to defendant policy of sequestration of prospective witnesses and
requiring that defendant desiring to testify do so before any other defense witnesses heard). Other
decisions have allowed experimentation with recoupment programs, which require indigent defendants
to reimburse the state for the costs of their legal defense, but the decisions have limited the distinctions
that can be drawn in such programs. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40,47 (1974) (no violation of equal
protection clause if statute retains exemptions accorded other judgment debtors, including opportunity
to show recovery of legal costs imposes "manifest hardship"); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 139-40
(1972) (violation of equal protection clause when statute does not afford indigent defendants exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966) (violation of equal protection clause when recoupment statute applies only to incarcerated indigents).
651. 449 U.S. at 565-66.
652. Id
653. Id
654. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
655. 449 U.S. at 579-80. After quoting the admonition in its entirety, see supra text accompanying.
note 561, the Chandler opinion noted: "This concept of federalism, echoed by the States favoring
Florida's experiment, must guide our decision." Id at 580.
656. See supra notes 570-71 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of Brandeis' admonition by
Goldberg and Black).
657. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
658. Id at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
659. 1d
660. Id
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"discard . . . the possibility of federal leadership by example."' 66' The only
Harlan argued, was to return to the fundamental fairness
way out,6 Justice
62
standard.
In failing to return to the fundamental fairness standard, the current majority may have concluded that the costs noted by Justice Harlan were outweighed by the administrative convenience of the selective incorporation
doctrine. They may also have concluded, however, that those costs have
largely been avoided. It is far from clear exactly how often the Court knowingly has, in Justice Stewart's words, "relax[ed] the explicit restrictions that the
Framers actually did put upon the Federal Government" in order to avoid
restrictions upon the constitutional sovereignty of the
"impos[ing] intolerable
'663
individual States.
Of the post-incorporation cases in which the Court rejected prior precedent,
only the jury trial cases appear outwardly to be "watering down" previous
standards to meet the needs of the states,664 and even then, one cannot be
certain. If Congress had concluded that six person juries were appropriate in
misdemeanor cases (including nonpetty offenses) tried in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, would the Court have struck down that statute? Justice Harlan suggested yes, 665 because with only the federal system affected, the
weight of666the common law practice and federal precedent would have
prevailed.
A watering-down process may also have occurred in those post-incorporation decisions in which the Court emphasized the special needs of the states.
In Shadwick v. Tampa,667 for example, the Court might not have been willing
to permit arrest warrants for ordinance violations to be issued by clerks of the
court if the court had been in the District of Columbia. At stake in Shadwick
661. Id at 138.
662. 399 U.S. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
663. Id at 143 (Stewart, J., concurring).
664. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
392-98); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 385-91);
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (discussed supra note 632). In Ludwig the Court distin-

guished Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1880) (holding unconstitutional two-tier court system in
District of Columbia), on two grounds. First, the Massachusetts two-tier court system, which failed to

provide a jury trial on the first level, did not impose as substantial a burden on the right to jury trial as
did the District of Columbia two-tier system. Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 630. The second distinguishing factor
was that the "sources of the right to jury trial in the federal court" include art. III, § 2, cl. 3, as well as

the sixth amendment. Id This second ground suggests the possibility of still retaining separate constitutional standards for federal and state systems in at least this aspect of jury trial administration.
There were, of course, other instances in which the Court rejected the more stringent standards of
pre-incorporation cases, but those decisions did not appear to be influenced by any differences in the
state and federal criminal justice systems. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980)

(rejecting automatic standing for possession offenses in favor of rule requiring defendant to show personal fourth amendment right violated to claim benefit of exclusionary rule); Kastigar v. United States,

406 U.S. 441, 459 (1972) (use and derivative use immunity co-extensive with fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; transactional immunity, affording broader protection, not constitutionally
required); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967) (rejecting distinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities, fruits of crime and contraband for valid searches under fourth
amendment).
665. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

666. Cf. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (two-tier trial system in District of Columbia that
imposes burden of full trial in first tier unconstitutional).
667. 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 633-34).

HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. L. J. 334 1982-1983

19821

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION

was adequate funding for the local court, 66 8 and the Supreme Court probably
would have been less concerned with Congress' resources than with those of a
state or municipality.669 On the other hand, the Court would have no reason
not to apply standards meant to accommodate the special responsibilities of
state law enforcement officers to federal officers with the same responsibilities.
For the answers to these problems could not be found in the greater resources
of the national government. In short, although there may have been instances
in which the Court purposely "diluted" constitutional standards to give the
states "more elbow room," most cases adopting flexible standards probably
desire to give both federal and state governments some administrative
reflect a670
leeway.
Of course, even when a "watering down" of standards does occur, it should
not preclude "federal leadership by example." The Court may always impose
higher standards for federal proceedings pursuant to its supervisory authority
over the administration of justice in federal courts. As one commentator
noted, "[T]he supervisory power possesses a significant potential for reconciling the conflicting desires of the federal judiciary to improve standards for
the prosecution of individual rights while exercising the self-restraint appropriate to constitutional adjudication and to the delicate balances of the federal
system." 67 t Although the boundaries of the supervisory power are unclear, the
Court's pre-incorporation exercises of that power firmly establish its authority
to reach all aspects of the federal criminal process, including police activities,
through the exclusion of evidence. 672 In recent years, the Court has held that
certain state practices comport with the federal Constitution, but noted that the
supervisory power would bar those practices in federal courts. 673 Of course,
leadership through the supervisory power is always subject to congressional
668. 407 U.S. at 351.
669. On the other hand, the use of nonlawyer magistrates was tolerated for many years in the federal
system. Hearings on the U.S. Commisioner System 'efore the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,151-52 (1965).
670. Certainly the Court has passed by many opportunities to "water down" standards for the states

while keeping higher standards for the federal courts. For example, it has rejected the opportunity to
hold pre-incorporation rulings inapplicable to the states by construing those rulings as having been
based on the Court's supervisory power rather than a subsequently incorporated constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (requirement that warrant affidavit indicate
basis for reliability of information grounded on fourth amendment, not supervisory power); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (earlier decisions prohibiting adverse comment on defendant's
silence based on self-incrimination clause, not supervisory power); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38
(1978) (decisions holding jeopardy attaches when jury sworn based on fifth amendment, not supervisory power).
671. Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1666 (1963) (dis-

cussing broad scope of Supreme Court's power of supervision over inferior courts).
672. See id at 1656-64 (discussing exclusion of evidence ancillary to supervisory power); Hill, supra
note 264, at 204-05 (same); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (Court has authority to
impose higher standards in area of search and seizure through exclusion of evidence pursuant to its
supervisory power).
673. Compare Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1981) (questions designed to
identify racial prejudice would be required in federal court when requested by defendant of different
racial or ethnic group than victim) with Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9, 598 (1976) (no per se
rule requiring inquiry into racial prejudice when defendant of different race than victim). Compare
United States v. Hale, 442 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) (new trial ordered in exercise of supervisory power over
lower federal courts because impeachment reference to postarrest silence possibly prejudicial) with
Fletcher v. Weir, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (1982) (per curiam) (no violation of due process in state court to
impeach defendant's testimony with postarrest silence when no Miranda warnings given) and Jenkins v.
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veto, but Congress has utilized that authority most sparingly.674 For a Court
that finds selective incorporation sufficiently flexible to be responsive to the
appropriate needs of federalism, there is no need to reject that doctrine in order to maintain "federal leadership by example."
V.

CONCLUSION

Over the years Supreme Court opinions considering the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment-particularly as it
bears on state criminal justice systems-have referred largely to five concerns:
(1) adhering to the language of the amendment and the intent of its framers;
(2) avoiding vague standards that invite the Justices to apply their own subjective and idiosyncratic views of basic justice; (3) providing broad protection of
individual liberties against state systems too often willing to sacrifice those liberties in the interest of obtaining more "efficient" administration of the criminal laws; (4) giving appropriate recognition to the principles of federalism; and
(5) providing sufficient direction to state courts to gain consistent enforcement
of federal constitutional standards within the framework of Supreme Court
review necessarily limited to a minute portion of all state criminal proceedings.
All of these concerns have played some role in shaping the standards adopted
by the Court, but the weight given to each has varied from one period to
another.
Perhaps no concern has been mentioned more frequently than the first, the
need to adhere to the historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment as reflected in its language and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. Yet,
neither that language nor history has proven especially confining in the Court's
choice of standards. Although total incorporation was rejected in part because
it failed to fit the amendment's language and history, it seems likely that the
practical consequences of adopting that doctrine played an even larger role in
its ultimate rejection. Selective incorporation was adopted notwithstanding
675
similar difficulties in finding textual and historical support for that doctrine.
Other positions taken by the Court are also suspect on this score. Consider, for
example, the Slaughter-House interpretation that the privileges and immunities clause added nothing to the rights of citizenship that did not already exist
prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, 676 and the textual and
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980) (no violation of due process for prosecutor in state court to
impeach defendant with prearrest silence).

674. For example, 18 U.S.C. §3501 (1976), which gave the trial judge discretion to determine the

voluntariness of confessions before they were received into evidence, purported to overrule the McNabb-Mallory rule, which was a judge-made rule of supervisory control over federal officers that in-

cluded the right to exclude confessions received during period of illegal detention. See generally
United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970) (discussing purpose and history of §3501). The
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1976), which allowed the court to order production of statement tran-

scripts of a government witness after the witness testified, respondea to Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 668 (1975) (upholding order directing government to produce FBI reports for inspection and

impeachment purposes), but largely codified it. C. WRuoIH, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 417 (2d ed. 1982).
675. Indeed, many would argue that selective incorporation is niore difficult to justify by reference to
the language and history of the amendment than total incorporation. Supra note 413.
676. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (discussing Slaughter-House Cases). Because the
rights of national citizenship already existed as part of the relationship of the citizen to the national
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historical support for a reading of the 6due
process clause that encompasses
77
substantive as well as procedural rights.
The Court's rulings also suggest that the second concern, avoiding vague
standards that might invite subjective decisionmaking, was far from a dominant factor in the shaping of the fourteenth amendment standards. Although
the fundamental fairness doctrine was frequently criticized as leading to subjective judgments, the Court has refused to reject completely the potentially
subjective elements of that doctrine. The "ordered liberty" standard remains a
part of the selective incorporation doctrine. The Court continues to utilize
what is essentially a fundamental fairness standard when it looks to the due
process clause to find constitutional protections that extend beyond the specifics of particular guarantees. Many of its post-incorporation due process rulings rest on a standard of overall fairness, tied to the circumstances of the
particular case.678 Indeed, the Court has kept alive the possibility that, as in
Rochin, a police practice may be deemed "so outrageous" as to violate due
process on that ground alone. 679 Finally, decisions based on specific guarantees have not infrequently adopted standards that are as flexible and require as
much case-by-case
balancing of varied interests as the traditional fundamental
680
fairness analysis.
The third and fourth concerns, providing broad protection of individual liberties and giving appropriate recognition to the principles of federalism, have
undoubtedly had the greatest influence upon the development of fourteenth
amendment standards. The Court of the 1960's struck a different balance than
its predecessors in weighing those concerns, and it was that difference that produced the selective incorporation doctrine. For the pre-1960's Court, which
government, state interference with those rights would be barred, even in the absence of the fourteenth
amendment, as an interference with the function of the federal government. See Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (states may not impose tax for privilege of passing through state; citizens
have right to travel freely throughout country). Thus, the Slaughter-House decision has been described
as rendering the privileges and immunities clause "technically superfluous." Tribe, supra note 30, at
423; see also E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 965 (5th ed. 1953)
($laughter-House rendered privileges and immunities clause "practical nullity"); supra text accompany-

.ipg notes 48-57 (discussing probable intent of framers to incorporate Coeld concept of privileges and
immunities).
677. See supra note 158 (citing readings discussing scope of due process clause); J. ELY, supra note
34, at 18 (due process clause suggests application only to procedure).
678. See supra notes 473-75 and accompanying text (discussing ruling based on circumstances-ofthe-case analysis). In at least one instance the Court has turned to a "circumstances-of-the-case" analysis of due process even though the state practices under consideration arguably fell within the general
area regulated by specific Bill of Rights guarantees. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302

(1972) (restrictions of cross-examination and introduction of hearsay testimony constituted violation of
due process under facts and circumstances of case; no need to determine if fifth amendment right of
confrontation and sixth amendment right to compulsory process violated).
679. The Court in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), noted that the Court might some
day be presented with a situation of entrapment activity "so outrageous" that due process principles
would bar prosecution without regard to the traditional standards of entrapment, and cited Rochin by
analogy. Id at 431-32; cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.9 (1980) (outrageous police
conduct violates due process).
680. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (balancing four factors in determining whether
defendant denied constitutional right to speedy trial); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514-15
(1978) (balancing interests in determining whether double jeopardy bars retrial following declaration of
mistrial). But 5f Nowak, Due Process Mfethodology in the PostincorporationWorld, 70 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 397, 400-01 (1979) (arguing that decisions based on specific guarantees tend to rely on
definitional analysis and fail to fully explore the interests at stake).
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gave more weight to the interests of federalism, the fundamental fairness doctrine was obviously preferred because it readily allowed greater leeway to the
state systems. For the Court of the 1960's, which gave greater weight to expanding the protection of the accused, the selective incorporation doctrine was
preferred; it made immediately available a large body of federal precedent that
extended the rights of the 68accused substantially beyond the fundamental fairness decisions of the past. '
Although fundamental fairness favored one concern and selective incorporation favored the other, each doctrine was sufficiently flexible to strike a new
balance within its own framework. The fundamental fairness decisions of the
post 1930's managed to move substantially beyond earlier decisions in protecting the accused, and the Justices who supported that doctrine in the 1960's
managed to reach many of the same results as the majority that relied on selective incorporation. Similarly, as the Burger Court decisions have shown, selective incorporation does not preclude a renewed emphasis on allowing leeway
for diversity in local settings and recognition of the value of experimentation.
In the end, the fifth concern, providing guidance for the state courts, may
have proven the most significant factor, if not in the adoption, at least in the
retention of selective incorporation. A Justice may view selective incorporation as not sufficiently flexible to allow appropriate deference to local concerns,
yet conclude that the doctrine's administrative advantage may do more to promote a vital federalist system than occasional rulings relieving the states of the
obligation of following certain constitutional standards applicable to the federal government. The additional degree of certainty about the nature of constitutional regulation arguably will mean far more to the state desiring to
shape its process to fit its own needs than the Supreme Court's willingness to
give the state slightly greater leeway at the fringes of that regulation.

681. Arguably, reference to the particular guarantees requires a more expansive reading of the individual liberties even without regard to prior precedent because the language and history of those uarantees provide a "preordained balance of interests," while the fundamental fairness analysis permits "a

present balancing in which interests clearly protected by the Constitution are forfeited on behalf of
'contravening considerations.'" Chase, supra note 594, at 573. But cf.supra note 625 (discussing different approaches to interpretation available under either doctrine). Consider also Professor Nowak's

statement:
Those who argued, as did Justice Black, that this process of incorporation would limit the
discretion of the Justices, were mistaken. There is no way to avoid making interpretative
decisions on issues relating to topics arguably covered by the Bill of Rights when there is no
historic guidance on, nor simple textual resolution of, the issue. States simply do not appear

in the Supreme Court of the United States asking for the ability to conduct unreasonable
searches without warrants or probable cause, to force defendants to incriminate themselves

against their will, to exclude counsel from criminal proceedings, to eliminate juries in criminal
cases, or to try defendants twice for the same crime. Yet only such claims could be resolved

easily by an appeal to the Bill of Rights.
Nowak, supra note 680, at 400.
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